Editorial

Security

Politics

World

Letters

Sports

Obituaries

Archives

Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA

"No work shall be undertaken unless it has been carefully examined," insists Chanakya Kautilya in his Arthashaastra (Artha...1:15:2-5). He stresses this point in a discussion of the ideal organisational structure of the State, especially the upper level of the command structure. One thing the ancient sage's work is noted for is its exhaustive scope of examination of the science and method of politics and systems of polity.

Thus Arthashaastra has an extensive discussion of the systems of command and control and of decision-making that an ideal state should possess.

The various bodies of decision-making, of counsel for the monarch, of planning and implementation are all delineated. The emphasis on systematic planning and preparation for all contingencies is great.

In fact this ancient work on the science of polity is replete with lists of possible contingencies and scenarios and the numerous possible and alternative strategies and tactics that could be adopted to deal with them. In contrast, the fumbling of the Sri Lankan State and the national political leadership these past several decades in response to the ethnic conflict has shockingly revealed how far away we are from that ancient sophistication.

Our collective failure to understand that the ethnic conflict is but a symptom of that larger civilisational crisis left behind by colonialism is also a characteristic of the disease. Our insistence on deluding ourselves with the pretensions of Western-style modernity our also symptoms.

Three times, the Sri Lankan State went for negotiations with the Eelamist militant movement and each time, the result did not bring peace. Others have analysed the political factors that contributed to the failure of these "peace talks" as they are popularly known. No doubt, the larger political and geo-strategic circumstance prevented success.

No doubt, the petty whims and foibles of the politicians and militants involved at the time were also a micro-level factor.

However, there has been little discussion of the technical preparedness of the Sri Lankan State and the political leadership when entering into and proceeding with these negotiations. I am referring here to the appropriate mechanisms and methods that need to be in place and utilised in the conduct of negotiations. This is what I have referred to previously as the "infrastructure for negotiations" in my column of January 7, 2001, just over a year ago.

If the larger political and geo-strategic circumstances were not fully conducive for the success of peace negotiations in the past, in more recent years the environment has turned positive.

Even if there is yet inadequate understanding of the full ramifications of a political settlement at the mass level of the population, at least the mainstream national political leadership now has a broad understanding.

At the same time, the fires of ethnic hegemonism have been largely doused by the blood spilt in the war, although small bands of ultra-nationalist fanatics still pursue their fantasies. There is growing popular will to peace and a negotiated compromise. The most significant domestic factor is the presence in power in the State, of both major Sinhala-led political formations thereby providing the opportunity for a joint responsibility for peace-making and hence, mutual political credit if successful.

The geo-strategic environment at regional and global levels definitely favour a negotiated compromise rather than the pursuit of military victory by either side. The global inter-state system (almost a global State) is gearing up for battle against non-State armed movements and anti-State revolts. The emerging contours of global political repression - the anti-"terrorism" regime - are starkly hostile to Eelamist militancy.

Hence, the LTTE's keenness to re-build its legitimacy, one tactic being the reviving of links with India - by means of establishing its ideologue-cum-political frontman Dr. Anton Balasingham in India ostensibly for negotiation purposes. But while the circumstances may now be more favourable than ever before, what will be actually achieved through negotiations will be decided by our preparations for it. In short we need to get our act together.

The last attempt by the Sri Lankan State to enter into negotiations with the LTTE (that grotesque caricature of a "sole representative"), in the 1994-95 period, was perhaps the most amateurish by any Sri Lanka Government.

There is no question that the People's Alliance created history by being the first to be elected with an explicit mandate for peace. And, in terms of its political credentials vis-…-vis ethnic justice and peace-making, the PA was the most suitable to initiate renewed negotiations.

But Kautilya would be the first to point out that mere good intentions are wholly inadequate for good governance. Statecraft, or the "science of polity", as the sage is wont to call it, is of the essence. Given the glorious opportunity in terms of the specific conjunction of favourable factors, the PA was criminally amateurish in its conduct of the negotiations.

I recall that the very day before the first negotiating team left for Jaffna, the team leader, Mr. Lionel Fernando (one of our best public servants) was asked at a media briefing what arrangements had been made for regular communications between his delegation and Colombo while they were in Jaffna (then under LTTE control) holding talks. Mr. Fernando was nonplussed and did not seem to realise the point of the question.

The questioning journalist (myself) suggested that such communications would be necessary for consultation with Colombo in the course of negotiations. Mr. Fernando confessed that no arrangements had been made at that time but said that something might be done. So much for preparedness! And this was a State at work, not some Boy Scouts club or any so-called 'civil society' organisation (whatever that might be).

At least Mr. Fernando, being a politically astute intellectual, an experienced and sophisticated bureaucrat and, most importantly, Jaffna's most popular Government Agent, was eminently qualified to be part of a negotiating team. But the rest of that team had little to show in terms of practical experience of national-level politics, national political authority (in terms of a high-level representation of the Government), technical competence in negotiations, expertise in military affairs or logistics or administration or law or, any other subject that could come up for discussion in the process of negotiations.

If that first delegation was poorly equipped (in terms of competence as well as back-up), so were the two subsequent negotiating teams. The inclusion of an experienced (his performance in the bloody counter-insurgency against the JVP may not have been a qualification for peace-making) Army officer in one team did not, in any way, make-up for the general inadequacy of that team.

If the composition of the negotiating teams was grossly inadequate for the task, the support infra-structure for the conduct of the negotiations was non-existent. There was no political authority formally appointed to oversee the negotiations. Neither was there any back-up facility such as logistics and communications, and advisory groups. Even years after the failure of that attempt, those who had been involved, including the politicians backing it, were uncertain about this 'back-up' of infra-structural aspect.

Happily, one of those politicians involved at the time, Professor G. L. Peiris, perhaps the most sensitive in the PA (at that time), other than Lakshman Kadirgamar and President Chandrika Kumaratunga herself, to the complexity of a negotiating process, is now in the thick of the preparations for a fresh attempt at peace talks.

Today, clearly if negotiations are going to take place, the UNP Government is going to be prepared. This, probably, is the happy outcome of an innate characteristic of the UNP as the quintessential party of Sri Lankan capitalism: its penchant for management.

Whatever the UNP has done in the past from drastic economic reform to poverty alleviation to political repression - it has attempted to go about it in a businesslike manner. Even if all its activities were not necessarily managed in an appropriate manner (leaving aside the bloody counter-insurgency overkill), nevertheless, an emphasis on good management has been a characteristic of the UNP and seems to be part of the new Government's dynamism as well.

In fact, given the professed new, liberal-democratic, outlook of the current party leadership, as well as Sri Lankan society's increasing sensitivity to dirty politics, there is the possibility that this 'businesslike' manner would be thankfully limited to the practice of good governance.

What are the requirements for an infra-structure for negotiations? Firstly there has to be clearly demarcated and publicly appointed political authority to coordinate all affairs. And these affairs are many indeed.

Secondly, the government needs two teams of experts, drawn from both the State and non-state sectors, to advise on numerous concrete subjects pertaining to the Sri Lankan-peace-making process: the military aspects in terms of cease-fire conditions and monitoring, frontline demarcations, troop deployments etc., the socio-economic aspects such as refugees, the needs of communities in un-cleared areas, civilian hostages, and finally, the long term political settlement of the conflict.

Not only should there be think-tanks to advise on all these aspects, but the relevant governmental and non-governmental bodies should be actively working out practical programmes and blue-prints for all these aspects. This 'on-line' inter-face between the negotiating group and the agencies already handling diverse subjects relevant to the negotiations is a necessary third aspect.

Fourthly, there is the most complex aspect of the negotiations. That is the working out of the contours of a permanent settlement of the ethnic conflict. This, actually, must be a parallel and inter-active process: of negotiations between the Government and the LTTE on the one hand, and the national political effort to reform the Sri Lankan State on the other.

Since this process involves comprehensive national political participation by as many interest groups as are willing to participate, there will have to be some form of all-party committee or forum that will coordinate the process on the one hand while inter-facing with the negotiating process on the other. Parliament too will play a role while there is also the possibility of an extra-parliamentary 'constituent assembly' and referendum process being required as well.

Then there is the aspect of foreign mediation. It may be necessary for the Foreign Ministry to have a special unit that will, in addition to continuously servicing the Norwegians, explore possible roles by other governments - India and Japan would be this writer's recommendation - and non-governmental bodies.

The very act of setting up such an elaborate infra-structure for negotiations is part of the confidence-building measures and, to its credit, the Government is already busy on this.

It has already appointed Mr. Bernard Tillekeratne, not only a veteran diplomat but one who has previous experience in negotiations to be in charge of a special secretariat to co-ordinate the negotiations.

The Government has then formally appointed a political authority to oversee the process - to be jointly done by Ministers G.L. Peiris and Milinda Moragoda, two of the three most sophisticated minds in the Ranil Wickremesinghe Cabinet (the third would be that of Minister K.N. Choksy). There is a powerful combination of legal expertise and management acumen between Ministers Peiris and Moragoda. Professor Peiris is a legal scholar and architect of the Draft Constitution, while Mr. Moragoda, the son of Sri Lankan and international diplomat Christopher Pinto and grandson and heir of finance tycoon N. U. Jayawardene, is an accomplished business magnate and a one-time adviser to President Premadasa.

It is now up to this very powerful and talented trio to build up its team of advisory groups, co-ordinating committees, and networks of inter-face between relevant agencies and individual experts all which will contribute to a successful and inevitably long-drawn-out process of negotiations. They will also need their public relations mechanism since the conduct of the negotiations must necessarily have both a confidential as well as public aspect.

That the Government has already begun this process of elaborate preparation bodes good for the peace talks this time round. Many other factors are conducive. What remains is the LTTE response. Can it match the sophistication of the UNP regime?

If the LTTE is genuine in its attempt at a negotiated compromise, then surely its ingenuity in warfare can be transformed into a creativity in civilian political engagement.

If not, then, as in the past, it is possible that the Tigers are waiting to seize on any excuse for continuing it secessionist war. And the UNP's weakest point is that it does not possess an elaborate peace formula such as the PA's Draft Constitution. Perhaps Professor Peiris can lay claim to his proudest intellectual achievement and the PA can play its historic collaborative role in sharing their once-denigrated 'Package'.

Hard work lies ahead. As the Emperor Asoka observed in one of his Rock Edicts: "In India, the gods who formerly did not mix with men now do so. This is the result of effort, and may be obtained not only by the great, but even by the small, through effort - thus they may even easily win heaven."

News | Business | Features | Editorial | Security
Politics | World | Letters | Sports | Obituaries

Produced by Lake House
Copyright 2001 The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd.
Comments and suggestions to :Web Manager