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| Sunday, 20 November 2005 |
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Dissecting the people's verdict by Jayatilleke de Silva People have chosen their fifth Executive President. It was a keen contest between two principal contestants. There were also nearly a dozen who also ran the race. It would be opportune to examine some salient features of this verdict.
Firstly, none could be blind to the impact of the Northern boycott on the result. Had there been no boycott the result could have been different. This, of course, does not take off its shine. Nor does it belittle its significance. What is important here is to understand one fact. The Northern voters have exerted a decisive impact through non-participation just as much as their Southern counterparts could do through participation. Thus, the Northern voters have proved that they are a force to be reckoned with through their mere existence or non-existence. It was a strong signal that they could be ignored only at the risk of possible separation. Well, de facto there is political separation of the North and the South. The newly elected President should begin in earnest a quest to incorporate them in the Sri Lankan body politics. It could be easy to condemn the poll boycott as the demonic act of a terror group or a hegemonic design by the LTTE. That would be to negate the existence of an ideological divide between the Sinhala and Sri Lankan Tamil communities. This divide is a product of objective historical development, especially since independence. It would be worthwhile for the President and his advisors to comprehend the logic or the rationale of the boycott from the LTTE point of view. The UPFA and its allies have been so used to the rhetorical charge that Ranil Wickremesinghe is a close friend and accomplice of the LTTE in betraying the country, they have never tried to find out whether there are any contradictions between the UNP and the LTTE. Let us recall the reasons given by the LTTE when they decided to withdraw from the peace talks in April 2003. The first was their accusation that the UNP Government was trying to isolate the LTTE internationally by holding a Donor Conference in Washington without their participation. The second was the failure of SIRHAN, the mechanism established to undertake humanitarian work in the North. The third was the over-internationalisation of the peace process through the so-called security net. The UNP too failed to take note of these accusations and was content with blaming the PA for the stalemate in the peace process, conveniently forgetting that they too failed to resurrect it for almost a year. In a sense, it was frustration with the UNP that led the LTTE to boycott the Presidential poll rather than any love for Ranil Wickremesinghe's opponent. It would also suit their struggle for a separate state, failing any accommodation with the Government. The LTTE may not have been blind to the outcome of the boycott too. Perhaps, they wanted to try a new man at the bargaining table, especially in view of the latter's better ability to build a southern consensus. Whatever the rationale behind the boycott, the new President should grab the opportunity before him to build a southern consensus on devolving power and then proceed to talk with the LTTE as he has already pledged. Talks or consensus building require the ability to listen to diverse views, weigh them rationally and judiciously and arrive at compromises. The southern consensus cannot and should not be the like of a 'take it or leave it' ultimatum. This is the biggest and immediate challenge before the President. The electoral verdict clearly showed the rich-poor divide or the privileged-marginalised divide in society with the poor and marginalised sections placing their trust in the UPFA. The latter performed in the rural hinterland as well as in the outskirts of the metropolis where the working population could be found in considerable numbers. Colombo city limits and its immediately contagious suburbs of Dehiwala, Jayawardhanapura and Kolonnawa marked UNP victories as against the more proletarian Maharagama, Kesbewa or Kaduwela electorates. Changes in the class composition of the population in metropolitan Colombo and the migration of many working people further away from the centre has led to working class bastions like Colombo Central which at one time had two Left and Centre candidates to the solitary Right representation has now become bastions of the Right. Even suburbs of Colombo like Jayawardhanapura Kotte are being subjected to a similar demographic shift now. Unless the UPFA and the Left realise this and implement measures to prevent this exodus they are in for more shocks in the future. The agricultural hinterland whether in Uva-Wellassa or the Rajarata showed a clear preference for the UPFA. This is nothing but an electoral illustration of the well-known slogan "kolombata kiri, gamata kekiri"( Plums for Colombo, crumbs for the periphery). In contrast the UNP found its support in the plantation belt from Matale to Rakwana via Nuwara Eliya and Badulla intact. In addition to the support extended by the CWC, the UNP has also considerable support among the estate workers organised under its trade union wing. The UPFA has not been able to or has not paid any attention to building its strength in the plantations and had been content with deals with "leaders" who promise electoral support in lieu of certain favours to be bestowed on them. The UPFA found support among small entrepreneurs both in town and country and the strong nationalist appeal attracted them. In contrast Ranil Wickremesinghe was more attractive to big business seeking strategic partnerships with global capital. One principal advantage of Mahinda Rajapakse was his 'commoner' image and his deep-rooted links to the soil unlike his opponent who was commonly considered to be a representative of an alien culture. His boasts about getting high loans from President Bush did only fortify his alien image. The better performance of the UNP in the Colombo and greater Colombo areas in contrast to its performance at the General Election 2004 could also be attributed to considerable following of the Hela Urumaya deserting it to return to the UNP. The new President should be forewarned of the availability of inflammable material among the broad coalition that supports him, especially with respect to inter-religious relations. The weakness of such elements and their undisciplined fundamentalist appeals was amply made use of by opponents to rouse religious ill feelings and instill fear in religious minorities. Election results demonstrated the price paid by the UPFA due to such follies in the Western coastal belt. Managing the broad coalition, keeping it on the chartered course without being led astray and working out a methodology of inter-party relations and activities is a huge challenge facing the new President. In this he could draw on the wide experience of former coalitions and alliances, including the experience of the UPFA during the post 2004 General Election period. Coalitions, by themselves are not unstable. As South Asian experience shows they are in fact the trend in politics today. Even countries with traditional two party systems like Britain and Germany are entering the age of coalitions. They are definitely more representative and more democratic. Lastly, a word about the media. It is not strange that most media failed to comprehend the heartthrob of the people and predicted a victory for Ranil Wickremesinghe. Perhaps they were taken in by the stories they themselves cooked up to boost the latter's campaign. Or else they were guided by the environment in metropolitan Colombo that was overwhelmingly pro-UNP. One consolation is that this is not the first time they were proved wrong. The media does not play such a crucial role, one could conclude. The money spent on electronic media advertisements by the UNP seems to have gone down the drain or the campaign has boomeranged against it. |
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