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| Sunday, 22 January 2006 |
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Talking peace with Tigers: Lessons from the past by Jayatilleke de Silva The ceasefire is being stretched to the limit. Ceasefire violations have become a common occurrence in daily life. Attacks on military as well as civilian personnel continue unabated. Though there is no war the media have begun to take headcounts on either side, the majority victims, however, being on the side of the government.
There have been calls for urgent talks between the two belligerent sides to the conflict - the GOSL and the LTTE. Sooner or later, (sooner the better) the two sides have either to begin talking or go to war. Both sides reiterate they are not for war. Yet ground realities point to the possibility of a war, unless the present tense situation is defused. Deficiencies It is better to prepare for talks. Good intentions and sincerity alone would not produce good results at talks. Even during the previous talks between the two sides there were no deficiencies of good intentions and sincerity. Then what went wrong? Talking peace with an opponent who has been conducting a war for decades is not a simple task. It is not like meeting old friends. Besides each side has a following that is more intransigent than the leaders that talk. There are also political rivals and even friends who are waiting to pounce on you the moment you take a false step. It is also not easy to please everybody. Our own experience tells us that earlier talks failed due to several reasons, which became obvious later. The first is the lack of proficiency and preparedness on the part of the delegations that went to the talks on behalf of the government. In the case of the Thimpu Talks, it is said that some of the delegates were not at all acquainted with the national question and its history. Though a legal luminary and the brother of President J. R. Jayawardene, the leader of the delegation had no experience in handling political issues. What they faced in Thimpu was a well-prepared delegation from the opposite side. The government delegation was nonplussed when they enunciated the famous Thimpu principles. Unaware of what was to be done the talks had to be abandoned. Another drawback was the level of the Government delegation. It had no persons from the political hierarchy. When President Ranasinghe Premadasa started fresh talks with the LTTE he rectified the second drawback. There was high-level political representation with the continuous participation of Minister A. C. S. Hameed. However, President Premadasa's approach to the talks was also naive. He believed that he could take the Tigers into his confidence. His well proved tactic of winning over opponents by charm and favours did not work with the LTTE, a seasoned politico-military organisation. Enough talent President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga unfortunately had not learnt from the mistakes at Thimpu. She sent her confidantes to talk with the LTTE. Some of them had no idea what the problem was. The delegation had no authority even to decide on humanitarian issues. There was a complete lack of professionalism. However, it is to her credit that subsequently she was instrumental in developing our own professionals in the field of conflict resolution. The international community too helped in this regard. The result is that today we have enough talent in the country to select the required professionals who could assist the government delegation in future talks. The UNP Government of Ranil Wickremesinghe approached the talks much more professionally. However, in spite of the academic and political qualifications of the government delegation they were also without any substantial authority. Of the two ministers one was a political novice. The other too had been aloof from grassroots politics and thus was lacking in political commonsense. The delegation was so weak that Thamil Chelvan was quoted as saying that every time a problem arose the delegation would telephone the Prime Minister for advice. Globe trotting In retrospect, one could also fault the format of the discussions for its ultimate failure. Even minutes of the discussions were not taken by agreement so that what was left at the end of each round was a terse communique from the Royal Norwegian government as to what transpired at the discussions. The much talked about Oslo Accord was also a reference to one such communique. As the former President once said it was only a political circus that went globe trotting. This time the government cannot be excused if its delegation does not do its homework before embarking on its mission. It must be seriously stressed that kinship or friendship cannot be a criterion for becoming a member of the delegation. The delegation no doubt has to be of a high level. At least the Head of the delegation should be a knowledgeable Cabinet Minister with experience. The delegation should have a back-up team of military, administrative and constitutional experts who are genuinely committed to devolution. What is most important is clarity of opinion on what could be done and must be done at the present juncture. Another reason for the failure of the last attempt at talks was the lack of clarity within the UNP about devolution of power. |
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