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| Sunday, 16 November 2003 |
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Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
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Chandrika vs Ranil : can Prabhakaran mediate? Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA A political joke doing the rounds is that Velupillai Prabhakaran is
being asked to "mediate" or "facilitate" between
Chandrika and Ranil. A funnier political joke, in my view, is that some
media rights lobbyists (including the International Press Institute, I
understand) think that the state media institutions were impartial when
they were under the UNF Government and that, since the PA Presidency has
now taken them over, their 'impartiality' has been undermined!
I thought that all these liberal media freedom activists regarded the control imposed by Sri Lankan governments in general as preventing state media impartiality. Can I be wrong? Or, is it all a joke being played on us, Third World peasants (not the Third World moderns), who don't know the meaning of Liberal Democracy? For the moment, however, I'll go with the Prabhakaran joke. It is an indication of the unity of the Tamil secessionist factor with all the other factors in the current political equation. In fact, it is possible to argue that, given the intimate involvement of LTTE/Tamil secessionism in the whole equation, there is, indeed, a kind of 'mediation' by V. Prabhakaran. Contest for state power The on-going contest for state power between the UNP-led United National Front and the SLFP-led People's Alliance, is, in my view, the inevitable result of two larger parameters: (a) the kind of political party-based, competitive, majoritarian parliamentary democracy we have been colonially saddled with and, (b) the general domination of the Sri Lankan State by the ethnic majority Sinhala constituency thereby rendering the other ethnic groups here, especially the Tamils and the Moors, marginal to the national political community. By framing the contest between these two parties in this manner, one can see in operation other dynamics. Firstly, there is the dynamic of class interests. Secondly, there is the dynamic of the Tamil nationalist response to Sinhala supremacy over the State. It is possible to argue that the UNP and SLFP and their allied parties represent, in terms of the weightage of social groups comprising their political constituencies, two large social blocs. Both basic party constituencies are primarily ethnic Sinhala (and Buddhist), especially during the inter-elections period when these two parties are in either Government or Opposition. At times of general election, ancillary social groups, usually the non-Sinhala ethnic groups at mass level, gravitate to either the UNP or SLFP. Right now, for example, it may be said that a general election would see the Tamils and the Muslims (Moors & Malays) swinging more in favour of the UNP-led coalition as against the PA. In the 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections, it was the other way around. I stressed 'mass level' because, at the level of the top capitalist class and the westernised urban elite, most ethnic groups are unified in their interests. But the operation of the basic dynamic of a Sinhala-based mass constituency is crucial. This is the principal constituency factor that prevails both at elections and also in between elections during the period of being in Government or in Opposition. The UNP and the SLFP both articulate this mass Sinhala interest intensely. It is this articulation which prompts the contest over the 'spoils of State'. When I say 'mass' I am distinguishing a range of social classes at the lower levels in terms of ownership of capital/property and in terms of income and demographic location. Sinhala constituencies Thus, both the SLFP and the UNP share, more or less equally, large Sinhala constituencies of the peasantry, rural poor, rural and semi-urban lower middle classes, urban poor and urban lower-middle and middle classes. An undecided 'swing' vote bank in all these classes moves between the two parties and their allies during elections. Both parties also share the old Sinhala feudal class. But at the level of the modern capitalist class, the UNP has the vast bulk of that class firmly behind it while the SLFP usually has to make do with very small elements of this class, or merely that of segments of the small capitalists. It is only once, in 1994, when the capitalist class was so embarrassed by the UNP under R. Premadasa's bloody authoritarian rule, that it largely swung in favour of the SLFP/PA mainly in order to ensure an element of respite from the intensity of social and political oppression under the UNP. 1994 can be said to be a turning point, firstly, in terms of a shift to political liberalism within our post-colonial capitalist democracy. That shift is yet holding. The SLFP/PA however, ensured, for the capitalist class, the continuation of free market economic policies and the furthering of structural adjustment a la the IMF. Secondly, 1994 also saw the Sinhala mass constituency, with the up-front endorsement of the Sinhala capitalist class itself (led by the likes of Lalith Kotelawela, the Sri Lanka First consortium, et al), swing generally in favour of political negotiation with the Tamil nationalist movement. Swing This swing too is holding, despite temporary reversals due to the military conflict during the latter part of the PA regime. This is the result of that second dynamic of the Tamil nationalist struggle to which I referred at the beginning of this article. The LTTE's final operation against Katunayaka airport has ensured the continuity of that shift, with the capitalist class now enthusiastically taking the lead. Capitalist class Indeed, the capitalist class, happy with the new liberal-look UNP and its multi-ethnic coalition as well its bold ethnic equality and power sharing policies, has once again thrown its full weight behind that party. But the recent action by President Kumaratunga, I think, has reminded the capitalist class that, this time round, the political scenario is not the usual UNP Government versus SLFP/PA Opposition one. Rather, Chandrika's move has reminded the elite (and its Western backers) that there is a new, more complex, if more desirable, political equation. The UNP is certainly the better political party for government in terms of high quality management (including its authoritarian style, of course), clear modernist outlook, and finally, intimate links to the capitalist class. It is the quintessential capitalist party, and certainly, the best political formation to lead this country into the copycat western-style modernity that the Sri Lankan capitalist class and its social camp followers crave, indeed what many ordinary Sri Lankans want too. In contrast, the SLFP/PA, tied as it is to the feudal classes, the old Left as well as the dogmatic new Left JVP (certainly not the radical Left NSSP), is not what the IMF doctor ordered. But the political reality does not dovetail to these class cravings, desires and doctor's orders. This is where the capitalist class must re-think its political outlook. In terms of the overall configuration of the Sri Lankan State, given the successful military pressure of the Tamil secessionist movement, the Sri Lankan capitalist class has already moved radically in favour of altering State structures to cater to that movement. This general policy shift can be seen in that class' backing for the UNF Government's ceasefire which partially legalises the existence of a seceded territory. But the adoption of this general policy by the ruling elite (and its international backers) is wholly inadequate. Ruling elite It is in the direct interest of the ruling elite to ensure that that ceasefire initiative is followed through with a negotiating strategy that will bring success in terms of permanent settlement that will provide for, firstly, the political stability needed for capitalist economic growth and, secondly, the governmental management (both in the Tamil region as well as in the Sinhala region) of population, culture, and ecology for economic expansion. The electoral reality is that both the UNP and the SLFP are in State power. In fact, in a certain sense, both the UNP and the SLFP/PA are also in parliamentary Opposition: although the bulk of the parliamentary benches comprise the PA and its current ally the JVP, there is a significant enough Opposition segment, the Tamil National Alliance, that supports the UNF Government and ensures its continuation in governmental power. Thus, the negotiating process simply cannot go forward without recognition of the political power and political needs of both the UNP and SLFP. The ruling elite must actively work to ensure, at least temporarily, that these two power blocs collaborate in this venture. And, unlike the ad hoc meetings and pious posturing that has taken place so far, a genuine collaboration has to be done through institutional mechanisms that will compel both parties to cooperate and act jointly. current line up It is precisely because the current political line up within the State is due to the electoral pressures of the ethnic conflict that the LTTE must be seen as an active factor. VP may remain silent and "laughing on the sidelines" (actually, in his separate political entity), or there may be interventions by his proxies, the Tamil Nationalist Alliance or LTTE 'front' organisations in the Tamil diaspora. But the mere presence, alone, of the Tamil nationalist factor, in terms of its continuing politico-military pressure on the Sri Lankan State and also its pressure, thereby, on Sinhala ultra-nationalism and its domination of that State, is mediation in the contest between the two Sinhala political power blocs. LTTE's postures It must be clearly understood, however, that the LTTE's postures (its own 'silence' and the interventions of its proxies) are not articulations of the interests of anyone other than that of the Tamil community and its nationalist project. This is rightly so, and must be respected. But this means that the LTTE's postures are in the interests of Tamil self-determination, if necessary Eelamist secession, and not in the interests of the Sri Lankan State, especially not of the State in its current Sinhala dominated form. If the LTTE or its proxies seek to manoeuvre between the UNP and the SLFP, and between the Government and the President, that is being done purely for the purposes of Tamil self-determination and, if necessary secession. I have no problem. whatsoever, with that. But I wonder whether the Sri Lankan capitalist class has. It should, unless it wants the current impasse between the LTTE and the State to continue, for secession to be consolidated in a non-legal, un-controlled, fashion not at all suitable for politico-economic stability. For the masses of Sinhalas too there is a partial confluence of interest with the ruling elite in that a permanent political settlement, achieved with joint political effort and broad consensus, could bring about a new polity that will ensure basic human rights as well as better economic and social rights. The Prabhakaran mediation therefore is real, even if indirect. Will his silent promptings push the various actors in the South toward a reasonable path out of the crisis? |
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