The need for a national consensus: Issues and challenges

By Professor G. L. Peiris

There is considerable public interest today in the current attempt to work towards a national consensus on the ethnic issue and other urgent problems. A brief analysis of the policy matters relevant to the developing situation is probably of some value. The search for a national consensus in respect of issues of public importance has been found necessary in many countries during periods of crisis or renewal. When South Africa was struggling to be reborn in the interim phase of a delicate and complex peace process in 1993-96, with the formation of a Government of National Unity bringing within its fold political parties across the spectrum, a national consensus was sought - and achieved - as a point of departure.

In India, when the Congress led by Shrimathi Sonia Gandhi was elected in 2004, she took the initiative, with success, in forming an alliance with no fewer than fourteen other political groupings. The framework within which this consensus was accomplished, derived from the document entitled “A National Minimum Common Programme” published by the Government of India in May 2004.

The advantages

At this moment in our history there is an overwhelming groundswell of opinion in all sectors of civil society that a consensual approach to
national issues on the part of the major political parties is not merely useful but absolutely essential if progress is to be achieved with regard to the basic needs of the country at this time - the peace process and the development of the economy.

This is a matter of undeniable practical experience: successive governments since 1958 have attempted in good faith to formulate and implement a solution at the political level to Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem, only to be thwarted by the principal party in Opposition at any given time. Blame for this cannot justly be placed at the door of any one political party or group: it has been a persistent and recurring pattern throughout half a century, bringing in its wake tragic consequences which are all too evident in our midst today. This realization has prompted the vast majority of the public to call for, and support strenuously, a firm resolve in the main political parties to put behind them the bitterness and recriminations of the past.

The strident demand at this time is for the replacement of the confrontational political culture of the past, for which society as a whole has paid far too heavy a price, by an attitude to the resolution of national problems founded upon consensus.

Leaders of religions, the professional and academic community, trade unions and the business sector are today at the vanguard of a movement determined to promote a fundamental change in the texture and quality of the politics of Sri Lanka.

Fears and constraints

If this is to become a reality, we have to address some of the fears and constraints which continue to be articulated by segments of society, and to understand why these inhibitions are devoid of any rational basis.

Surrender or Abdication of Party Policy

It is argued by some that a practical collaborative arrangement between the Government and the major Opposition party necessarily entails surrender or abdication of the policy of each participating group, and that this is likely to be particularly harmful to the Opposition because it is embarking on negotiations with a party which has at its disposal the full gamut of State power.

This fear, genuinely entertained in some quarters, is entirely unfounded. A consensus should involve a meeting of minds within a framework of principle, not expediency. Its objective is to enable political parties with different perceptions and points of view, to engage in a search for common ground in a spirit of fidelity to their own distinct identity, culture and values. Neither party swallows up the other: each contributes to the emergence of a consensus from the perspective of its own vision and traditions.

If other countries, in similar circumstances, have attained at least moderate success in this effort, there is no reason why our own country, fortified by the uniquely high quality of its human resources and the vibrancy of its democratic traditions, should be found wanting.

Policy Differences: A hindrance?

The view is sometimes expressed that a large overlap of substantive policy is necessary for a collaborative arrangement of this kind to be worked out successfully, and that sharp differences of opinion in crucial areas of policy between the governing party and the main Opposition party makes this ask impractical.

The premise of this objection, I believe, is wrong, because in the two areas which are of the greatest concern at this time - the peace process and the economy - the thinking of the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party is not incapable of reconciliation. In any event, divergence with regard to political opinion is no impediment to working together. Margaret Thatcher publicly declared that she found it a pleasure to do business with Mikhail Gorbachev. Relations with Beijing were initiated by none other than Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, two of the most conservative among American public figures.

Partisan Advantage

I have heard the objection raised that support for the Government, not only in terms of numbers in Parliament but through the infusion of insights and expertise of the United National Party, will inevitably strengthen the Government, with corresponding detriment to the United National Party and its supporters. The argument is that, if this support contributes in significant measure to accomplishment of the objectives of the Government, especially in respect of the peace process and invigoration of the economy, the Government will be able to reap the benefits abundantly at a general election, were it to be held in the near future.
This is not necessarily true.

It must be remembered that Clement Attlee joined Winston Churchill in running the administration in Britain during the Second World War, but Churchill, having won the war as Prime Minister, had to concede defeat at the polls soon afterwards. The public of Sri Lanka is sufficiently well informed and mature to realize that a monopoly of credit for the achievements of a government administered in partnership, whatever its form and the degree of participation by the different parties, cannot be claimed convincingly by one side alone.

In any event, the objection based on partisan advantage is hardly tenable or worthy of acceptance because the national interest is indisputably the governing consideration in this situation.

Exclusivity: A mirage

There are supporters of each Party who claim that, if the Party is convinced that its policies will lead to a durable settlement of the ethnic problem and rejuvenation of the economy, there is little or no reason to collaborate with the other Party in working towards these goals. This argument overlooks the reality, reinforced by the empirical experience of many decades, that neither party, in isolation, has been able to achieve substantial success in these daunting tasks in the face of obstruction by the rival party. There is the further consideration relating to the amplitude of power vested by Sri Lanka’s Constitution in the Executive Presidency.

II : Modalities

It is appropriate, in view of the depth and intensity of public support for the concept of a national consensus, to examine modalities which I would suggest as helpful for this purpose.

A common national agenda

I am convinced that the way forward lies through identification and development of the issues comprising a common national agenda. The trust of the effort is to arrive at agreement on the substance of a cluster of minimum policies to be implemented jointly by the political parties which are signatories to the agreement. The situation envisaged is admittedly more complex than one in which the formulation of policy is the sole prerogative of one party. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the challenge is too formidable for the leadership of the major political parties in our country, provided that some salutary guidelines and approaches are borne in mind.

Preconditions: Useful or counter- productive?

The crux of the problem is to reconcile two competing considerations. On the one hand, each party has its own identity, vision and value system. On the other hand, both parties are acutely mindful of the magnitude of the current crisis and the paramount need for thinking out of the box. A realistic balance has to be struck between these factors.

A minimum common programme, by its very nature, requires willingness to give and take. It cannot, on either side, be all of one and none of the other. Clearly, one party cannot be expected to adopt, in its entirety, the policy of the other. The common programme or agenda has to be so crafted as to reflect, in its provisions, a blend of the policies of both, ensuring that the core values intrinsic to each party are not violated and that the text, as drafted, enables a reasonable level of comfort on both sides.

This can be achieved only if each party has the fullest opportunity to stipulate the components of policy which it regards as fundamental in a variety of sectors, and to insist that these elements find expression, in a suitable form, in the draft of the common agenda. It does not follow, however, that this objective is best attained by means of a series of conditions which are insisted upon at the threshold. In my view, the successful formulation of a common agenda is not facilitated but jeopardized by the insistence of one party that the other should accept a host of conditions, before they agree to sit together at the negotiating table to a corner. Not only is a hard position taken at the outset, but this position is made public. This necessarily leads to polarization even before commencement of the substantive dialogue, and the space for manoeuvre is consequently reduced almost to vanishing point.

This consideration is of particular relevant in a culture such as ours, where loss of face is an overriding deterrent. When an intransigent position is adopted and announced in advance, the party doing so deprives itself of the capability to soften or modify that position credibly during subsequent discussion, and the utility of direct discussion is thereby greatly diminished. This should be avoided by dispensing with threshold conditions and taking up the issues which are crucial to the parties, once the dialogue has begun. Adequate scope for flexibility and resilience is indispensable for productive negotiation. There is every justification for conditions being imposed prior to agreement being reached; but there is no legitimate ground for resorting to conditions as a means of forestalling the beginning of a dialogue.

Prioritization

It needs to be emphasized that what is aimed at is a minimum, not a comprehensive, common agenda. This necessarily calls for prioritization. It is neither essential nor feasible to traverse the entire spectrum of policy issues in search of global agreement on all matters which had previously proved contentious between the parties. A selective approach is mandatory. The issues which are demonstrably compelling in the current national context need to be identified, and mediating techniques perspectively applied with a view to reaching consensus on a limited range of matters going to the root of the present crisis. This area, involving issues crucial to the nation, should be carved out initially. Differences of opinion in respect of peripheral matters should not militate against progress towards formulation of the common agenda.

Avoidance of tension at the grass roots

It is of vital importance that every attempt be made, during the sensitive period of negotiation, to prevent tensions at the grass roots level from hindering the continuity of the dialogue. The success of the negotiation will depend not only on its inherent terms, its format and the modalities employed, but even more on effective control of antagonisms among party cadres in respect of matters not falling within the purview of the discussion. This is why it is crucial, for the purpose of bringing about an atmosphere conducive to productivity of the dialogue, that there should be no room for bitterness engendered by such acts as the harassment of party supporters, unwarranted transfer or loss of employment, controversial arrests and denial of legitimate benefits.

The applicable time frame The consensual arrangement between the parties should be time-bound. Its operation is restricted to the minimum period required for attainment of urgent national objectives. The common agenda represents an exceptional response to a special situation and involves a departure from the norm. As the immediacy of that situation and involves a departure from the norm. As the immediacy of that situation fades away, the norm can be re-established.

The parties can then go their separate ways and contest each other at elections without any impediment. However, a calamity of the gravest proportions would have been averted in the meantime, and for this the nation will no doubt be grateful.