Israel seeks hint of victory
Israel's move to greatly increase its ground forces in Lebanon a day
before it is expected to accept a cease-fire has two goals: to damage
Hezbollah as much as possible and to conclude the conflict with
something that could be called a victory for an Israeli government under
domestic pressure.
Having begun the war by proclaiming that the aim was the destruction
and disarmament of Hezbollah, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will be able to
claim only that Hezbollah is badly hurt and, with the help of
international troops, effectively restrained - even without the robust
new international force or disarming of the militia that Israel
initially demanded.
In this last army push, which many here regard as too late to make a
big difference, Mr. Olmert wants to ensure that the Iranian-backed
militia and its stockpiles are at least cleared out of southern Lebanon.
The hope is that inhabitants of the north will be able to return home
or emerge from bomb shelters without the daily fear of rocket fire. The
Israeli cabinet was scheduled to meet Sunday to discuss a United Nations
Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire. But the Israeli
Army will be pressing forward if not beyond, trying to destroy Hezbollah
rockets and assets. That is a task that Israel does not believe the
Lebanese Army, even accompanied by an expanded United Nations force,
will dare to do. Mishandling the war

Sheik Hassan Nasrallah |

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert |
Mr. Olmert and his defense minister, Amir Peretz, have been wounded
by the perception that they mishandled the war and were overly reluctant
to commit sizable ground forces when there was enough time to accomplish
the government's stated goals. The life of the government is likely to
have been shortened.
The debate in Israel has not been over the war's legitimacy - that is
widely accepted. The attacks on the government have been over its
handling of the assault.
In a familiar pattern of backbiting - the best indication that the
war has not gone well - the army leadership is complaining that the
politicians did not let the military do its job, and the politicians are
complaining that the army promised that the task could be accomplished
in a week or two and largely with air power.
As usual in Israel, the army is more popular than the politicians,
and it is bound to win the argument. But the army's performance against
Hezbollah will lead to considerable introspection and criticism about
failures in strategic analysis, intelligence, training and preparedness,
especially among the reserves.
There will also be sharp criticism of governmental preparedness, with
the image of many thousands of poorer Israelis huddling for a month in
decrepit bomb shelters with inadequate public services and supplies.
Mr. Olmert, who leads the centrist Kadima Party, is going to face a
postwar onslaught from the right, in particular from Benjamin Netanyahu.
Mr. Netanyahu, the Likud Party leader, favored a major military
operation to destroy what he called "an Iranian army division" fighting
in "a war conceived, organized, trained and equipped by Iran, with
Iran's goal of destroying Israel and its fantasy ideology of building a
once-glorious Muslim empire in which we are merely the first pit stop."
There is more of this talk to come, and from another rival on the
right: Avigdor Lieberman, who is already very popular among the Russians
who make up a large number of the Jewish Israelis living in the north,
many of whom were too poor to seek shelter in southern towns.
Mr. Olmert's plan to extend the policy of unilateralism by removing
up to 70,000 Israeli settlers from the West Bank, behind the separation
barrier, also appears moribund. The rocket wars have made the barrier
look flimsy, and one year after Ariel Sharon and Mr. Olmert pulled 9,000
Israeli settlers out of Gaza unilaterally, many onetime supporters of
the plan say that critics like Mr. Netanyahu appear to have been correct
- that the disengagement provided little security or stability.
The plan to hand over more territory in the West Bank to a Hamas-led
Palestinian Authority that could use more sophisticated rockets to hit
Tel Aviv is now being dismissed as folly by many in the center, not just
on the right - an unexpected gift to the settler movement.
"A year after the withdrawal of Gaza, there is a huge 'I told you so'
hanging in the air, and it's hard to argue with, when Qassams are still
flying out of Gaza and nothing has moved forward," said Tom Segev, an
Israeli historian. "Like Oslo, Gaza disengagement was a good idea, but
it was managed very badly. But instead of criticizing the management, we
criticize the thing itself."
Itamar Rabinovich, a former ambassador to Washington, said bluntly:
"Two notions have died. First, unilateralism, and second, separation by
the fence. Missiles dwarf the fence."
Israelis also fear there has been damage done to their relationship
with the United States, where some may complain that the Israelis were
given time to clobber Hezbollah and did not get the job done.
Mr. Rabinovich is more sanguine. "Part of the reckoning will be our
reputation as a strategic partner, when we tell the Americans, 'Give us
the tools and we'll do the job,'" he said. "Part of our self-image is of
military miracle workers, and we didn't do that this time."
Still, he said, Lebanon reinforces Israel's view that the real danger
in the region is Iran, Hezbollah's patron, and that the threat of a
nuclear-armed Iran is aimed at Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan too. For
Mr. Segev, the Lebanese war seems like a side show to Israel's main and
persisting problem: the Palestinians. Israel still faces a crisis in
Gaza, including the unknown fate of a soldier captured June 25, and
unresolved disputes over the Hamas-led government.
"This war is a huge detour from the real problem, like an accident
that shouldn't have happened," Mr. Segev said. "The Palestinian problem
persists, and again the government looks to be bad managers."
(New York Times)
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