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| Sunday, 02 March 2003 |
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The contours of Tamil self-determination Observations by Lakshman Gunasekera "When the degree of progress is the same in pursuing peace and waging war, peace is to be preferred. For, in war, there are disadvantages such as losses, expenses and absence from home," observes Kautilya in his Arthashaastra (Artha... 7.2:1-2). That, according to the sage, is when a treaty or agreement should be entered into between the two warring entities. And the sage advises: "When the benefit accruing to kings under a treaty, irrespective of their status as the weaker, equal or stronger party, is fair to each one, peace by agreement shall be the preferred course of action. If the benefits are to be distributed unfairly, war is preferable". As can be seen in these arguments, our greatest classical political theorist predicates his State strategy propositions on a conception of equilibrium. It is an equilibrium not simply in military terms or simply between two contending entities but actually a set of equilibria: a complex of balance of forces between contending entities as well as the balance of various other factors such as the possibility of progress in time, politics within a State etc. Last week I insisted on a conception of a fragmented reality. Thus, there is no need to search endlessly for a complementarity of these various equilibria in some holistic conception of affairs that in turn, enables some grand strategy. In Sri Lanka today there is such a complex equilibria, however temporary that balance might seem to be. Not only is there a strategic military stalemate between the two warring entities, the Sri Lankan State and the LTTE, but there are other equilibria prevailing. These other equilibria include, firstly, the internal political conditions within the Sri Lankan State and within the LTTE proto-State in terms of the balance of political party power and, balance of class and other social group forces. Secondly, there is the impasse in political progress towards a permanent settlement of the ethnic conflict that has arisen primarily as a result of the current stalemate between the two main political party formations within the Sri Lankan State, the United National Party and its allies and the Sri Lanka Freedom party and allies. Thirdly, there is the larger, mutually balanced, socio-cultural mobilisation originally based on ethnic political rivalry and now further fuelled by inter-ethnic suspicion, distrust, anger, bitterness and other hostile emotions and motives. There is also disequilibrium in the greater Sri Lankan equation. There is, most significantly, the juxtaposition of a relatively stable, well established State, the Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan State, alongside a proto-State that is hostile to it and which presides over a territory and population that is relatively unstable in terms of social order. Furthermore, within the Sri Lankan State, while the internal balance of power favours the capitalist class and the two main 'national' parties that are its principal political fronts, that balance is tentative given the socially disruptive economic conditions that prevail. The impasse in movement toward a comprehensive political settlement of the ethnic conflict is the most salient feature of the current Sri Lankan reality after a year's successful suspension of military hostilities. While there has been some 'surprise' progress in rhetoric with the Government and the LTTE currently agreeing on a 'federal' conception of State structure for the future. The limited, merely rhetorical nature of this 'agreement' in the Oslo round of talks is not in the least surprising given the powerful factors weighing against any immediate concrete political progress in the formal re-structuring of the State. Two phrases must be noted in the preceding paragraph: 'comprehensive political settlement' and 'formal re-structuring'. For long, the Sri Lankan political elite has sought and thought in terms of a 'comprehensive political settlement' of the overall ethnic conflict. That is, a 'permanent' end to the current military hostilities has tended to be conceived of as one which involves a grand negotiation between "all parties" and an agreement based on a "national consensus" which would provide for an all-encompassing process of social and economic rehabilitation paralleling a major re-structuring of the State. And that re-structuring has always been thought of as being a 'formal' constitutional process. It is a process conceived of as involving the immediate creation of elaborate new State institutions in accordance with existing, formalised, concepts of 'democracy' and human rights. Our fragmented reality, however, is quite contrary to this grand conception. While socio-economic rehabilitation is proceeding apace, that is not paralleled by any comparable progress on the "core issues", the popular code for a comprehensive political solution. In fact, the very lack of parallel progress will produce and, is producing, new political conditions and dynamics. And these dynamics are further undermining the conception of and hope for a grand, comprehensive settlement. On my part, I do not emphasise the need for immediate and 'comprehensive' settlements nor do I insist on a strictly 'formal', constitutional process. The reality is different and that reality is happening. We need to grasp it and engage with that reality in a creative way. The military stalemate has laid the groundwork for a further consolidation of the proto-State that has emerged over the past several years in the LTTE-controlled areas. By the freeze on the territorial lines of control, the LTTE and the larger Tamil political leadership now have both the time and space to consolidate a new social-political community. They already have some geographical space and now they have won the time, in terms of a suspension of hostilities, to proceed. Even more significantly, the lack of any 'formal' progress on the larger political-constitutional issues, has meant that the socio-economic rehabilitation work agreed on is providing further ad hoc political space for the further consolidation of territorially-based Tamil political power. The rehabilitation committee, comprising, as it does, both Government and LTTE representatives, and overseeing the entire North-East region, is providing the opportunity for the Tamil political leadership to extend its legitimate political control over an area much larger than the geographical territory it militarily controls. In short, we are seeing, at a very elementary level, the development of a Tamil polity. To those who crudely fetishize the existing bourgeois State in its centralised, 'unitary' form, all this may seem most dangerous. Fortunately, the current Governmental leadership, and the elite that backs it, is more sophisticated. They are quite aware that the larger objective of maintaining the stability of Sri Lankan capitalism is not dependent on this kind of centralism nor on ethnic hegemonism. This creative refusal to be trapped in 'comprehensive' solutions and purely constitutional processes, and this new flexibility of conception of the future State is paving the way for the ad hoc, non-formal dynamics to proceed. What the Tamil people have long sought is some form of regional autonomy that must be largely of their determination. The very ad hoc nature of the current peace process is providing for this 'self'-determination within the limits and contours of a larger Sri Lankan entity. The current governmental leadership is happy to go with the flow, and, to a larger extent, that is enabling the peace and the equilibrium that grounds it, to hold. But there are disequilibria as well as equilibria and, thus, 'the flow' is not entirely smooth and there is the danger of destructive torrents. The North-East is riven with ethnic differentiation, especially in the East and this has already caused instability with communal riots and violent harassment of the Eastern Moors by LTTE units. This inter-ethnic tension as well as the Tamil sub-national dynamics (the Batticaloa Tamil aspirations) is a major source of disequilibrium within the Tamil proto-State. On the one hand, this is a major factor that prevents any movement towards total secession within the current peace process. These internal North-East tensions are such that the LTTE cannot engineer a complete secession from the Sri Lankan State without disrupting the current peace process and being compelled to resort to a Fourth Eelam War that neither it, nor its Tamil popular base wants. In fact the LTTE needs the current peace process and the backing of the Sri Lankan State as well as the international community in order to deal with the tensions within the North-East. On the other hand, these tensions are a challenge to the LTTE and the larger Tamil political leadership to not merely proceed in a non-formal and ad hoc fashion. While the Sri Lankan State is unable to facilitate a genuine, formal process of a 'comprehensive political settlement', the leadership in the North-East faces the challenge to get its own North-Eastern house in order within the current ad hoc autonomous format. Both social order as well as social recovery urgently compels the evolving of stable institutions and more inclusive, representative and democratic decision-making processes in the North-East. Since there is no 'national consensus' on the matter, those within the North-East must start the process on their own. From the Sri Lankan State's point of view, this is most desirable since this would help create a more stable entity in the North-East. Furthermore, this piece-meal process actually contributes toward the larger, long term goal of an 'all-island' political settlement of the conflict. What is required at this point is a creative awareness of the piece-meal nature of the peace process and, on these grounds, to envisage a multiplicity of tracks and to endeavour to nudge the variety of actors on to tracks that do not lead to head-on collisions. At the same time we have to hold on to the reality (disturbing though it might be to those not philosophically prepared for it) that all tracks do not run parallel or in the same direction. |
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