Online edition of Sunday Observer

Thursday July 24, 2003 marked the 20th anniversary of 'Black July' which is accepted on all accounts as the worst happening in the history of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka.

Between 350 (official estimates) and 1000 (unofficial estimates) lives were lost and more than a 100,000 (75 per cent of them from Colombo) were rendered homeless and ended up in refugee camps. Several thousands more fled the country seeking refuge in the West. The 10 days of unmitigated violence propelled Sri Lanka into an era of war and destruction that lasted for 20 years, costing a further 65,000 lives or more and leaving the economy in tatters.

Why did July '83 happen? What made a community forsake the doctrines of peace and brotherhood and turn against friends and neighbours? Why were the acts of murder, arson and pillage allowed to continue unabated? And why was no government action to punish the instigators and compensate the victims forthcoming?

Twenty years on, with a ceasefire in place and peace on the national agenda, these questions still continue to haunt the country, as does the question whether July 83 could have been prevented.

The Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence from 1981 to 1984, a belated effort to explore and examine 'July 83' and the events that led to the 10 days of violence, do not answer these questions. But it gives some insights into the widening fissure in communal harmony that finally cracked altogether in 1983, and questions government action that literally ignited the inferno of communal hatred.

Although the country's history records invasions, wars and violence, there is no evidence to suggest that they were ethnic or communal in character. The first ethnic-oriented violence was the racial clashes against Tamils in May 1958. The next was the political reprisals after the General Elections in August 1977 which turned into communal violence against Tamils living in all parts of the country. Another was in August 1981, this time particularly against Tamils of Indian origin in the plantation sector.

Then followed the violence triggered off by the killing of 13 soldiers by Tamil Tigers on Saturday July 23, 1983 at 11.30 pm at Thinnavely in Jaffna, the largest number of soldiers to die at that time in one single incident. The dead bodies were interred at Borella Kanatte in the evening of Sunday July 24 with State-accorded military honours. Violence began that evening at Borella, spread throughout the country against Tamils and Tamil owned properties until August 3, 1983.

In a retrospective analysis, the report records the sequence of events, which over the years, finally culminated in the country being divided on ethnic lines, by the formation of the LTTE militant group and their demand for a separate state.

According to the report, the events of post-1977 which provided no room for peaceful political dialogue, were a countdown to the conflagration of '83. The first was the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979 and the written order of then Executive President J.R. Jayewardene to General Tissa Weeratunga, the Armys Chief of Staff, to eliminate, according to the law of the land, the menace of terrorism in all its forms of the island and more specifically from the Jaffna district.

With the arrests made under PTA and the several deaths while under police custody, it was clear to the people in the North that the Jayewardene government was not pursuing to resolve Tamil grievances but favoured destroying Tamil militancy which was in formative years. The District Development Council (DDC) elections, held for seven councils in the North and the East in June 1981 was critical in that the Tamil youth perceived DDCs as a government strategy of wresting political power.

Evidence placed before the Presidential Commission shows a clear attempt by the government to rig the polls but the TULF had a sweeping win. Ten days prior to the polls, S. Thiagarajah, the UNP No. one candidate for DDC in Jaffna was shot dead by a lone gunman. At the TULF rally, held a few days later at Nachchimar Kovil, three policemen were shot at and two died. Following this, a large group of policemen went berserk and set fire to Jaffna's education monument, the Jaffna Public Library. The commission records that the act was committed by some of the policemen deployed in Jaffna from other areas, for intensified security operations after the killing of Thiagarajah. The commission has not received any report of any inquiry by the State into the incident and perceive this indifference to have aggrieved the people.

The critical developments of 1981 are the burning of Jaffna library, attempt of the government to rig DDC polls in Jaffna and the emergence of a small militant group called the LTTE. After the Presidential Elections in 1982, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was introduced, extending the life of parliament for another six months, avoiding a general election under the new proportional representation system. If a serious attempt had been made to resolve the Tamil grievances while the TULF was strong and the LTTE was a small group, the civil disorder which ensued would have greatly mitigated.

The next crucial issue was the new regulations introduced by the government under the Public Security Ordinance, effective from midnight of June 3, enabling the disposal of dead bodies by police officers of the rank of ASP and above, without recourse to inquest and inquiry procedure. June 1983 saw in Trincomalee continuous incidents of violence between Sinhalese and Tamils, resisting resettlement of Indian Tamils. Ranjan Hoole, testifying before the commission, had said that a gesture from the President strictly and impartially enforcing the law in Trincomalee would have gone a long way in calming the situation whereas the government tightened the screws of repression.

When, by July 18, 1983, the tough new regulations re-enacted by the Government as Emergency regulations under the Public Security Ordinance for the Northern Province, allowing the police to deal with the dead bodies without a judicial inquiry, were implemented island-wide, at a time of relative peace outside of the North and the East, the reason was not made clear. The radio quoted President Jayewardene as having told the Daily Telegraph of London, "No need for any debate, arguments or counter-arguments. Firm action will be taken shortly to uproot terrorism." -(Davasa - July 17, 1983.) Four days before the communal violence, on July 20, 1983, the government imposed a total censorship of all news relating to terrorism. If this was based on intelligence reports of impending communal trouble, when violence broke out in the entire country, it showed that the government failed to take advance measures to prevent such violence.

After the killing of 13 soldiers in the North, on the night of July 23, 1983, the 51 reprisal killings committed by the armed forces in the North never appeared in the print media. As much as the publicity of the reprisal killings could have prevented the backlash in the country, the censorship of the death of 13 soldiers could have prevented the cycle of events that followed. Why the government planned on a funeral for all dead soldiers together and not organize 13 separate funerals in their respective villages is also not clear. It also did not impose a curfew in anticipation of trouble and did so only in the afternoon of July 25 when much damage had already been done.

The commission is unaware whether it was a mere coincidence that about 50 Tamil detainees were brought to Welikada prisons from Panagoda during the last week of May, 1983, only a week prior to the promulgation of the Emergency Regulations on June 3. A noteworthy feature of the new regulations was to authorize the police to deal with the disposal of dead bodies without recourse to inquest proceedings.

Fifty-three Tamil suspects were massacred at the Welikada prisons by a group of prisoners on two days, 35 on July 25 and 18 on July 27. Among the dead was Kuttimany. There was no evidence that the prison authorities had attempted to control the attack in any organized or co-ordinated manner.

That the deaths could have been avoided is proved by the single Sinhala prison guard, who saved the Tamil prisoners in wing C3, who told the assailant prisoners that they would have to kill him first before proceeding to kill the Tamil prisoners. The government failed to prosecute those involved in these crimes.

1. The President and the Prime Minister must give leadership to a new era of ethnic reconciliation and national unity;

2. The support and participation of the people of the country in the towns and the villages must be obtained and sustained by the country's leaders for the above purpose;

3. Legislation similar to the South African, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 32 of 1995 be enacted to establish the legal framework for sustaining the process of ethnic reconciliation and to provide for the elimination of all forms of racism and ethnic related discriminations:

4. The leadership, support and co-operation of religious leaders, the civil society, the media, the schools, the police and the armed forces be ensured in the process of reconciliation and national unity;

5. The national unity and ethnic amity be fostered with due regard and recognition for pluralism and diversity;

6. The establishment of a just and fair governance that will eliminate all forms of racism and discrimination be promoted with perpetrators of discrimination losing the right to hold any public office for specified periods of time;

7. The media be made to recognize that sections from amongst them did contribute to the sustenance of ethnic misgivings and that they have a major responsibility to support and promote national unity and ethnic reconciliation with due regard to pluralism and diversity. Advertising on media which fail to promote ethnic reconciliation must be discouraged by the State as well as the private sector;

8. The government must pay full compensation to the victims (or their dependents) on the basis of the Commission's Recommendations by publicly recognizing the trauma and sufferings the victims had to endure and as a warning to the perpetrators that economic destruction will be fully compensated: and strongly recommend that the government includes legal interest on the determined compensation as from 1983 till payment in full;

9. An Investigation Division of officers with police powers functioning entirely under the direction of the Human Rights Commission to apprehend and prosecute persons holding public office acting in violation of fundamental rights with particular reference to ethnic related discriminations be established with adequate legal powers;

10. The Human Rights Commission, in all cases on its own or upon complaints of unsatisfactory investigations by Police relating to ethnic violations or issues must take over and conduct investigations through its Investigations Division and ensure appropriate action;

11. The perpetrators of ethnic violence whether they be members of the public, the police, the armed forces or the public service be prosecuted whenever any ethnic violence occurs in the future. The government must on the occurrence of any ethnic violence in the future forthwith appoint a high level national committee reflecting as far as possible an equivalent number of persons of all ethnic groups and comprising the Attorney-General, Inspector General of police, Service Commanders, Secretaries to the relevant Ministries, Retired Judges of the Appellate and High Courts, Chairman of the Human Rights Commission, the Civil Society and the Media charged with the tasks of ensuring immediate action on all ethnic related violence. The national committee must ensure that there is no cover-up of prosecutions.

12. Truth Commissions be appointed mandating to cover ethnic violence during the post - 1984 period and to compensate all victims of ethnic violence and to achieve national unity and ethnic reconciliation.

Some questions that require honest answers

* Did we handle correctly the problems of citizenship and language?

* Did we handle justly and fairly the problems of providing equal educational opportunities in our schools and in our universities to all?

* Did we do the right thing in the distribution of state resources without committing any discrimination?

* Did we do the right thing in dealing with communal violence that led to deaths and destruction?

* Did we promote genuine national unity?

* Are we not accountable for failing to answer some of these questions honestly?