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Peace holds in Sri Lanka, for the time being

by V. S. Sambandan

The Geneva talks represent a small, hesitant step away from a relapse into war. It is critical for Colombo and the LTTE to remain engaged. "Politics," Chairman Mao famously said in 1938, "is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed." Sri Lanka's latest politics of war and peace was set in an Alpine chateau in Switzerland, where the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ended yet another round of direct talks on Thursday.

The Geneva talks, which coincided with the fourth anniversary of the ceasefire agreement (CFA), were more about politics than the immediate prospects of conflict resolution. The main outcome - the two sides will meet again in Geneva in April - is that the prospect of the island relapsing into war has seemingly waned, momentarily. In effect, it represents the continuation of the holding operation.

Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim's declaration announced no major breakthrough. None was expected either.

The commitments fall under two categories: those jointly made by the Government and the LTTE and those specific to each party. By themselves, the commitments do not foretell a big change in the near-term. It is in the minutiae of the CFA that there are clauses of concern in the medium and long terms that could determine the nature of post-conflict northeastern Sri Lanka.

The joint commitments include "respecting and upholding the ceasefire agreement" and taking "all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no intimidation, acts of violence, abductions or killings." The LTTE has committed itself to taking "all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no acts of violence against the security forces and police." Colombo will "take all necessary measures in accordance with the CFA to ensure that no armed group or person other than [the] government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations." To a large extent, these outcomes conformed to the expectation in the run-up to the two-day talks.

Implementation the key

Inasmuch as the talks were consistent with the razor-thin agenda of discussing implementation issues, the spirit with which the outcomes are implemented will hold the key to the continued status of a "negative peace." At a broad level, the implication of the Geneva commitments is that they could help in Sri Lanka staying the CFA course, which has translated into the longest period of non-fighting between the state and the rebels. Much of how the situation evolves will, however, depend on how close they stay to the Geneva commitments. Any "euphoria" over the "success" in Geneva is best tempered with a reality check. The talks and their outcome conform to certain patterns in the continual tragic dynamics of war and peace in Sri Lanka.

As in the past, the LTTE bombed its way to the negotiating table. The sharp escalation in violence since early December last and the implied threat of pushing Sri Lanka over the edge were in tune with its carefully nurtured image - it would not do business with the state from a position of weakness. The Tigers' main demand at Geneva - that "paramilitaries" be disarmed - conforms to a well-reasoned conclusion that conflict resolution issues will take the backseat as long as the LTTE's immediate issue is not settled.

In the current context, it is the rebellion by its former special commander for Batticaloa-Amparai, V. Muralitharan (`Col.' Karuna). What was initially termed an "internal issue" of the Tigers became embarrassingly difficult for the LTTE to accept as a continued challenge. It has, therefore, clubbed other former militant groups and a nascent Muslim group with the "Karuna group" and wants the Government to disarm them.

From Colombo's perspective, the CFA talks will help President Mahinda Rajapakse's Government move towards an image makeover. Internationally, Mr. Rajapakse is seen more through the prism of his main allies in the Presidential poll - the unitarist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the hardline Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU).

The ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which criticised the CFA, when it was signed by the then Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, and LTTE chief V. Prabakaran, also made its point at Geneva. It maintained that the CFA was unconstitutional and outside the law, but reiterated its commitment to "respect and uphold" the document. By doing so, it has kept open the slim possibility of reverting to its original position that the CFA should be "reviewed." However, as a review of the document will depend on the consent of both the Government and the LTTE, the possibility has not yet presented itself. The broad endorsement by both sides of the CFA points to the necessity of the document in the current context.

What then are the prospects for peace? The answer lies in how the Geneva commitments are adhered to. The Government and the LTTE could differ on the spirit behind their commitments.

It is here key domestic and international dynamics come into play. The military space gained from Geneva gives the LTTE time to "neutralise" its most serious internal challenge posed by Col. Karuna's rebellion. At a larger domestic level, much will depend on how Mr. Rajapakse convinces his hardline allies on the need to stay the CFA course. The entrenchment of the CFA in its present form could weigh in favour of the LTTE in its control over land territory - an outstanding issue for the rebels being the right to sea passage.

The timing of the next round of Geneva talks is significant. With elections to the Tamil Nadu Assembly coming around the same time, how the LTTE plays its cards could be linked to this critical external dynamic.

A pattern

The current talks are different from the six rounds held between September 2002 and March 2003. Seasoned negotiators point to a particular pattern in the past. The LTTE veers away from the track when a convergence of views between the two sides for a solution within a united Sri Lanka seems possible.

The pullout from talks is invariably followed by a period of strain - in all instances save the latest one, outright war - after which negotiations restart.

This has been the pattern through the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the Premadasa parleys, the Kumaratunga devolution debates and the Wickremesinghe peace talks. As the Rajapakse Government starts its peace talks, it is also critical that there is continuity in the key political concepts of the Kumaratunga-Wickremesinghe peace talks.

If Ms. Kumaratunga's Government set the stage for far seeking devolution of political powers, Mr. Wickremesinghe's administration successfully managed a commitment from the state and the LTTE to "explore federal models" for conflict resolution within a united Sri Lanka. Mr. Rajapakse, through his "practical measures," hopes to bring about a solution to the decades-long ethnic conflict. In doing so, it is critical to factor in the successes from the past and utilise the institutional knowledge that is available within Sri Lanka's political and administrative machinery.

The Geneva talks represent a small, hesitant step away from a relapse into war. Rather than count hits and misses, what is important is to set the Geneva developments against the larger prospects for peace, and more critically, the nature of the evolving peace. The one consistency in Sri Lanka's elusive search for peace is the recognition that a solution lies in politics - war without bloodshed.

While it is critical that this political engagement process between the Government and the LTTE should continue, it is equally important that the long-term gaze remains set on a lasting political solution that will bring decades of bloodshed to an end in which all its people share a common nation-state with dignity.

- Courtesy Hindu

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