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| Sunday, 22 January 2006 |
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Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
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LTTE violence : What it conveys Lt.Col.Susantha Seneviratne, RWP, RSP, Psc, MSc (def)-retd. "When 'violence' is used as a 'jargon' in communication/dialogue, it must be 'decoded' clearly for action; failure will bring 'costly results' - experience in combat.
Thus, every single violent act committed by the LTTE since the inception of armed struggle for separatism has signified a 'specific message' as far as their political and military strategy is concerned. This needs to be clearly identified, analyzed, assessed, and perceived for necessary action/response; so that the LTTE 'deception' cannot take the state on a ride, like in the past. Of the violence of past two decades, the most 'significant' were the acts they committed following ceasefire and resumption of peace talks in 2003, to date. Because, this is the longest truce, observed in comparison with the former ones and more importantly, this is the first time the LTTE has given a clear certificate for peace through dialogue, by signing a MoU, which was sponsored by a facilitator. Leaving aside the LTTE's past activities of both 'military' and 'terrorist' nature, every Sri Lankan expected a significant change in the attitude of LTTE towards peace, through compromise and consensus at talks. Hopes and expectations were, so high that everybody began to talk of peace; positive interpretations, analysis and comments, expressing very high optimism originated, even from the 'dress' the LTTE leader had worn at his official debut for media briefing - from 'camouflage' kit to 'bush-coat'/ 'safari-dress'. Some commented that USA crack-down on international terrorism following WTC attack by Al-Qeada, coerced LTTE to enter negotiations while another attributed this, to 'pragmatism' of then PM and the confidence and trust that LTTE had bestowed on UNP for peace. At the culmination of this 'peace carnival', some politicians got a 'free air ticket' to go on European tour to buy a suitable 'garment of peace' that fits the LTTE leader. Complacency was at peak as 'illusion' had shrouded peace. Thus, following establishment of a 'firm base' by the LTTE in the North, behind the curtain of this merry-making show of peace, which lasted over two years or so the 'day dream' of those, who marketed and went shopping for peace, began to turn into a 'nightmare'. Today, those 'dreamers' are not to be seen or heard - this is the time they must talk of peace with solutions in practical sense; rather than waiting for 'tide'. And, this is what the LTTE theoretician very rightly reiterates in his often 'deceptive' talks, by referring to Sinhalese as 'mutts' - as they can be deceived easily. 'Tit for Tat' History has not recorded the existence of any guerilla force, without violence. In general, activities of violence committed by such a force can be classified into three categories - so are the activities of the LTTE. Any act of violence committed by the LTTE, with the intent of taking revenge falls into the category of 'retaliatory' - a kind of 'tit for tat'; an act, in response to any damage done to them, either physically or psychologically or by any other direct or indirect mean. In 1982, when the LTTE was just a small band of militants, some of their senior cadres, namely Shanker, the first LTTE cadre, who was killed and, then Arulnadan and Seelan, alias 'Charles Antony', the most trusted lieutenant of Prabakaran were killed by the Army. Prabakaran become, so outrageous; but the LTTE, were not strong enough to carry out attacks on camps although they had been successful in a raid that of Chavakachcheri Police station and several 'hit and run' strikes on relatively small targets. In order to take the revenge, they ambushed, by killing Lt. Vas Gunawardene and 13 soldiers, who were on a night mobile patrol on 23 July, which led to well known 83 Black July. Similarly, in 1984 when troops conducted a cordon and search operation in Velvettiturai. Maj. Srimal Mendis, the officer commanding (OC) of Gemunu Unit was killed by a grenade attack. Subsequent clearance that ensued from this incident caused deaths/injuries to a large number of civilians in the area. This situation became, so worse that then commander Northern sector was transferred to HQ Southern command. The LTTE, a few days after this incident, massacred those devotees at Sri Maha Bodhi, Anuradhapura. Posters, claiming responsibility and giving the incident at Velvettiturai as the reason for revenge, appeared on walls, in the north. This shows that taking revenge is an essential part of the LTTE; so is in any other organisation. This is to keep morale of the own force as high as possible and to gain public confident; otherwise cadres abandoning the organisation and the public losing their confident, respect and sympathy would become inevitable. Mode of reaction In 1982, when Lt. Gen. T. I. Weeratunga was appointed as the commander, the LTTE on the same day carried out the first attack on Army personnel at Kondavil, Jaffna. The General was, one time the Northern commander; another time, he was the 'competent authority' to bring down normalcy by eliminating militancy while holding the appointment of Chief of Staff. And, thus he became a crucial target of the LTTE, along with others, such as then president, speaker, IGP and so on, of whom the LTTE published photographs on posters, claiming as 'most wanted' by Ealam State during this period. Similarly, the LTTE conveyed the same message when Lt. Gen. S. C. Fonseka assumed the commandership; by exploding claymores on troop movements - this is to cause psychological impact. As for this category, it could be any thing; even peaceful means, signs/gestures of non-co-operation, non-agreement with what they desire, etc. The present spate of LTTE violence can be identified as a 'mode of reaction'; to certain events/changes that took place in the higher defence echelons and on ground, following the new president being elected. Some critics attributed this violence to the government stand on 'unitary' state while another comments; fragile ceasefire, delay in scheduling peace talks, controversy on 'contradictory' venues for talks, etc - this is what one can see when looking at this violence from 'outside'. But, the 'hidden' message says something else - At the last election held, the LTTE, never expected a majority would go against separatism, by voting for PA candidate, whose stand was the 'unitary' state, despite 'fighting' and 'economic' wearisome as propagated by the UNP. This seemed to have fermented the LTTE - sudden change in attitude by resorting to violence, the LTTE expects to remind the people, who oppose the concept of a separate state, of possible consequences, similar to that of past. Program target All other activities of violence, and primarily those of military nature fall into the list of program targets/campaign objectives - the military, economical, and psychological targets take priority over the others. Launching attacks on military bases / defended zones / areas / localities / posts, such as Poonaryn, Mullaitivu, Mankulam, Elephant pass, Kilinochchi, in the north and Kokkadicholai and Thoppigala area in the east; detonating 'bombs' at the central bank, the central bus stand, etc; conducting 'raids' on airport and the oil refinery; carrying out 'massacres' at villages, such as Gonagala, Valaichchenai, Kaththankudi, etc and killing Buddhist monks at Aranthalawa and including some assassinations carried out in the past, can be enumerated under this category. However, assassinations can, also take place for 'tit for tat'. The LTTE, sometimes are reported to be engaged in 'passive' violence; but unlawful, in terms of civil /human rights. Intimidating / provoking / inducing people to protest against the military is one of the common sights reported in the North. Recent boycotting of elections, denying franchise of Tamil people by intimidation comes under this category of 'program target'. Although critiques give various comments, the LTTE were not interested in the winning of any candidate; because they knew, whoever being elected, would, ultimately have to deal with them. Nevertheless, the LTTE were well aware that if the people had voted; irrespective of candidate, such voting would go against their ultimate demand for a separate state; people would, in any case vote for, either candidate. At the last election,the likelihood of securing a majority Tamil votes in the North by UNP candidate, was high; such votes would have served as a clear mandate / evidence given by Tamil people for a 'federal' state under a 'united' country whether he had won or otherwise. So, the LTTE, having calculated all these eventualities, denied franchise of the Tamil in the North and East thus killing two birds with one stone - they 'prevented' Tamil votes representing, in favour of the present governing system or any other systems to be proposed in the future while they 'proved' that Tamils are, for nothing less than Elam. So, what the country, now experiencing is the message that comes in the form of Violence; in this manner, the LTTE reminds the public, of possible disastrous consequences as that of the past, in the case of 'rejection' of their ultimate demand. In this context, the International community has failed to exert pressure on LTTE, so as to stop this violence. Condemning and requesting both parties for talks have been the reaction by them. so far. Diversionary Therefore, one should not get mixed up 'domestic' terrorism with the 'international' terrorism, which this community is much concerned about. Because the 'rule' thus defining 'domestic' and 'international' terrorism depends upon the 'bearing' of atrocities committed by such perpetrators; in terms of their own 'land', 'nation', 'properties', and 'interests' worldwide. So, they would'nt mind, harbouring "Tigers'; tolerating their 'growing' and 'roaring' on their soil as long as they won't jump' at them. The LTTE are, absolutely no different from jungle tigers; always maintain silence before jump - This includes radio, movements, all types of offensive activities, etc. Possible 'diversionary' or 'deceptive' activities take place, in parallel to avoid suspicion; 'relative silence' in particular area means the LTTE is upto something. Constant monitoring, vigilance and preparedness are the key to success. Arrival of facilitator, which is scheduled on the 24th instant seems to be, rather late; and is presumed that his late arrival has nothing to do with any possible major violation of casefire, which the LTTE is likely to exploit during this crucial period |
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Sound of guns, has always been the medium of communication of 'voice of
Tigers' - Even under the 'true agreement', they demonstrate their habitual
observance of 'violence peace'. 
