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| Sunday, 23 November 2003 |
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| News Business Features Editorial
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Government : 'national', ultra 'national' or supra 'national?' Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA 'National Government' seems to be on many people's lips these days at least among people of certain social classes. Big business chambers, professional bodies, sectoral business interest lobbies such as the ship chandlers, have begun contributing their voice calling for both the UNP and the PA to form a 'national government'. Interestingly, while the President herself made the original suggestion, she and the PA have been more reticent on the subject in recent weeks. The UNP, for its part has been openly lukewarm about joining a National Government, while the Prime Minister himself has refrained from comment, shrewdly leaving his associates to make responses ranging from apparent rejection by some of the more aggressive elements in the Party to conditionally positive responses by the senior leaders. Such aggressive noises notwithstanding, both parties are in consutation with several committes now formed. Slowly but surely the UNP seems to be reconciling itself, at least for the moment, to a sharing of governmental power with the PA by means of some consultative process. In this, those other actors concerned about a revival of the peace process for an 'internal' settlement as well as those interested in using the inevitable constitutional reform process for purposes of introducing strong elements of social democracy to our polity, should help out by offering different formulae for such consultative government. The concept of National Government has its limitations. At its simplest, this concept recalls the joint government between Britain's two major 'national' parties, the Conservative and Labour (along with several smaller groups) that ran the United Kingdom during the Second World War. The European experience of National Government has been one of a consolidation of the parties linked to the dominant (capitalist) social class to form governments that have inevitably been hostile to the subordinate social groups. Hence political movements linked to subaltern social sectors, like the Left parties, have always been instinctively unfriendly to National Government ideas. Derivative form But in our Third World society, with its affinity to consensual social, economic and political behaviour, a National Government could take on a derivative form that differs considerably from the class-specific political articulation that was seen in National Governments in Europe. Right now, however, in Sri Lanka, there are two major negative reactions to the National Government idea from sections that perceive this idea as not only dangerously class specific but also unhelpfully ethnic specific. Firstly, some of the radical Left groups are already reacting negatively fearing that National Government would mean a greater coalition of capitalist and allied political forces in opposition to the vast masses of people of the subaltern social classes. These Left groups - and the JVP could possibly take the lead in this - perceive a consolidation of the 'comprador' (foreign linked) and 'national' (locally based) bourgeois classes that would not only further trample and exploit the country's poor, working class and peasantry, but would also draw Sri Lanka deeper into the viciously exploitative web of the global capitalist economy. These Left groups fear that ultimately the 'government' in Colombo will only be the local instrument for global supra national governance. Given the degree of direct foreign intervention in economic management as well as in State security operations, one cannot be surprised at this perception. After all, even the 'national' delegation that represented the country at the recent World Trade Organisation summit conference in Cancun, Mexico, included a foreigner who reportedly dictated strategy! The second major opposition arises from the fear of the non-Sinhala ethnic minority communities that a National Government would end up being a coalition of major Sinhala-led political formations that would result in a Sinhala ultra nationalist regime. On numerous occasions in recent decades, the Tamil parties have reacted negatively to calls for a coalition government involving all major national political parties. This is for the simple reason that both parties that claim to be 'national', both of which are the only parties to ever win governmental power, are the PA and the UNP which are dominated by Sinhalas at leadership level and are dependent on Sinhala mass constituencies. Worse, they also have unsavoury political records of political mobilisation on an ethno-centric basis and of employing thug violence and military power to defend Sinhala supremacy over the Sri Lankan State. This record alone makes this fear quite legitimate. The Muslims too would be suspicious of such a coalition. Major twin oppositions Thus we have a conjunction of major twin oppositions to the idea of National Government that could either render such a Government unmanageable, or, if it is to be able to operate effectively, could compel it to resort to severely authoritarian measures that suppress this opposition. But the whole purpose of a national government is primarily to obtain, firstly, a viable and credible governmental posture for negotiations with the LTTE and, secondly, to build a broader popular consensus that would enable the re-structuring of the State to provide a permanent political solution to the ethnic conflict. An authoritarian form of National Government, while perhaps providing for a stable negotiating posture jointly managed by the UNP-PA, would antagonise all other political groups and their affiliated social sectors or ethnic communities to the degree that that required 'popular consensus' would be unattainable. In terms of antagonisms within the Sinhala formation, there would be a revolt or at least aggressive hostility from the radical Left on the basis of class oppression and from the Sinhala ultra-nationalist groups on the basis of ethnic chauvinism and pure paranoia. This reaction alone, judging from the experience of Palestine and other similar conflict situations, could be enough to either block progress in negotiations or to scuttle any agreement that is reached. Thus the possibilities for political collaboration at national level must look beyond the conventional, western form of 'National Government' between the two main political parties. It cannot be merely a coalition of political formations representing the ruling class. Even if such a UNP-PA coalition is formed, why should the working class and peasantry and their political leaderships support such a government? Given the continuing attack, a la the IMF and World Bank, on the socio-economic rights of peasantry and working class in terms of government policy that raises agricultural costs, causes market marginalisation, dilutes security of industrial employment, undermines basic social infrastructure such as free education and health, the support of the political forces representing these sectors cannot be expected. This is where there is a golden opportunity for these subaltern forces to fight back against the current policy trend. The fundamental re-structuring of the State that must happen if peace is to be consolidated can only be achieved if there is the broadest possible popular consensus. The collaboration of the UNP and the SLFP alone may suffice for parliamentary legislation for a federal state but certainly not for its implementation. For that, there will have to be some broad, popular understanding within the Sinhala community which is the community most hostile to power-sharing. The Left parties could tilt the balance in favour of such popular concurrence if the class-based fears and concerns of the Sinhala masses (and of all ethnic groups) are assuaged. Joint policy essential In short, the Left movement as a whole can trade their support for the peace process for some significant social policy shifts on the part of the government (whether a single party government or a coalition). The active support of the Left movement will easily marginalise the Sinhala extremist groups. The behaviour of the JVP, however, could be more complex, given its thirst for immediate institutional political power. But again, this factor also indicates why simply a 'national government' between the UNP and PA is wholly inadequate. In this light, certain viable possibilities emerge that do not confirm to the simple 'national government' concept, European style. First and foremost, even if there is no coalition government between the UNP and PA, it is essential that several consultative mechanisms are set up that enable the UNP Government and PA Presidency evolve joint policy and implementation on at least Defence matters and, most importantly, peace negotiations with the LTTE. However, this alone is not enough. If that joint policy is to see a viable political outcome in terms of a reformed State, then there have to be other processes and mechanisms that enable a broader consensus with political forces outside the Government and Presidency. This does not necessarily mean mechanisms that provide for formal, inclusive coordination with several other political parties. While such mechanisms could function with some political forces, other processes would be needed to relate to certain other groups. For example, the JVP is unlikely to come into a process on par with other much smaller but parallel Left parties. But the delicate balance of power between the UNP and the SLFP is even today partly maintained by the tentative political relationship that has evolved between the SLFP and the JVP. It is feasible that both the JVP and the SLFP may see value in maintaining that tenuous relationship in order to maintain the larger balance of forces. At the same time, the JVP along with the other radical Left groups (and perhaps the traditional Left as well) would be eager to negotiate socio-economic policy concessions from the Government that would protect the interests of their social base. Even partial success in this, that is a softening of the currently harsh socio-economic policies, would render these groups more amenable to lending their active support for the peace process. And the stridently anti-chauvinist policies of these groups will assuage the fears of the minority ethnic parties that the national level political collaboration will be purely a Sinhala chauvinist one. Rather than impede greater power-sharing, such a broad consensus will be better guarantee for a settlement than a single party government that is isolated by its own political exclusivism. In all, it is going to be a complex process. But that is social and political reality; something that simply cannot be represented by 'road maps'. |
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