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Following the expression of displeasure by Delhi, the drafting ofjoint press releases after each session became a difficult task. Mr. Hameed, Bala and I were given this sensitive job. Since the criticism of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, the atrocities by the Indian troops and the demand for the withdrawal of the IPKF were the main themes that dominated the dialogue, the drafting of joint statements that would not offend or provoke the Indian Government was a challenging task. Sometimes it took several hours to construct a few sentences.

Bala insisted that the theme and content of the discussions should be incorporated in the joint statements. Mr. Hameed wanted to avoid controversies with India and sliced off the flesh of the dialogues leaving only a skeleton. Bala was concerned with the plight and predicament of his people and argued that the reality must be revealed to the world. With his profound experience in diplomacy, Mr. Hameed was concerned about sensitivity in international relations and did not want to displease Delhi. Though it took time and patience it was a pleasure to work with Mr. Hameed. He was a master at resolving contradictions.

The choice of Mr. Hameed was a shrewd act of diplomacy and politics by Mr. Premadasa. Indisputably, had Mr. Hameed not been on the scene., the Indians might still be in the North East.

Of course, Mr. Hameed was chosen because he was a member of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka. Presumably Mr. Premadasa assumed that the common link as members of the island's Tamil speaking communities would provide a basis for rapport and a working relationship between the LTTE delegates and Mr. Hameed.

That was certainly a relevant point. But Mr. Hameed's success in the talks with the LTTE cannot be reduced only to his empathy with the Tamils, but from his own remarkable personal attributes also. Although small in physique Mr. Hameed was, in my view, a man of great stature.

Whether it was his patience that contributed to his skilled diplomacy or his years as a Foreign Minister that has fostered had infinite patience, my knowledge of him was insufficient to decide. But certainly patience was an admirable characteristic of Mr. Hameed: It made him a wise man also. His intellect was as sharp as a razor.

When Mr. Hameed sat down at the negotiating table, he came well armed with specific objectives and a well though out strategy to achieve them. Indeed, he planed his argument as if playing a game of chess.

As secretary to the LTTE delegation, I was provided with the opportunity of being an observer as Mr. Hameed took the dialogue on its intended course. He measured every word, in anticipation of an expected reply, to which he had a contingency answer. And so he would work his way to the conclusion he aimed at. Aware of Mr. Hameed's objectives, Bala prepared himself and the intellectual dual between the two during the talks became a fascinating struggle. Meeting his match, Mr. Hameed was well tuned to the cutting off point.

As leader of the Sri Lankan team he had his finger on the pulse of the response and sentiments of his colleagues and he neatly avoided contradictions to prevent the souring of the tone of the talks and the spoiling of potential agreements. In another shrewd move. Mr. Premadasa kept the hard-line racists, Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake out of the talks. Had we met them across the table it is doubtful that that the talks would have got past the first round, such was the antipathy between us.

Private diplomacy

But as most experienced diplomats well know, what is said and commented on at the 'public' negotiating table is not always the full story. The private negotiating time is often as important, if not more so, than the public.

Mr. Hameed was an advocate of private diplomacy. For him, complicated, subtle and contested issues could be best explored in private confidences away from the glare of the public. In pursuit of this strategy he often met Bala for private discussion in the evenings in our hotel.

And it was during these times Bala and Mr. Hameed established a healthy rapport and respect for each other. While it was true that Mr. Hameed wanted to broach issues such as the administration of the North East after the withdrawal of the Indian troops.

Bala, equally, conveyed the LTTE's position on this and many other matters. The maturity of both Mr. Hameed and Bala meant that there was unlikely to be any ugly public debates or damaging political fallouts on major differences of opinion. But in general Mr. Hameed was popular and respected on a personal level by Bala and myself and by the LTTE in general. His supplying of deliciously prepared Muslim buriani and goat meat curry to the LTTE delegation added that all-important human touch to an otherwise calculated political process.

Furthermore, it was Mr. Pirabakaran's high regard for Mr. Hameed that brought the two together in dialogue and allowed the talks to continue for as long as they did. Sri Lankan politics is certainly bereft of people of his calibre and stature since his unexpected and sad demise.

We miss him. As the peace talks between the government and the LTTE progressed, focusing primarily on the abuses and excesses of the Indian army in the Tamil homeland, Delhi became uneasy and annoyed. For Rajiv's administration it was a serious diplomatic embarrassment. Though severely constrained by Mr. Hameed's cautious censorship, the joint press releases received publicity locally and internationally, exposing war crimes by Indian troops.

Delhi's displeasure was expressed sharply through a press interview given by the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo. Mr. Lakan Lal Mehrotra on 14th May 1989 defending the role and function of the IPKF and criticising the LTTE for propagating 'misinformation'. Since Mr. Mehrotra's interview received widespread publicity in the local media and was thoroughly misleading, the LTTE delegation took up the issue at the Ministerial meeting on 16th May and demanded that their response should be incorporated fully in the joint release without rigorous censorship.

The LTTE delegates rejected the central point advanced by the Indian envoy that the Indian army had restored peace and harmony to the North East. On the contrary, the Tigers argued, the Indian army had brought "intensified violence and terror and the war still continued unabated in the Tamil provinces".

Rejecting Mehrotra's contention that the Indian army had used minimal force in their disarming operations against the LTTE, the Tiger representatives said that the Indian troops had used maximum force with heavy weapons including field artillery, heavy mortars, tanks and helicopter gunships.

Describing the High Commissioner's statement that civilian casualties were minimal as a deliberate distortion of truth, the LTTE declared that they had already submitted concrete evidence confirming the deaths of more than five thousand Tamil civilians.

Dismissing the envoy's claim that the Indian disarming project was a success and the LTTE had lost its fighting capacity and was marginalised in the jungle, the Tigers stated that their guerilla units were engaging the Indian army all over the North East and inflicting considerable casualties and causing demoralisation among the troops.

The LTTE delegates also queried as to why the Indian army, which had been carrying out de-commissioning operations against the LTTE, was arming other Tamil groups and recruiting a voluntary force called the Tamil National Army. Such activities, the Tiger delegate argued,violated the very spirit and the cardinal obligations of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

The LTTE delegates also presented a detailed account of the extreme hardships experienced by the Tamil people as a consequence of various restrictions and proscriptions imposed by the Indian army on day to day economic activities which had severely disrupted agriculture, industry and fishing in the North East. At the end of the meeting, we struggled successfully with Mr. Hameed to include most of our viewpoints articulated in response to the Indian High Commissioner, in the joint press release.

Delhi's critique of talks

The joint press release, which was given wide publicity both locally and internationally, provoked Rajiv's government into issuing a critical note through its High Commission in Colombo. The Indian release said.

"The High Commission of India has noted with regret the Sri Lankan government communiques conveying the view of one party to the talks over the role and function of the IPKF in Sri Lanka and casting unwarranted aspersions on it.

The High Commission notes that these communiques make no reference to the circumstances in which the IPKF came to this country, the mandate that has been given to it jointly by the Governments of India and Sri Lanka, the immense difficulties of its task and the enormous sacrifices it has been making in an attempt to preserve the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka.

As a result, a misleading impression may be created in the minds of the people. It was our impression that the purpose of the current talks was not to provide a propaganda forum but to address themselves to the objective of bringing all concerned into the democratic process by giving up violence and accepting a commitment to the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. If unfounded charges are made, it can only be expected that there would be a response to set the record straight".

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