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by Jayatilleke de Silva

We are living at a time when the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed three years ago has been stretched to the maximum. According to some commentators, the CFA has already collapsed. Others predict its imminent collapse and resumption of Elaam War IV. While one could debate how far these predictions are accurate everybody is agreed that the escalation of CFA violations does pose a serious threat to its very existence.

The Norwegian facilitators, the Co-Chairs, India and other friendly countries, have specifically pointed this out.

The assassinations, claymore mine attacks and accompanying street demonstrations and hartals have created a sense of uncertainty in the minds of the public. This has generated a fear psychosis among the population, especially in the Northeast.

Various media analysts and Opposition politicians have added fuel to the fire by their predictions of imminent war and the creation of war hysteria. The conduct of the LTTE and its proxy the TNA does not provide any ground to allay these fears. On the contrary they enhance the fear. The Government, on the other hand, has displayed maximum restraint despite provocation.

In actual fact a low intensity undeclared war is going on. This calls for restraint from both parties to the conflict. It also underlines the urgency of two parties meeting each other, first to de-escalate the situation and then to review the operation of the CFA. Ground level meetings between the combatants are an urgent need if the situation is to be de-escalated. Religious dignitaries as well as the SLMM have already called for such contacts.

If one recalls the situation immediately prior to the signing of the CFA one would see that the war had come to a position in which neither side could defeat the other. Despite the early setbacks that saw the LTTE running over with ease government military installations right up to Jaffna city limits, it was not possible for the Tigers to re-capture Jaffna. It is this military stalemate and not the goodwill or the skills of Velupillai Prabhakaran or Ranil Wickremesinghe that gave rise to the ceasefire.

The present deterioration in the security situation is due to the apprehension by both sides that the military balance has tipped in favour of the enemy.

It is true that the LTTE has been able to increase its military cadres and amass weapons and ammunition utilising the conditions that were generated by the CFA. The opportunity it received to engage in political activities within the government controlled areas were also used by them to expand their base and theatre of operations. This gave rise to justifiable apprehensions on the government side. trend in global politics

Similarly the development of military cooperation between the government and the US as well as the negotiations on a Defence Agreement with India has given rise to justifiable apprehensions within the LTTE.

Despite these apprehensions and possible changes in the relative military strength between the two belligerent parties the status quo remains in the main and there cannot be a successful conclusion to any military adventure by either side.

This makes it imperative for both sides to pursue a negotiated settlement. In spite of the belligerent rhetoric and violence the present moment is impregnated with the best opportunity for pursuing peace. Even the LTTE leader has acknowledged President Rajapakse as a pragmatic politician.

His approach to peace is based on the search for a Southern consensus. He alone of the Southern politicians could command the allegiance of diverse sections of the Southern polity. Paraphrasing Charles Dickens we could define the present moment as 'the best of times, the worst of times'.

I would like to dwell on certain home truths or undeniable factors that should be kept in mind in the quest for a durable peace in our beloved country.

The first is a discerning trend in global politics where internal armed conflicts are increasingly resolved through negotiations instead of by military means. We could cite the Aceh peace accord as an example. Further Columbian guerrillas of the ELN are negotiating peace with the government in Havana. In India there is a truce between the Naga rebels and the government preceding talks.

Even the problematic peace accord between the UK government and the IRA had got fresh impetus following the latter's agreement to decommission weapons. The international community would treat the pursuance of the military option by any side to the conflict as unwanted stepping out of the line. The strengthening of international opinion against the use of terror also provides a healthy external environment towards a negotiated peace.

The second factor to be kept in mind is that the international community has come forward to guarantee the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. That means no state from the United States to India would recognise an independent state of Thamil Elaam. In the present context of globalization no country could stand isolated without becoming a partner in the international division of labour and international trade and commerce.

Economically it would not be sustainable. The fundamental mistake committed by the LTTE was the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. It shut the door to even the remotest possibility of even Indian moral support for a separate state. Besides India's own interests would preclude such a possibility anyway.

However, this is not an all time guarantee. If the Sri Lankan government opts for a military solution, which would certainly entail scorching earth practices world reaction would turn against it. That means the equation would be reversed to our disadvantage. Hence the international guarantee of our territorial integrity is linked to the conduct of a correct policy on the national question.

It is also necessary here to dispel the illusion that foreign powers, whether it were the United States or India would assist us militarily in the event of a war with the LTTE. It is to be understood that all governments base their policies on their own national interest.

The Indian central government comprises several parties in Tamil Nadu that are supportive of the LTTE. Public opinion in Tamil Nadu is against direct Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict. Moreover, India has already burnt its fingers during he IPKF involvement in the conflict. The IPKF came to Sri Lanka as peacekeepers and they were pushed into fighting a war with the LTTE.

Ultimately they were unceremoniously kicked out after much sacrifice by the Indian jawans. Once bitten twice shy. They would not intervene unless their own interests are threatened and even then it would be only to the extent of neutralising that threat.

This Indian position was well stated by Nirupama Subramanium in a Leader page article in The Hindu recently. Referring to the proposed Indo - Sri Lanka defence agreement she says: "the draft of the agreement suggests only the formalising of existing cooperation between the two defence establishments. It is certainly not an Indian commitment for on the ground assistance to Sri Lanka in case of a war with the LTTE".

Southern consensus

President Rajapakse's effort to arrive at a Southern consensus is welcome. It is imperative if a durable solution is to be negotiated. However, the outcome of negotiations would depend on the nature of that consensus. Negotiations mean compromise, give and take.

A Southern consensus could be a point of origin or departure for negotiations just as the LTTE had placed the ISGA as their point of origin. It would also be useful if the consensus includes how far the negotiating team could go in compromises.

There is also much talk about following given models for devolution. Some call for the Indian model - an example of a federal structure. Others call for the UK model- an example of devolution within a unitary state. Still others would want to emulate a European or a Nordic model.

What is actually necessary is a unique Sri Lankan model negotiated by all stakeholders. In Sri Lanka two words have become taboo between the two estranged communities. While the word federal is anathema to Sinhala politicians the Tamils would reject in to any unitary structure as being too limited.

It is best to leave nomenclature aside and start negotiating and framing a Constitution that would contain aspects of both systems unitary and federal. In the modern world there are no totally federal or totally unitary states.

We have to take into account that we are negotiating devolution after two decades of a war in which thousands sacrificed their lives on both sides. Structures framed and instituted in other countries in the past with diverse experience may not be adequate for Sri Lanka at present.

Even our international friends would like to see a solution that fulfills the aspirations of all communities. We have to read the fine print in the reports of President Rajapakse's visit to India. While President Rajapakse reiterated his commitment to maximum devolution within a unitary state President Abdul Kalam while appreciating that stand said India was ready to share with Colombo its experience of unity in diversity, pluralist traditions in a democracy and devolution within a federal framework.

Nirupama Subramanium was more explicit. She wrote; "The Sri Lankan political establishment must think seriously of a federal solution, because that is the only answer to the LTTE's separatism. This should be India's most important message to the visiting President of Sri Lanka."

Devolution has to be coupled with sharing power at the centre. Otherwise devolution could give momentum to centrifugal forces that would end up in division of the country. Unfortunately this aspect has not been given adequate thought still. What is important is to work out modalities of power sharing at the centre simultaneous with devolution of power to the periphery.

In India we are witnessing a healthy power sharing at the centre where many regional parties are at the helm in New Delhi at times occupying even vital posts of Prime Minister and important economic portfolios.

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