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'Strategy' for action - need of the hour

Operation 'Good governance'

New President will have to take an initiative in formulating a 'National Strategic Defence Initiative Program' (NSDIP); based on 'threat perception' and 'terrain' factors.

by Lt. Col. Susantha Seneviratne


President Mahinda Rajapakse

"The ability to evaluate the situation objectively has always been a sign of true leadership"-General Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear nor Hope (1964)

The maiden speech delivered by the new President after he was sworn in as the 5th Executive President can be viewed as a combination of 'professionalism' in understanding facts in their 'true' perspective, and 'culmination' of his political experiences, that helped him to outline the foundation or the framework, on or within which each solution must be based.

Although the top leadership, the country had, so far had talked endlessly to change the present complex ambience of political, security, economical, and social affairs, barricading the country's progress, none have failed to present an action plan that was workable.

Separatism

According to his speech, he seems to be wanting, to adopt or to maintain a 'democratic' style of leadership in resolving matters of national importance. But, the alliance that he was elected with, may sometimes pose some opposition in the decision-making process, when it comes to a crisis as that of separatist conflict.

In that case, he may have to change his style of leadership to somewhat 'autocratic' using his legitimate authority in office. At the same time, this may probably cause him an 'imbalance' in the forum of national politics, leaving room for opposition to exploit.

So, what kind of alternatives has he got when dealing with crises, such as separatism, under such a situation. Will a kind of 'strategy', considering LTTE-demands for a 'separate' independent homeland, 'unitary status' policy of JVP and JHU, and 'federalism' policy of the UNP be the 'panacea' to satisfy all these parties.

As for national crisis, no political party has, so far been able to spell out a pragmatic solution. This may be due to the fact that these parties, including the LTTE are at 'extremes' and are not willing to compromise whatsoever.

Even if, the UNP repeatedly emphasises that federalism is the, only solution, the LTTE expectations go beyond the limits of such governance. It is not that the UNP leadership was not aware of this. They all were fully conscious of it; that is why the party depended much on what they called 'international net' to trap the LTTE in the long run. But, they failed to present it to the public as a strategy.

The LTTE, however having experienced the past dealing with the UNP government, anticipated that they would, once again be subjected to international pressure in case of a UNP leadership. Because, what they, now want is to strengthen the 'legitimacy' and the international 'recognition' they have gained by exploiting the ceasefire.

So, the LTTE' s reverting to 'combat' is unlikely as they do not want to loose what they have gained so far. Besides, their 'military campaign' is, now over (as programmed) as they have achieved their desirous 'military objective' within the specified period of 25 years, approximately as per the book/theory; passing through the phases of guerilla warfare- the 'preparatory', 'resistance', 'active-resistance' and 'open offensive'.

More importantly, the LTTE realised that the vote of the Tamil community (other than those aligned with UPA) in favour of the UNP would stand as the 'approval' or the 'willingness' for a 'federal state' and that it would withstand the 'status' of the separate state, which they are struggling for.

The LTTE, however by denying the franchise of the Tamils in the N&E the pre-empted rise of such a situation.

So, in this background the new president will have to scheme his political 'manoeuvres', keeping in view the need for him to have the political 'balance' to be in office.

In search of a solution for separatism, there is absolute need for those terms, such as 'unitary', 'united', 'federal', etc(in which most of the political parties seem to be embedded) which are likely to pose impediments at discussions the President expects to hold with other parties, need to be temporarily withdrawn as a pre-requisite of talks; for this, he is required to convince both the JVP and JHU that the state has to device a 'strategy', which must be interpreted as a 'solution' and therefore that they need to understand the reality with 'foresight'. Also, he is required to lay emphasis on the need for change in their individual 'stance' in the interest of the country as the outcome of such 'strategy' cannot be achieved 'overnight'.

Leaders' Meeting

It is important that the parties understand through their political wisdom that the LTTE have never committed themselves in 'specifying' the system of governance they are demanding for - 'federal', or under 'confederate' or 'united', etc, on which the political parties are currently arguing with one another.

The LTTE have put their demands, such as independent Tamil homeland, self-determination, etc; but the terms used by them imply 'separation'. Therefore, the President, at the outset has to create a 'professional' environment of politics where emotions, sentiments, patriotism, etc would not dominate; all they need is strategy, and the art and science of governance- how the so called national patriotic ambitions can be achieved by strategy - how the LTTE came up to the present standing.

As a preamble to talks, a top leadership meeting at a given location, with the mediation of a facilitator is an essential need, to create a congenial setting to commence future talks. This, by no means should one treat as though the President is trying to 'demean' himself and his office; it must be done for the sake of a long-term strategy.

This must be understood by those parties opposing to talk with the LTTE. All, they need to understand is politics in the professional perspective. Face to face, eyeball to eyeball meeting at top level will carry a long way, and is likely to dispel fear and skepticism that used to falter the peace process from time to time.

Above all, one has to understand the 'psyche' of the LTTE leader, which is very important; he wants to be 'recognized'- this is his 'character'. No one at the top level has, ever ventured to talk to him. So, this will be an ideal opportunity for the new President to keep to his words; and exploit what he spelt out in the speech- a new leader, a new government, a new policy, a new country and a new citizenry; A speech assuring the fact that the demands of the LTTE would be accommodated following the change of governance system in the country, would be more appropriate at the outset.

Ceasefire must be monitored by a three party representation - the military, the LTTE and a monitoring member should be established at appropriate locations along the 'imaginary' line that divides the land into 'cleared' and 'un-cleared' areas, so that speedy action could be ensured at emergencies.

It is important that both parties refrain from engaging in 'cold war'. Conspiring by undue means, such as the military backing of the so called renegade group ('Karuna faction') and the LTTE assassinating VIPs and others, who are opposing them must be agreed to stop.

As for the LTTE renegade fraction, although the government and military believe that this was due to a 'rift' at the leadership level, the 'truth' may be something else. What the LTTE have done in the past and what they are doing (to those intelligence personnel), at present by 'espionage' must be analyzed rather than exploiting them for political gains.

However, the crux of the problem to be sorted out needs a lot of political strategies and maturity. While strategy is being worked out, talks must proceed; The government needs to evaluate every possible condition/room and space that would be conducive towards formation of a separate state and possible situations that come, thereafter.

So, ideally it must be a solution with multiple answers; and those answers must be found within a new administrative governance system based on strategy, in pursuant to geo-politics, strategic and tactical military defence, economic-politics, etc., so as to cater to the demands not only, of the LTTE but also of the others, who are suffering due to the 'ineffective' governance system in this country.

Regional Politics

The new President is seen as a typical Asian, the way he emphasised the importance of Asia - the culture, its people, and India, in particular. It sounds as though he expects a lot from Asia, when it comes to economy, whilst expecting much from India.

In view of home security, the new President will have to be instrumental in consolidating regional security; proposing the need for a comprehensive defence co-operation within SARRC. It can, initially play a role in humanitarian/disaster management.

In this context, Sri Lanka would have sent a military contingent to assist both India and Pakistan following the earth tremor; rather than trying to be fully committed for peace efforts in Haiti. Because; this is a kind of 'defence-politics'. The defence and the foreign ministries must understand the significance of this diplomacy. Regional politics would be of vital importance for the new President to keep home affairs safe and economically sound.

However, by keeping the ministries, such as defence and finance under his control, he is likely to adopt a 'directive' style of leadership (where he needs/wants to tell: what, how, when, and where).At this juncture, if the present government under the new President, also follows the same path as that of, under his predecessor, the LTTE will continue to engage in 'cold war'.

Nevertheless, the new President will have to take an initiative in formulating a 'National Strategic Defence Initiative Program' (NSDIP); based on 'threat perception' and 'terrain' factors, so that there is readiness for eventualities.( this would require conducting of a strategic appreciation' and implementation of a program of 'reforms' in the military).

Finally, it must be remembered that the 'separatism' cannot be stopped by mere answers and solutions or, by introducing federalism; unless they are based on 'strategy'- as Capt Sir Basil Liddell Hart said "Grand Strategy must always remember that peace follows war" (Thoughts on War {1944}).


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