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| Sunday, 22 May 2005 |
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A
humanitarian response to tsunami disaster
by a staff correspondent JM or the so-called Joint Mechanism is the buzzword in political circles, business forums, civil society events, media bulletins, print and electronic media etc. etc. From the market to the pulpit, from the metropolis to the periphery everyone is talking about or commenting on the "Joint Mechanism". Some have come forward even to die to prevent it. So far nobody has come forward to die for it except the President herself who has expressed her desire to forego even her presidential post to bring the JM into fruition. Comments, counter-comments Comments and counter-comments on it are so much that the masses are still baffled as to what is actually meant by the JM. Like 'Federalism" JM too has generated so much controversy, misinterpretation and disinformation that the Government and the LTTE have decided to use a different nomenclature to identify the joint structure that will be set up for post-tsunami relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in six tsunami affected districts in the North East. It is called Post Tsunami Operational Management structure (PTOMS). According to Government's Peace Secretariat Chief Jayantha Dhanapala it is "a humanitarian response to the tsunami disaster". This definition by itself embodies in a nutshell both the nature and the origin of the entity envisaged. Clearly PTOMS is a product of the tsunami. Hence it is not part of a long-term conspiracy hatched by any interested party to destabilise Sri Lanka or threaten its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this respect it would be advisable to recall the sequence of events that led to the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Government and the LTTE. Reacting immediately and spontaneously to the tsunami disaster the LTTE and the Security forces personnel in the North East plunged into relief and life-saving actions helping not only civilians but also combatants irrespective of their political and military affiliation. Thus joint relief action was itself an immediate result of the tsunami - an appropriate humanitarian response. Two days after the disaster on December 28 President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga wrote to LTTE Political Wing Chief Thamil Chelvan inviting the LTTE to participate in the national level common relief work. The LTTE responded positively to the invitation. On December 30 LTTE Peace Secretariat Chief Pulidevan met his counterpart in the Government Jayantha Dhanapala. Soon followed several rounds of discussions between the officials of the two peace secretariats on a common structure for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the tsunami-affected areas in the North East. Two objectives The discussions were aimed at achieving two objectives: equitable allocation of foreign resources and ensuring an efficient and effective delivery system through project proposals. The discussions, which went on smoothly in a highly professional manner, suffered a setback with the killing of Kaushalyan, LTTE Chief in the East. The LTTE suspended negotiations alleging that the government was involved in the act. The Norwegians, however, acting as facilitators managed to persuade the LTTE to change their hard stand. Not only that. They narrowed the gap between the positions of the two parties by skilful use of compromise language so that at last consent was available from both parties. It is only after that President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge telephoned the Norwegian Finance Minister Jan Peterson on April 28 and informed him of the government's consent. True to the principle of seeking broadest possible consensus the President has then initiated a dialogue with political parties and other stakeholders. She had several rounds of discussions with the JVP and these discussions have not been concluded yet. She earlier met religious dignitaries and members of the Muslim Peace Secretariat Unfortunately the major Opposition party, the UNP has refused to cooperate and wants the government to decide first. Instead of cooperating with the government in a statesmanlike manner it has sunk to crass opportunism and is attempting to destabilise the ruling Alliance by using for its advantage differences of opinion between the President and the JVP. Three-tiers As reported in the media the proposed management structure is three-tiered. Unlike most government structures this one is based on a bottom-up approach. The District Committees (Six in all) would comprise Government Agents, representatives of relevant Government departments, MPs of the district, civil society members including NGO and INGO representatives, and the LTTE. Actually these committees have been in existence ever since the tsunami. At the Regional level the Committee will consist of 5 LTTE nominees, 3 Muslim nominees and 2 government nominees. There are safeguards to protect the interests of the regional minorities. Though decision-making is by a simple majority, if 2 members perceive a danger to a minority they could invoke the minority safeguard clause in the agreement, which calls for a compulsory 7/10 majority to take such a decision. This allays any fears of the LTTE hegemony in decision-making. There is also a similar safeguard against the Regional Committee rejecting a proposal of a district committee. For such rejection too a 7/10 majority is needed. In the case of the National Committee, which has three members comprising one LTTE nominee, one Government nominee and one Muslim nominee decisions will be consensus. To ensure accountability and transparency in the dealings of the National Committee it will have two international observers representing bilateral donors and multilateral donors. They would not take part in decision-making but their presence is likely to influence the conduct of the members of the committee. The proposed structure has a built-in mechanism to solve crises, which could arise from failure to reach agreement at the national level. It envisages a 24-day cooling-off period during which the international players and others could facilitate agreement. If an agreement is not possible even then there will be suspension of cooperation. Yet it will not affect work at regional and district levels. An important aspect of the proposed structure is that both project formulation and project monitoring will be at the district level. While project evaluation and recommendation will be at the regional level, allocation of funds will be done at the national level. Foreign funds will be given directly to government treasury and funds will be then released to a Regional Fund administered by the World Bank. They will be audited according to best international practices. The Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure will be an administrative set up and not a political one. Geographically its area of operation will be limited to a 2 km coastal strip in the tsunami-affected areas in the North East. It will also be flexible enough to include inroads towards the interior, which would arise of necessity in certain projects. What would be the political consequences of institutionalizing this structure? It will induct the LTTE to the process of democratic governance and facilitate its later entry into mainstream politics. Its main beneficiary will be the poor people in the North East in whose development the government has an unavoidable stake. This article is based on a talk given by Jayantha Dhanapala, Chief of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) at a seminar held by the Council for Public Policy (CPP) last Friday at the BMICH, Colombo. |
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