Mahinda Pathirana's The Wikileaks Period (Wikileaks
Horawa):
The end of new liberal domination and the rise of Asia as the
turning point of post-modernism
by Prof Rajiva Wijesinha
(Excerpts of the keynote address delivered by Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha
at the launch of Mahinda Pathirana's Wikileaks Horawa)
It is an inadequacy in our university system that few academics feel
the need to write and share their knowledge with the world. In the
Faculty of Social Sciences at Sabaragamuwa we did quite well on this,
and I am happy to see here Manoj Ariyaratne and Saman Handaragama and
Sunil Senevi who have written so well, in addition to Mahinda Pathirana
who wrote the Wikileaks Horawa.
I have some points of disagreement with Mahinda as to the content. In
the first place, I object to his dismissive use of the term
Neo-Liberalism - just as I was disappointed when Sunil Senevi spoke of
the dichotomy between Liberal Capitalism and Marxism, as though these
were the only two political philosophies that obtained.
This is to ignore the importance of Liberalism, the most apt
philosophy for today's world but one which is sadly ignored in Sri Lanka
- perhaps in part because the Liberal Party is not very effective in
propagating its philosophy. Even the President referred in Parliament
yesterday to the gamut of political ideas represented in Parliament,
ranging from Liberal to Progressive, whereas Liberalism - as opposed to
what is termed Neo-Liberalism - is the most progressive doctrine there
is, since it promotes development as well as equity.
Unfortunately, in Sri Lanka, as a facet perhaps of the period in
which we got our independence, we know only of Capitalism and Communism.
Those were the days of the Cold War, and confrontational politics. When
Bandaranaike started the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, it was to follow the
Middle Way between these two extremes but sadly, perhaps because he and
his successors were pushed leftward by the forces of the right that
wanted to make them ineffective, the SLFP ended up advocating Statist
Socialism, with what seemed essential coalitions with Marxists.
Change
Following an extreme version of this in the seventies, there was a
change, we had only the unbridled capitalism, the cronyism, of the
Jayewardene years. It took many years before we reached the consensus
that we now have, an understanding that statist socialism will not work
if we are to have development, and that the engine of growth must be
private enterprise; but also that, left to itself, this will lead to
marginalization of the worst off, and it must be accompanied by strong
social policies to promote equal opportunities.
This balance for instance is what the Chairman of the University
Grants Commission, in line with the policies developed by the dynamic
Minister of Higher Education and his Secretary, is trying to achieve
through University Reform - more opportunities for higher education
through harnessing the energies of the private sector and creating
institutions from which those now shut out can benefit, while at the
same time preserving and expanding free places through the state system
as well as through scholarships to private institutions. We have to
remember after all that, in guarding free education, we have to make
sure that the education that is provided is of a high standard and takes
modern developments into account to ensure excellence.
Liberalism
Though this is recognized, and the present government provides a
practical and effective example of liberalism - which the government of
President Kumaratunga also aimed at, though not so effectively given its
relative neglect of rural areas - the underlying philosophy is not
emphasized, and instead we still have reassertions of the old polarizing
dichotomies.
Thus the great liberal philosopher of the seventies, John Rawls, is
hardly heard of, and his simple enunciation of liberal thinking, the
maxi-min principle, the need to devote one's greatest efforts to the
welfare of the worst off, is unknown.
But I cannot blame Mahinda Pathirana or Sunil Senevi for missing out
on this, for they belong to a generation that was brought up on the
myths of the Cold War. And so too I cannot blame Mahinda for the sharp
critique of Western policy and practices he engages in throughout this
book, even though I believe it is exaggerated and does not give credit
to the positive aspects of Western actions.
Looking through the book I was struck too by how common such a
critique is, how many young idealists in the non-Western world deplore
what they see as the destructive partisan approach of the West. Though
nothing excuses terrorism, and we need to deal with it firmly, as I have
often said with regard to our own situation too, we need to try to
understand the causes of terrorism, and what makes often idealistic
youngsters turn to destructive violence. And in looking at books like
this, we need to understand why intellectually bright youngsters, while
not turning to violence, are so bitterly critical of what they see as
unfair and selfish actions by the West. As T S Eliot put it, they have a
vision of the West which the West hardly understands - but there are
reasons for this which the West should examine, just as we, while
rejecting the image that is being created about us by a few powerful
interests, should try to understand the reasons for that creation being
effective in some quarters.
The last three Western wars, before the latest one in Libya, perhaps
suggest a reason for the suspicions of the West that mark the thinking
of most young intellectuals worldwide in countries that feel a blanket
hostility. The average young thinker, here and in many non-Western
nations, talks about two Western wars against Iraq and one against
Afghanistan.
I have often pointed out, in teaching international relations, that
the first two wars were not Western wars, they were authorized by the
United Nations, and there were good reasons for them being waged. But,
unfortunately, it is the memory of the third war, an arbitrary decision
to invade Iraq made by George Bush, and supported by just a few other
countries, that governs perceptions of the motivations of the West in
all three cases.
Libya
And so, with regard to Libya too, though there was a Security Council
resolution, we are likely to remember only the manner in which it was
interpreted in a way that those who did not stand in its way may not
have dreamed of. I can only hope therefore that we will not have in this
case the arrogance that made such a mess of Iraq, when the efforts of
the rest of the world to play an active role in reconstruction through
the United Nations were shrugged off.
I hope that in Libya there will be a productive international effort
that focuses primarily on the interests of the Libyan people, not a
scramble for authority and influence such as we saw with the appalling
self-regarding decision making that seemed to allow impunity for torture
and corruption, even though I have no doubt that those were not the
primary characteristics of the post-war situation.
Contrast initial impressions there with initial impressions of
Afghanistan, which were universally positive, and you have the contrast
between action the world at large deplores and what it can accept.
And go further, and look at how the initial high hopes for
Afghanistan collapsed as attention was diverted to Iraq, and you will
see how the adventurism of just a few elements in the West can ruin an
initially productive initiative.
we have to understand the indignation felt by academics like Mahinda,
and I hope the West realizes the importance of ensuring consistency and
honesty in its responses, if it is not to keep fuelling the type of
resentment that burst out so horrifyingly on the September 11 ten years
ago. But, equally well, we should also understand that there are
positive aspects too to the Western approach.
I have been categorical in my condemnation of Western hypocrisy and
double standards in certain approaches to Sri Lanka, and I believe such
criticism is necessary, instead of blindly accepting what those more
powerful than us say.
Reason
But at the same time we should also consider whether there are
reasons for the criticisms we face, and we should try to overcome any
faults in our own approaches. When we are attacked for reasons of
electoral advantage or gain for the attacker, we must respond
forcefully, but we should not ignore our own obligations to make things
better for our own people all the time.
Let me congratulate Mahinda on his book, and for drawing attention to
certain trends in international relations that suggest the caution we
must exercise in assessing the actions of others. But we should also be
equally clearsighted in assessing our own actions.
We must recognize that, as Thucydides put it so lucidly over two
thousand years ago, states look after their own interests, and to expect
morality is absurd. But we should not avoid our own moral imperative to
scrutinize our own actions as well as those of others in the light of
moral and human obligations.
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