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| Sunday, 27 July 2003 |
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Features |  |
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Kinniya camp and road-mappin' blues Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA Baghwan Shri Rajneesh, tantric guru, echoing the Vedanta, exhorted us to "live moment by moment". Most of us reading this, however, will not be familiar with either the Vedanta or the pocket-derivations of the Teachings by the Rajneesh Guruji. Schooled as they are in Western modernism, readers will be busy 'planning' for the future, or, to use a hip term, 'road-mapping'.
The danger of the positivist-modernist approach to managing South Asian affairs is not understood by those of us at the remote tip of the Sub-Continent. Just as much as the Brits are no more than 'a nation of shop-keepers', we, Lankans, especially the numerically dominant Sinhalese, are a nation of idolaters. We spend life worshipping and pretending to epitomise, rather than actually emulating the civilisation of which we are on the (admittedly colonially ravaged) periphery. A bizarre aspect is that, the colonial triage has been so severe on this island that many of us are not even certain of which 'periphery' and which 'civilisation'. When we, in the anglicised elite, speak of 'the Continent' I suspect that most of us mean the European Continent and not the Sub-Continent off which we geographically located. Such is the power of our pseudo-European identity. But when we, in the non-anglicised mass of citizenry, think of ourselves geographically, however, there is no such self-perception since there is a greater sense of inclusion in a non-colonial identity of South Asia. Part of a culture True to the spirit of social engineering and forward planning, as envisaged in European modernity, we, of the anglicised elite, are busy trying 'to Be' or become part of a culture that we take as The Model. Just as much as this desire 'to Be' is schooled in us a la European colonisation, so is our envisaged Model that of European modernity. Since 'following the Model' is the principal dharmic dynamic, we, of the anglicised elite, prioritise becoming something else rather than being what we are. Of course, 'what we are' will immediately be brought up for debate. But that direction of response is important only to those who are theorising. After all, in positivist-rationalism, theorising is all-important. But if Living is prioritised and if, in recognition of the importance of relationality, Community is the site of Living, then, the practise of Being (rather than Becoming) is understood in relation to the community with which we relate. Then, Being is feasible in a self-conscious manner and Becoming is achieved in a different way. The politicised intelligentsia of the anglicised elite of the country, who straddle the leaderships of major political parties as well as the elite, 'civil society' NGOs, then, are busy planning and mapping ahead in the spirit of scientific social engineering. Despite all the anti-communist rhetorical rejection of 'central planning', economic planning today is not even merely nation-state-centric; it is centralised on a global scale with the same structural adjustment-cum-open-market plan imposed on all states and regions. 'Planning' is so crucial to the social consciousness of becoming. Likewise, despite the philosophical up-holding of individualism, Governance is about 'command and control' and not about sovereignty, specific-local efficacy and participation. Thus, in the political sphere, in the spirit of command-and-control, there is a mapping ahead of the desired political goal. Often the goal itself is only vaguely articulated; the ideological tactic being the subsuming of the goal in the nitty-gritty dynamics of the various 'strategies', 'policies', 'measures', 'accords' and 'settlements' that comprise the Road Map. But then comes what these modernist social engineers call 'spoilers' but which, not just Guruji's tantrics but most Advaitas and other non-modernists, would regard as discrete dynamics not fully integrated by any single perception of relationality. We already see a variety of 'Spoilers', such as the emergence of Eastern Muslim proto-nationalism or Sinhala ultra-nationalism or, LTTE factionalism or regionalism. These are, of course, 'spoilers' only for those busy following a map that points toward a specific plan and ideal of Becoming: that of the unified Sri Lankan nation-state and unified economy unified, that is, under one national capitalist elite. A specific instance of a 'spoiler' in the political sphere is the new LTTE military strongpoint set up near Kinniya in the Trincomalee district. To all the road mappers and planners, including the Third Party Facilitators, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, this camp has spoiled their plans. In this, however, the SLMM has committed the cardinal error of presuming far too much in their facilitating role. The new camp is part of a whole region in which there is no demarcation of 'frontlines' of the two warring forces. One of the weakest aspects of Ceasefire 2002 is that unlike many conventional wars, the Sri Lankan war does not have a geographically demarcated battle-line that is contiguous for the larger part of the disputed territory. And this is in spite of (or, because of ?) the huge ideological emphasis on control of territory in the conduct of the war by the State. In the Sri Lankan ethnic civil war, possibly less than half of the disputed territory of the whole North-East region is demarcated by frontlines. Demarcating frontlines Most of these demarcating frontlines are in the Northern Province while the Eastern Province, in which Kinniya is located, is a complex patchwork of areas held exclusively either by the State forces or the LTTE or dominated by either of the two warring sides or, even more complicatingly, dominated by either side but whose population, being Muslim, is not politically loyal to either side. The whole Eastern Province is, in geo-strategic terms, a very 'porous' region and, especially in static warfare terms, very insecure. The territory-based, static conception of warfare by the State is not merely to do with a statist style of centrally-controlled war. It is also to do with the heavy ideological-political emphasis by the Sinhala-dominant State on the holding of physical territory. That is why it is only very belatedly, in the post-Ceasefire situation at that, that the State is beginning to focus on the LTTE's re-supply capability and the Tigers' crucial maritime supply line. This column has long argued that the State would have been able to counter the North-Eastern secessionist insurgency more effectively if it had, during the war (and not after the Ceasefire), focussed on cutting or squeezing the LTTE's maritime supply line rather than clinging to or trying to regain physical territory. Currently, even as the road-mappers are busy thinking ahead (and not just Being), much of their mapping is based on a conception of a territorially-based State rather than a community-based State. Worse, the State itself, is yet looking at a post-Ceasefire situation from a military viewpoint. The emphasis in the current 'planning' therefore, is firstly on military concerns and, secondly on the importance of retaining a geographically centralised State as far as possible. Future structure That is why, another (less constant) refrain in these columns has been about the need to leave political envisioning or planning as flexible and imaginative as possible including the envisioning of a negotiated settlement either way: secessionist or non-secessionist. If Peace and not holding onto territories and hegemony is the goal of the negotiations, then, what does it matter if the future structure of the State on this island is uni-polar, bi-polar or multi-polar? The value of such a conception, what I would call a secession-sensitive conception, is that then, what matters is not so much the exact acreage of territory being held by either side but rather, the maintaining of the strategic symmetry that enabled the Ceasefire and that continues to sustain it. That symmetry is based not merely on military capability, as presumed by State-centric road-mappers. It is a complex of military capability (including the capability of internal coercion) as well as of political control and ethno-political loyalty; of Military practise as well as collective consciousness which, in turn, enables a social movement. Political mobilisation That is why the very porous nature of the war zone is of advantage to the LTTE, which functions on the latter complex of dynamics and is a disadvantage to the State which relies heavily on conventional military capability and cannot, for a variety of reasons, be sustained by a high level of political mobilisation in the form of a social movement. In short, Kinniya is in an area that has not been retained or regained by the State forces because it was not considered essential to even a 'minimalist conception' of the territorial Sri Lankan State. That was why, in between the Army's forward patrols, the LTTE was able to set up a small camp unnoticed. If so, why worry about a few hectares coming under the fixed control of the 'enemy' (Is the LTTE 'the enemy'? To whom?) when it does not actually upset the military-strategic symmetry that is sustaining the Ceasefire? Just as the LTTE did not re-start the war because of successive Navy interdictions of its major military supply consignments, and the State has not re-started the war because the LTTE is not joining in negotiations, why should the Kinniya camp be considered such critical issue? That is why, the SLMM, seemingly immersed in a pro-State 'territorial' and militarist conception of the post-Ceasefire situation, can be said to have committed a serious error in rushing to designate the area near Kinniya in question as Army-held territory when it is actually part the disputed area. The SLMM must ask itself the question: is it part of a 'Third' Party Facilitation (or Mediation) that is maintaining a necessary equidistance between the two sides or, is it actually a tool of the globalising State and, in effect, leaning more towards the Sri Lankan State? Norwegian facilitators The very composition of the SLMM largely led by senior ex-military and ex-bureaucracy personnel in my view, reflects the statist function of the SLMM. It is, in effect, a State-centric (global and not just Sri Lankan) policing tool rather than a carefully equidistant mediating or facilitating mechanism. Hence, its outlook and operational style. To the road-mappers, both State and elite NGO, this is not important. I am sure that to the LTTE it is. And the mass of people outside the (anglicised) social elite too clearly perceives the SLMM as well as the Norwegian facilitators as being a little too 'Statist' and not neutral. The mass of people in the South, Sinhala and Muslim see the SLMM as well as the Norwegian involvement as a global-statist intervention and thereby not so much in the interests of 'Sri Lankans'. Here we see the current contours of nationalism in the country in perhaps the politically least violent year since the violence of July 1983. Not only is there a dynamic of ethno-nationalism in politico-military confrontation (Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim), but there is also an equally powerful dynamic of a socio-cultural differentiation between the Westernised elite and the non-westernised ethno-communities. And this second dynamic is principally internal to the three politically mobilised ethnic communities but occasionally transcends these three community identities. Thus, within the small anglicised elite there is an even smaller pocket that does not fall in line with the general trend of the Anglos of following the Western 'models' and road maps but is aware of specifically indigenous politico-economic-cultural needs that are, even so, not necessarily linked to ethnic differentiations. To get back to the Baghwan, it would be better if our elite political leadership responds more to some of the chords emanating from the mass of people and remains less within the ideologically comfortable confines of 'models' and 'maps'. The late President Premadasa proved significant in terms of the economy because, coming as he does from the lower classes, he was sensitive to mass perceptions and needs. Most interestingly, the current leadership of the UNP also seems to have some sensitivity despite its extreme westernised-mercantilist outward appearance. The pronouncements by UNP leaders, particularly Ranil Wickremesinghe, indicates a certain sophisticated awareness of that self-perception, that sense of belonging to the Sub-Continental civilisation by the large mass of non-anglicised Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims alike. This sensitivity can be seen in the UNP's very refreshing emphasis on close economic ties with South India, articulated very consistently over the past several years, even before coming to power. Ranil's boldness in sticking to this South Asian economic perspective even in the face of some Sinhala ultra-nationalist reactions, is valuable for the sustaining of a wider, more flexible, consciousness that clearly straddles both the westernised elite self-perception of our Sri Lankan identity and the non-westernised mass self-perception of the country. In this new concrete emphasis on closer ties with the Sub-Continent is a fascinating linking up with the UNP's very old tradition of being identified with the Sub-Continent at the dawn of the anti-colonial struggle in the whole region. This flexibility of vision then must be applied to the conception of the peace process as we go beyond military concerns to the social-political aspirations of Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims alike. The military symmetry must be protected and not violated. It is only this symmetry that enables us to go beyond. |
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