SLMM oversteps facilitation mandate

WAR AND PEACE: The Defence Diary by Ranga Jayasuriya

The failure in Oslo is edifying for the fact that it bared a popular misconception that the international community would tame the Tiger.

Instead, by snubbing the Norwegians, despite whose frantic effort, the Tiger delegation refused to attend direct talks with the government, the LTTE proved that it could go its own, when it pleases and find convenient despite whatever implications such a move would have on the movement.

That is reminiscent of the conduct of the LTTE in dealing with the international community, with whom it sided whenever it pleases its agenda, the most striking of this being the contrast of LTTE relations with India during its infancy and after the Indo-Lanka peace accord.

Of course, the refusal to attend direct talks with the government delegation would not augur well for the LTTE, but, the Tigers displayed that it would not care a damn if it fit to the wider goal of the movement.

The tigers are in the process of realising that the long held dream of international recognition is coming to a sour end. In this context, international opinion matters little to the movement. On the surface it looks like the Tigers refused to sit with a low level government delegation due to their over obsession with the parity with the government.

But then, this delegation was made public nearly a week before the talks and the LTTE peace secretariat was very much aware of the composition of the government's delegation.

Indeed, the Oslo meeting was a face saving effort for the Norwegians after the failure on the part of special peace envoy Jon Hanssen Bauer who tried, but in vain, to persuade the LTTE leadership to attend the Geneva second round.

The government's initial response was that a meeting on a limited scope such as the operational arrangements and security of the ceasefire monitors could be held in Sri Lanka itself, but later it decided to give it a chance, with the hope that it would lead to the Geneva II.

The security of the truce monitors, of course, has to be discussed with the LTTE due to the very fact that it was the LTTE that warned the naval monitors of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission-The LTTE wrote three letters to the chief ceasefire monitor , Ulf Henricssen warning the ceasefire monitors not to go aboard the Navy vessels and threatening that they would continue to do so at their own peril.

It is because the threats by the LTTE, which culminated to the abortive attack on the Pearl Cruiser II which had one truce monitor abroad at that moment, that the truce monitors suspended naval monitoring.

After that incident, it was everybody's knowledge that the SLMM demanded a new security guarantee from two parties to resume sea monitoring activities. By the time the government delegation flew to Oslo, the government had already responded to the SLMM requests and indeed had agreed to fulfil them.

On the part of the government, they were certain technical arrangements enhancing the security of the Naval monitors.

The government agreed for talks although they were only a face saving for the Norwegians and that the talks could have been exploited by the LTTE in order to avoid the then impending EU ban on the movement.

The Tigers found their dismay, that the EU ban came much earlier before the talks, thus ruling out a greater deal of propaganda advantage.

When Thamilselvan and company arrived in Oslo last week, they looked more like a bunch of outlaws to anyone concerned with international politics. But, the Tigers diminishing reputation still matters in Oslo.

The Norwegians, indeed, rolled out a red carpet for the Tiger delegation visiting Oslo on their way back from the first round of Geneva talks February despite the terrorist tag on the movement in half a dozen countries.

Only on Thursday morning Thamilselvan said the LTTE would not hold direct talks with the government. For any sane mind, it should be obvious that the Tigers should have protested at the composition of the government delegation at the outset, if they had any concerns.

But, not peace, but many other issues could have been settled in Oslo during the brief stay of the LTTE. Intelligence reports have suggested that the Tigers have shifted its foreign assets to Norway and Switzerland before the EU ban on the movement with which all the LTTE assets in 25 nation EU bloc were frozen.

This does not mean that Thamilselvan went to Oslo to count overseas wealth of the Tigers, but with V. Rudrakumaran from the United States and Shiva Pasupathy from Australia, many things must have been discussed in the hotel rooms, though not in the conference room.

The collapse of the talks turned out to be a diplomatic setback for the Tigers, even Solheim was not impressed, he said that LTTE was informed that the meeting was a face to face meeting and there could have been no reason for misunderstanding on the arrangements.

But, one thing is also edifying, that though its soft peddling of the Tigers, has risked integrity as well as ability of Oslo as an effective peace facilitator, there is still little love lost between the Norwegians and the Tigers.

That is evident in the media statement issued by the Norwegians in the aftermath of the collapsed talks, just hours after being snubbed by the Tigers. While holding the Tigers responsible for the non starter of the talks, the Norwegians had tried, true to past tradition, to pass some blame on the Sri Lankan government. This is the very conduct of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, but of course in a much more blatant and overt manner.

It seems that the Norwegians believe, appeasing terrorism would make it a better facilitator. Five questions of the Norwegian, directed at the President of Sri Lanka and Tiger chieftain Velupillai Prabhakaran are more or less a manipulated attempt to place a legitimate government with a militant movement banned more than over thirty countries.

Norwegians asked whether parties committed to the truce agreement, whether the parties wanted the continued existence and operation of the SLMM as a mission coordinated , facilitated and led by the Norwegians, whether parties would provide full security guarantees for all monitors, employees and physical assets of the SLMM in all situations, whether parties would adept amendments to CFA article 3.5 in order to enable the continued functioning of the SLMM at its current functioning level with full security guarantees and in the event that amendment to article 3.5 are made , will the parties provide full security guarantee for current SLMM monitors and assets during a six month transitional period until and amended solution is identified, decided and fully implemented.But it was the Tigers who demanded the removal of the nationals of Denmark, Sweden and Finland from their role in the SLMM.

And Norwegians should have asked the security guarantee from the Tigers, as the Sri Lankan government has not made any pronouncement on a change in its commitment to the truce agreement.

Not only Norwegians have refrained challenging the intransigence of the Tigers which caused the collapse of the talks and their unilateral moves to alter the composition of the SLMM, but also, do they try to place the blame or part of it on the government.

Understandably, the Norwegians have understandable reasons to play soft with the Tigers, though the very conduct has severely compromised its integrity in the South as an impartial and effective peace broker.

It is understood, that the Norwegians as the peace broker need to maintain a good rapport with both parties and understandably, Oslo has succeeded doing this. As hinted by Thamilselvan and Pulithevan, the Tiger leadership initially agreed to go to Oslo due to the persuasion of the Norwegians.

If then, what happened in Oslo should have been a further embarrassment to the peace facilitators. With all due respects to Norwegians effort to maintain good offices with the LTTE, questions have raised whether the Norwegian strategy of appeasing the Tiger to drive him towards peace negotiations has bore any success.

As evident in the recent escalation violence against security forces, such an appeasement coupled with lukewarm response to the violence by the Tigers could only be a reassurance of kind of international support, thus is a moral boaster at a time indeed the Tigers facing growing international isolation.

Oslo, though not a member of the European Union, inserted a greater deal of lobbying in the EU to avoid a formal listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.

Three Scandinavian nations, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, ironically enough, whose representation in the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, has now been demanded by the Tigers, opposed to the ban, showing solidarity with the fellow Scandinavian nation, till a week before the agreement on the ban. If the peace facilitator's in ability to act decisively is a cause for disappointment, the conduct and the perceived bias of the ceasefire monitors is cause for serious concern.

Remarks by the Head of the SLMM and its spokeswoman are fast loosing coherence. Even though the SLMM has been villified by the anti-peace lobby since the outset of the peace process- most such accusations turned to be unfounded and politically motivated-, the recent conduct of the truce monitors are fast challenging the integrity of the SLMM itself.

The SLMM has been bypassing its mandate on a several occasions in the past few months and making remarks distinctively bias towards the Tigers, at the same time failing to hold the LTTE responsible for clay more mine attacks on the security forces and other killings of security forces personnel, and most notably the abortive assassination attempt on the Army Commander, Gen Fonseka.

Of course, the SLMM acts out of frustration at its failure, and of course the failure of two parties themselves to halt the spiralling violence. But recent conduct of the SLMM gives the impression, that it acts in a set agenda, thus to hold the Sri Lankan government responsible for violations despite the fact it was very much clear that it was the Tigers who brought violence to a new intensity , exploding claymore mines targeting security forces, first attack being on November 17, weeks after the election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Claymore mines and other attacks on the security forces were indicative of a pattern of LTTE conduct which was in place for through out the separatist war, that is to intimidate the government into submission. But, the ceasefire monitors failed to rule on these acts of violations, thus raising questions of the meaning of their very presence in the North-East-As the CFA itself states, the SLMM is here for independent verification of events.

But, while failing to rule against violations committed by the LTTE, citing the lack of evidence and time constrains, truce monitors have shown an unusual haste in ruling against the security forces. Only a month ago, that the Head of the Mission put his foot in the mouth, trying to implicate the involvement in security forces in extra-judicial killings in the North-East. He later toned down his remarks and issued a clarification.

As for the allegations of extra-judicial killings, the SLMM displayed an undue haste in making remarks to the effect to perceived security force's involvement, and for the first time authorized a truce monitor based in the North-East to speak to the press on these charges.

And despite this obsession, truce monitors could not make a single ruling against killing of 6 farmers in Gomarankadawala, on April 23, murder of seven safari goers in Wilpattua and most recently, killing of 13 irrigation workers in Welikanda.

If the conduct of the SLMM is a cause for concern, its recent report dated June 4 on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement since the first round of talks in Geneva was its culmination.

The report itself mirrors the same flaws of the conduct and thinking of the truce monitors. No wonder that the government described it as "distinctively bias against the GOSL.

The government in a statement said, it was "dismayed by the attempts by the Head of the SLMM ...to cast aspersions on the conduct of the GOSL" The government said it was grossly unfair and arbitrary fro the SLMM to pass, in an undue haste, judgement on the commitment of the government to fulfil its obligations made in Geneva in the report which itself confesses that it "has been somewhat difficult for SLMM to inquire into vague and general accusations with very few concrete facts and that more time is needed to finalise the inquiries in a professional manner and to all parties to respond to the allegations.

The phenomenon of over stepping its mandate is not unique to the SLMM. Concerns have been raised about the conduct of the International Committee of Red Cross in Batticaloa. Breach of protocol by the ICRC Sub Delegate in Batticaloa Mr. Abbas Geha has raised eyebrows of the law enforcement agencies.

Abbas has exhumed a body of a slain LTTE cadre named M. Ganeshwaran without a magisterial order and transported his body through the Black Bridge entry-exit point, without informing the troops manning the entry point, that he was transporting a body.

The vehicle has not been at the entry point due to the mutual understating between the troops and the ICRC. But the ICRC sub delegate has exploited that goodwill and the breach of protocol on his part is on two counts, he has exhumed a body illegally which was buried in the Mankerny cemetery at the magisterial order and then transported it, without disclosing to the troops at the Black bridge entry-exit point.

Defence Ministry has informed the ICRC of the breach of protocol by Mr. Abbas. The collapse of Oslo meeting should be viewed in the context of worsening security situation in the North-East. Indeed, the Tigers are training a civil militia and planning to step up the training.

Sea Tiger leader Soosai has outlined Prabha's plan in a meeting after ten day training of civilians held in Pudikudurippu, Mullaitivu. "Soosai has said, before enemy start the war against us, we must dismantle his positions and redeem our land. This is the best course of action. "Instead of waiting for the enemy to launch the war we would have to take the initiative and take on the enemy.

The best course of action is for us to leap forward and confront our enemy who is occupying us at present. We can succeed only through such a course of action. "Our Leader will never say anything in words. He makes his intentions known through his actions. This is what he likes.

As a fast relief to ease the pain he is ever ready to redeem our land and the people as quick as possible," Most of this sound like mere rhetoric, and more or less phycological operations. But, given a backdrop of uncertainty, no one could be sure of what lies ahead.