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Towards a new edition of 1956

by J. Vitarana

Battle lines are drawn for the greatest battle of the first half of the first decade of the 21st Century in Sri Lanka. The forthcoming Presidential election seems to be much more than the election of a President. It could, mean a new direction of development or a return to status quo. It could mean an end to a dynasty but not certainly to the birth of a new.

All depends on the realignment of political forces. Whether such realignment would produce a discernible change in the balance of class forces or whether it would reproduce the old class positions in a new garb is yet a matter of conjecture.

Going by the superficial alliances of political formations we see two principal camps: the PA plus JVP plus JHU plus NUA plus few scattered Left groups and Liberals on one side and the UNP plus SLMC plus CWC plus UPF on the other.

Much has been written about the support extended to the UNP by the CWC and the SLMC as if it would substantially change the electoral arithmetic. Judging by past experience we know that both the CWC and the SLMC contested under the UNP symbol during the General Election in 2000, the last time the UNP was able to form a government.

The CWC contested both 2000 and 2004 General elections under the UNP banner. The SLMC had its own candidates in certain areas in the General elections in 2004 and had entered into electoral agreements with the UNP elsewhere. Further the SLMC today is much more splintered so that SLMC support to UNP cannot be considered as a substantial augmentation of the latter's vote base.

During the General elections in 2000, which recorded a better performance by the UNP it had secured 3,477,700 votes as against 3,900,901 votes secured by the PA. Then the total vote of the PA and the JVP combined was 4, 419, 675. If the UNP is to bridge this over 900, 000 gap it should secure roughly 12 percent more votes this time.

Such a big shift in statistical terms should be visible on the ground by way of a dramatic rise in popular enthusiasm for the UNP. Electoral arithmetic does not tend to show such a benevolent disposition towards the UNP.

It may be argued that support from the TNA (which has so far not declared its electoral preferences) could tilt the vote in favour of the UNP. However, both LTTE and TNA have lost much strength in the East on account of the Karuna factor and the spate of killings and human rights violations that go unabated. Therefore, it is doubtful whether even such support could change the electoral arithmetic in favour of the UNP in the absence of a tangible swing in the South towards it.

Policy-wise too the UNP has nothing new to offer. Though camouflaged with a bundle of attractive promises the notorious Regaining Sri Lanka program remains its pivotal policy anchor. Taken in the context of the dismal performance of the short-lived last UNP regime in the spheres of employment generation and poverty alleviation the masses cannot expect anything better. The robber barons, income tax defaulters and their ilk would, however, bet on their traditional horse even this time.

The opposite is the case in the other camp. It is putting forward a program much in the likes of the Rata perata (Country Forward) that was endorsed by the people in the year 2000. It has a definite pro-poor tilt in its development projections.

Worldwide experience has now confirmed that blind allegiance to World Bank and IMF prescriptions (the so-called Washington consensus) has widened the rich poor gap both between nations and within nations and privatisation of state assets is no panacea for economic ills of developing countries. However, the very width of the alliance could render some parts of this program vague and less pronounced.

The new alignment of political forces opposed to the UNP suggests the appearance of objective factors favouring a re-incarnation or a new edition of the 1956 social change under the present context of globalised capitalism. Whether this could be accomplished would depend on the strength of public support that this new political alignment could mobilise.

The most urgent issue facing the country, the solution of the National Question seems to have been sidelined in the campaign.

While the UNP pays lip service to a non-existent Oslo Declaration (in actual fact it is only a statement of the Royal Norwegian Government that both sides have agreed to seek a federal solution), its spokesmen do not fail to compete with the JHU or the JVP in posturing as "patriotic" or defending the "national interests". The PA-JVP-JHU, on the other hand, clings on to the "unitary state" as sacrosanct while promising maximum devolution of power.

As regards the character of the state, it should be remembered that the present trend is towards a hybrid type with unitary states taking federal features and federal states taking unitary features. It would be naive to cling on to these labels dogmatically whereas the need is for a pragmatic vision that could solve the National Question to the satisfaction of all parties.

Experience worldwide shows that in spite of sabre rattling in electoral platforms the winner will have to come to grips with the National Question for which war has been found to be no answer at all. Once in power even Ariel Sharon the world famous hawk had to deal with the Palestinian Authority in spite of its loudly declared hostility towards it and roll back Jewish settlements in the Gaza strip. De Klerk, leader of the Party that institutionalised apartheid had to deal with Nelson Mandela and the ANC.

Unlike in a General election the personality of the contestants plays a much more enhanced role affecting the outcome of a Presidential election. Between the two principal candidates the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition the former has an advantage in that he has not had an opportunity to wield executive power.

The Leader of the Opposition did in fact wield considerable executive power in the Government elected after the General election in the year 2000. His style of governance, both strengths and weaknesses were exposed.

While the Prime Minister had not shown any authoritarian tendencies whether in governance or in party affairs his opponent has earned notoriety for authoritarianism in both these spheres. It is said that the PM is weak, he listens to everybody and gives into others easily. However, this weakness is his asset as a better democrat much in the line of SWRD who was sometimes ridiculed for his lenience.

Considering the UNP policy of retaining the Executive Presidency( a pledge given to the CWC), which was responsible for the loss of democracy through a long period of our post independence history, an Executive President with a penchant for strong-arm tactics and authoritarianism portends gloom for the country.

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