Nuclear charades

N. Korea tests; the world whimpers; the U.N. 'acts' - and then we better build a better missile defense. It's not clear why North Korea testing a nuclear weapon set the world's teeth on edge.

After all, it was already universally assumed that North Korea had nuclear weapons. North Korea is no more dangerous after the test than before. In fact, given how small the detonation apparently was, the test may actually indicate that North Korea is not as far along in developing its nuclear capability as previously thought.

Nevertheless, the world's teeth are set on edge, and that's a good thing. Perhaps it will lead to some realistic thinking about North Korea specifically and about the tattered non-proliferation regimen in general. First, however, the world will play the United Nations charade. The United States will ask for tough sanctions to punish and deter North Korea. The Security Council will either not adopt them or not enforce them.

This is an utter waste of time and energy. With respect to leverage on North Korea, there are only two countries that count: primarily China and secondarily South Korea. China provides about a third of North Korea's food and virtually all of its fuel. China's aggressive anti-refugee policy keeps the North Korean population captive. South Korea is also an important source of food and a potential large investor in North Korea's infrastructure.

Less troublesome

Before the nuclear test, both counties had apparently concluded that a nuclear North Korea was less troublesome than an imploding North Korea. While the test shook things up politically in South Korea, there's nothing in the test itself that changes that strategic calculation.

There have been renewed calls for the United States to have a direct dialogue with North Korea. The Bush administration's policy of putting problematic governments in the deep freeze has not produced any noticeable benefits. The United States should maintain diplomatic relations with any governments that want them, including North Korea.

Nothing, however, is going to come, or should come, from such direct discussions. What North Korea wants from the United States are security guarantees and possibly financial assistance. It would be imprudent for the United States to provide either one.

The security anxieties of the Kim Jong-il regime are not entirely irrational. President Bush did name it as a member of the axis of evil, one of whose members was invaded and dislodged. The administration clearly would like to facilitate regime change.

Nuclear weapons are a powerful deterrent to conventional military attack. North Korea, however, is a true proliferation threat - including to terrorist organizations - and would remain so regardless of the policies pursued by the American government.

It will never agree to the sort of rigorous inspections necessary to verify an agreement involving security guarantees. And the current regime is inherently untrustworthy.

Financial pressure

On the economic front, what North Korea wants immediately is relief from the financial pressure the United States is putting on its counterfeiting operation. The United States, however, can't countenance a debasement of its currency. And there's no reason to ask the American taxpayer to underwrite such a reprehensible regime.

Realistically, North Korea is going to be brought to heel only if China decides to bring it to heel. The U.N. Security Council, direct dialogue with the United States, even the six-party talks are all sideshows.

The United States would like U.N. approval of an inspections and interdiction program directed at North Korea's potential proliferation threat. That's unlikely to happen, meaning continued reliance on the Proliferation Security Initiative, a sort of interdiction patrol of the willing that has been reasonably successful.

The one concrete step the United States could take, both with respect to North Korea and nuclear proliferation in general, is a much more robust program of missile defense deployment, research and distribution.

Missile defense can rob new nuclear states of the offensive leverage the bomb can provide, more important in Iran's case than in North Korea's. It also offers the most hope of keeping other nations, otherwise reluctant to go nuclear, from feeling compelled to do so as their own deterrent.

The United States and Japan are already cooperating on missile defense. However, the United States could do a lot more to make theater land-based missile defenses available to other countries and to increase deployment of a sea-based American capability that can intercept missiles midcourse.

And that's with existing, on-the-shelf technology. Research into boost-phase interception capability, when missiles are most vulnerable, also needs to be augmented and accelerated. A more robust missile defense program would cost billions a year, not tens of billions. And it would tilt the strategic balance away from rogue states and proliferation.

That's far from a wholly satisfactory response to North Korea having the bomb. However, unlike all the U.N. maneuvering and international diplomatic game playing, it would result in something meaningful getting done.

(AP)