Learning from the 1965 Indo-Pak war

by Stanley Mathews

The 50th anniversary of the India-Pakistan war of September 1965 has grabbed public attention in the two countries not only because it is a chronological landmark, but because it has come at a time when the two nuclear armed neighbours are at daggers drawn over cross border terrorism and the never-ending dispute over Kashmir.

- atimesphoto

Stung by terrorist strikes in Gurdaspur in the Indian Punjab and Pakistan's insistence on talking to the separatists in Indian Kashmir, India called off the National Security Advisors' level talks. Indicating an increasing militarization of the political standoff, the forces of the two countries began firing across the border in Kashmir causing civilian and military casualties.

Celebrations

When the Indian Defence Minister talked of ‘hot pursuit’ (albeit in a different context) and the Indian Army Chief declared that India is ready for a short, swift war –the Pakistani Army Chief replied that Pakistan is ready for all kinds of wars –short or long. Pakistan not only declared India as its enemy number one but also responsible for terrorism in certain parts of the country such as Balochistan.

However, while Pakistan kept the 50th anniversary of the war at a low key, celebrating its ‘victory’ over India as ‘Defence Day,’ the Narendra Modi Government has been making a lot of song and dance about making it an instrument to instill nationalism among Indians as part of the Bharatiya Janata Party's overall nationalistic agenda. Modi has turned the observance into a ‘commemorative carnival.’

The Indian Government held celebrations from August 28-September 22. It was on 28 August 1965 that Indian forces captured the Haji Pir Pass in Kashmir and made it impossible for Pakistan to send in infiltrators to foment a popular anti-Indian revolt in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley. It was on September 22 that the war ended due to the intervention of the UN Security Council, US, UK and the USSR.

The war ended in a No Win situation for both countries as the status quo ante was restored in regard territories seized. The Pakistanis failed to capture Kashmir and India failed to take Lahore, where the then Indian Army chief Gen.J.N.Choudhury was wanting to have a ‘burra peg’ or a large whiskey at the British-Raj vintage Gymkhana.

India sees the war as a vindication of its military prowess after the humiliation suffered at the hands of China in the 1962 border war. India derives satisfaction from the fact that Pakistan failed in its objective of capturing Kashmir and Punjab through Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam.

Pakistan derives satisfaction from the fact it stopped the numerically stronger Indians from taking Azad or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Lahore in Punjab. Through the Tashkent Accord brokered by the Soviets, it also got back the 1000-odd square kilometers it had lost to the Indians during the war.

Peaceniks object

However, peace lovers on both sides of the divide are dismayed by the hype over the 50 th anniversary. Sherry Rahman of the Pakistan Peoples' Party has decried the celebrations in India saying that it showed a lack of yearning for peace. Shivam Vij, an Indian campaigner for human rights, has said the celebration of military events could lead to the militarization of the Indian mind.

India could then go the Pakistan way where militarism is entrenched, he warned. Indian Express points out that India has never before ‘celebrated’ military victories. It has only solemnly observed the victories at Kargil and in Bangladesh. The accent had been on solemnly honouring the dead at purely military functions.

Be that as it may, the 1965 war needs to be recalled for its military and political relevance. It showed how ill-planned and ill-conceived military operations can lead to a stalemate and wastage of scarce resources.

Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir thinking that its

30,000 army infiltrators, dressed as Mujahideen, would be able to whip up a popular anti- Indian revolt in Kashmir. But the infiltrators spilled the beans about Pakistan’s plans when captured, which enabled the Indians to counter attack and stop the infiltration. The expected revolt in the Kashmir Valley did not take place. Pakistan lost what it seized in 1948 (though this was given back as per the Tashkent Award).

Pakistan attacked with tanks and infantry at Chhamb with the aim of capturing the Akhnur Bridge and bottling up the Indians in the Rajauri-Poonch area. This was code-named ‘Operation Grand Slam.’

But Pakistani commanders from Field Marshal Ayub Khan downwards failed to convert advantages into victories. Gen.Yahya Khan, who was commanding the 12 th Infantry Division in Chhamb, was told not to capture Akhnur. The stalling of the operation meant that India was able to maintain its line of communication between Srinagar and the rest of India. It also enabled the Indians to counter attack effectively.

According to the official Indian history of the war, the Indian side was inherently weak in Kashmir as many of the troops were raw, and the XV corps had been hurriedly assembled. Like the Pakistani commanders, the Indian commanders did not exploit advantages and favourable conditions. They believed that the Pakistani thrust would come from Poonch rather than Chhamb, with the result arrangement for the defense of Chchamb was poor.

On the other hand, the Pakistani commanders, expecting strong opposition, at the crossings of the Munawwar Tawi river delayed their advance to regroup. Later, the Indian advance in the Punjab sector forced the Pakistanis to withdraw the bulk of their forces from Chhamb. In the Punjab sector, the elite Pakistani armoured corps attacked Kham Karan but due to inadequate training in the use of the computerized Patton tanks, poor field intelligence and deliberate flooding by the Indians, the offensive was blunted. The Indians won the battles of Dograi and Burki but failed to get past the Ichchogil canal. Lack of boldness on the part of commanders on both sides led to a stalemate.

According to the official Indian history of the war, both sides held too much of their men and material in reserve out of fear of losses through attrition. The top brass of both sides did not visit the frontline often enough to motivate the troops. Indian Infantry was sent in without tools to dig trenches and the result: casualties due to shelling being high. Both armies lacked modern artillery and mobile guns when the days of towed guns were over.

No grand strategy

The Pakistanis had the modern, computerized Patton tanks which gave them an initial advantage but eventually these proved too sophisticated for the Pakistani crew. The World War II vintage tanks of the Indians were able to take on the Pattons at Sialkot.

The Pakistan Air Force had the modern F-86 and F-104 fighters which were superior to the Indian Air Force's Mysteres, Hunters and Gnats. But the Pakistanis did not use their air power to destroy Indian planes on the ground except at Kalaikunda in the Indian East. Neither the Indian nor the Pakistani Air Force attempted strategic bombing. The air forces only played a ground support role. Neither side used the navy to any meaningful extent.

The Pakistanis shelled Dwarka port in Gujarat just once and made no attempt to shell Bombay, India’s premier naval base. Pakistan did not use its submarine Gazi effectively as it scored no hits. At that time, Gazi was the only submarine in the Indian subcontinent.

The then Indian Navy chief, Adm. B.S.Soman who planned to strike at Karachi was prevented by the then Defense Minister Y.B.Chavan, on the ground that it will expand the war to the sea and will encourage Indonesia, an ally of Pakistan, to seize the Andaman Islands which it was claiming.

Neither India nor Pakistan had an overall grand strategy. Military moves were made and fronts opened on an ad hoc basis as the war went on. There was no clarity about the objective of the war.

Was it meant to capture territory, or defend territory or was it a war of attrition to destroy the military capability of the enemy?

It was only at a late stage that Gen. Chaudhury told Indian troops that it was a war of attrition. Soldiers were thrown into battle without proper training and briefing. Yet, junior officers made up for the deficiencies of their superiors. There was one Officer for 14 Other Ranks in the casualty list, while the Officer-Other Ranks ratio in any unit in peace time was one Officer for every 60 Other Ranks.

Intelligence, both field and non-field, was lacking in both sides. Pakistan misjudged the political mood in Kashmir and India was clueless about Pakistan's military plans. This made India set up the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) eventually.

Though acclaimed as a victory in Pakistan, the war led to the decline of Pakistani ruler Field Marshal Ayub Khan and the rise of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In East Pakistan, there were calls for autonomy which eventually led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.The war cost 3800 Pakistani soldiers and 200 tanks. As for Indian, it was 3000 men and 158 tanks.