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Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA

"The work, which is not done by suitable methods, will fail although many stand up to protect it," warns the Thirukkural. Its composer, Thiruvalluvar, would probably approve of the way in which the United National Front Government has so far set about renewing the peace-making process.

This column has commented previously on the systematic approach of the new Government towards the peace process and compared it with the approach of the previous regime. Ranil Wickremesinghe and his colleagues, however, have had two things running greatly in their favour: the advantage of hindsight and, a most appropriate conjunction of local, regional and global political factors.

The People's Alliance too did have the benefit of some hindsight and of the conjunction of some local political factors, but not so much as the UNF now has.

Chandrika Kumaratunga and her colleagues, to their credit, did not hesitate though and wait for more suitable 'conjunctions'. They very bravely plunged into the business of peace-making, seemingly with every intention of going all the way.

The PA's prompt action to initiate peace talks and commit itself to far-reaching objectives such as drastic political reform was in stark contrast to the duplicitous behaviour of the previous UNP regime, which had a five-sixths parliamentary majority in 1977 but ignored its explicit electoral promise to summon an all-party conference within a year in order to find a solution to the ethnic conflict.

The PA, in 1994, had a bare one-seat majority. Despite this, and despite a much less conducive conjunction of political factors, the PA did make a huge effort, in the face of tremendous odds, not least, the reluctance of the UNP to collaborate all the way.

Chandrika Kumaratunga and (some of) her colleagues have, unquestionably, taken the conflict resolution process forward to a new stage of politics. A third party became involved, although cautiously as a 'facilitator'.

The most radical set of political reform proposals to date have been formulated and remain available. And all this was done within a new local political framework of liberalised public debate (compared with the horrors of the previous regime), which has created a new domestic ethos for the peace process itself. The PA's efforts were made in the teeth of a vociferous opposition in the mass media and from numerous political and civic groups while the main opposition UNP was hardly supportive.

But bravery can end up as foolhardiness if there is a stark lack of professionalism in one's approach to the task at hand. And that has been a critical difference between the UNP and the PA. The PA signally failed to learn from the (albeit much shorter) past experience of the peace effort.

Even worse, its approach to the peace process did not have any semblance of that injunction in Chapter 47 of the Kural quoted above. Failing to learn from the past and to be more systematic in its approach, the PA ultimately foundered on its essential political weakness that had dodged it all along: the lack of a substantial parliamentary majority.

The UNF, being far more systematic and professional, seems to be learning intensively from the past experience which, is also, now much richer what with the experience of the PA's effort added on to the list of peace initiatives and failures.

Significantly, the UNP has also the advantage of a profound political continuity that did not mark previous changes of regime. We have today, a political continuity in terms of some significant political personalities, of economic as well as political policy and, most importantly (and dramatically), of a partial continuation in power of the previous ruling party.

In the early decades after freedom from colonial domination (that freedom which we will commemorate tomorrow), the continuity extant in changes of government was in the consolidation of a Sinhala-dominant State and the pursuance of social-welfarist, state-led capitalism. It was this persistent and increasing Sinhala hegemonism that, after all, led to the secessionist insurgency.

From the nineteen seventies onwards, partially due to the growing crisis situation as well, the changes in regime became signposts of substantial changes in policy. The 1972 SLFP-led United (Left) Front government wrought a major change in the polity with the first republican constitution and also took the country further down the road of an import-substitution economy.

The subsequent UNP regime of 1977 onwards did a complete right turn with its export-led economy, the second republican constitution and a centralised presidency, and finally, with the imposition of an authoritarian regime.

Both these governmental changes were accompanied by such substantial changes in policy and political ethos as well as complete changes in political personalities. In 1994, however, while there was a drastic change in political ethos (a reversal of the authoritarianism), party and the main personages, there were some significant continuities as well: in the liberal-capitalist economic policy and also in including in Government major Tamil political actors the CWC and the EPDP.

The change of ruling party in December last year, however, has more continuities and less of a break with the past. There is a new governing coalition, but there are many significant personages as well as political parties belonging to the PA-led coalition government who have returned to governmental power.

If, in terms of policy, the foremost personage returning to power is Professor G.L. Peiris, in terms of the electoral balance of power, we have the return of the CWC as well as (what is left of) the SLMC.

The continuity of policy from PA to United National Front is far more significant. In his speech closing the debate on the Prime Minister's policy statement to Parliament, Minister G.L. Peiris stressed on this continuity of policy. In fact he pointed out the debt owed by the UNP to the hard work done by the previous PA regime in terms of policy packages.

Minister Peiris was specifically referring to the PA's formula for easing economic sanctions against LTTE-held areas which, as he acknowledged, the current Government was now implementing. Economic Reforms Minister Milinda Moragoda last week categorically stated, in an economic policy pronouncement concerning negotiations with the IMF, that the UNF Government would "carry forward all the good economic policies of the previous administration".

The most profound continuity, which is unprecedented, is that of the continuation in partial power of the People's Alliance itself in the form of President Chandrika Kumaratunga. This, more than anything else, makes the current conjunction of political factors most auspicious for the renewal of the peace effort.

Now, all attention needs to be devoted to the peace process itself. Hence, the importance of the systematic approach of the UNF government. The care with which the UNF is approaching the peace process is epitomised by the considered pronouncements on the whole matter by Professor G.L. Peiris, Minister of Enterprise Development, Industrial Policy and Investment Promotion and, Constitutional Affairs. In my view, Professor Peiris plays his most significant role in that last aspect of his ministerial portfolio the Constitution.

Even in this, however, the Professor is in no hurry. As he told Parliament in his speech: "Our Government is very much concerned about proper sequence first things first".

This is certainly something that the good Professor, a Brahmin-turned-Kshatriya, if there ever was one (i.e. teacher-turned-warrior/ruler), as well as the rest of the UNF leadership has learnt from the experience of the past. Professor Peiris is very frank in acknowledging this in his speech.

This frankness, which is an appreciation of the role of the opposition PA, augurs well for an atmosphere of amity between the two parties, although there is much to be done (and much to be avoided, like political victimisation) before that amity overcomes the current rancour.

"Sequence' then is an important element of this Government's approach. This coincides well - and, perhaps is intended to - with the LTTE's own, sequential approach. After all, a basic element of the LTTE's posture all along has been that certain measures had to be implemented first in order to set the stage for more substantive negotiations.

These measures, first called 'conditions' and later, 'pre-requisites' (although it hasn't fooled anyone, except perhaps the most na‹ve, guilt-ridden peaceniks) were, till recently, either rejected by the Government in power or only considered reluctantly not least because of the LTTE's own pattern of behaviour in exploiting any concessions granted and then returning to war.

However, since that very pattern of behaviour helped diminish the LTTE's legitimacy, especially vis-…-vis the powerful capitalist countries that are concerned about the Sri Lankan crisis, and also since an increasingly anti-dissident global political regime began to emerge after the guerrilla attack on the USA, the LTTE may be less able to exploit such concessions in a warlike manner.

The LTTE's bona fides, however, remain to be seen, as Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe himself has stressed several times. In fact the actions the LTTE would have to take to prove its own commitment to peace-making are likely to form an important part of the 'sequence' that is now under way. At some stage, or stages, Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran will have to deliver.

Interestingly, the LTTE seems poised to deliver in a most convincing way shortly, if a recent media briefing by Tiger officials in the Vanni means anything: in the full re-opening of the Vavuniya-Jaffna highway.

While a partial re-opening would help ease some of the pain of civilians (and Tiger units) in the Vanni without risking the LTTE's strategic interests in any way, the full re-opening of the highway will certainly have a bearing on the strategic situation. A fully open route will completely dissect the LTTE heartland its only 'fall-back' area.

Of course, it is possible to argue that it would not be too difficult for the eastern and western sides of Mr. Prabhakaran's Vanni hinterland to be re-connected if hostilities resume. But it will mean some effort to drive government forces away once the A9 highway has been made motorable.

The LTTE probably has weighed these risks and costs against the cost of its current political marginalisation and the need to re-build legitimacy in an increasingly insurgency-hostile world. In any case, if the highway does begin operation, the LTTE will certainly not want it to be militarised the way it had been with government forces' strongpoints along it.

While this writer has for some time been sceptical of the LTTE's good intentions vis-…-vis a non-militarist resolution of the conflict, the current conjunction of political factors may mean a substantial change of policy by the Tigers and the Jaffna highway development could be a signal of that change.

Nevertheless, a huge amount of work needs to be done on the side of the Sri Lankan State. As Minister Peiris pointed out in his speech, the matter of "constitutional arrangements" (shorthand for structural reform of the State to enable inter-ethnic power-sharing) is way down in the current "sequence".

The UNF Government has the delicate task of handling the LTTE on one side and, at the same time, dealing with the PA and retaining its collaboration on the other, while also tackling the small but vociferous band of Sinhala ultra-nationalist groups opposed to any power-sharing.

The UNF-PA collaboration is critical. Premier Wickremesinghe himself noted in a speech on Friday that "it takes two to tango". But a complete exclusion of the Sinhala ultra-nationalists and the JVP would not make the peace process wholly effective. It is more than just a tango. There is a whole ballet to be performed in delicate sequence. Can our modern-day Kshatriyas dance?

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