Akashi's interview with IANS

Excerpts of the interview given by Yasushi Akashi, Japan's special envoy to Sri Lanka, to IANS Deputy Editor M. R. Narayan Swamy:

IANS: How did Japan's involvement begin in Sri Lanka's peace process?

Akashi: Japan has always (had) quite an important presence in Sri Lanka. But Japan was important to Sri Lanka in an economic sense because of its quite substantial assistance programme in that country. Japan has always felt certain kinship because of culture (and) religious and historic associations with that country.

Many Japanese felt grateful to the late president (Junius) Jayawardene who spoke very generously about Japan at the San Francisco peace conference. Jayawardene proposed that Japan should not be asked to pay reparations to his country. Japanese felt grateful to this Sri Lankan friendship. They wanted to reciprocate this with generous assistance to that country. Also the majority of the Japanese are Buddhists although perhaps not too many are practising Buddhists. So we feel certain kinship in that respect also.

In 2002, when the ceasefire agreement was concluded, I was approached by the government of (Ranil) Wickremesinghe, who was eagerly pursuing peace with the LTTE, whether I would mind being more actively engaged in Sri Lankan matters. This approach was formalised by a letter from the Sri Lankan foreign minister addressed to the Japanese foreign minister. That was in September or October. The Japanese foreign minister responded favourably by designating me as the representative of the government of Japan on this matter.

Although I had been to Sri Lanka several times, I started my mission to that country in October that year. In the following year, in June, we sponsored a major international conference on the rehabilitation and development of Sri Lanka that was attended by 51 governments and 22 international organisations including the UN. So Japan's interest in Sri Lankan peace as well as development became more focused, more organised, with greater participation of various Japanese entities.

IANS: By the time Japan came in, the CFA (ceasefire agreement) was already there. Were you happy with the provisions of CFA?

Akashi: Yes. In fact, for any kind of peace to take roots and (for) it to become very firm, you have to start somewhere.

And usually that starting point is conclusion of a ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire agreement is nothing more than an agreement to stop fighting. So ceasefire agreement by itself is very insufficient. But it is the necessary first point of departure. Usually it has to be succeeded with subsequent steps to make peace more durable.

Unfortunately, this Sri Lankan ceasefire has not been followed by more sustained sufficient measures for a number of reasons which we will discuss later. We look at the present situation with deep concern and dismay. The deterioration of the situation makes as if we might be on the verge of resumption of war and fighting on a rather large scale. Some people have described the situation as a low intensity war or a shadow war. I think they are not too far from the truth.

IANS: Why do you think this happened? A lot of others have also said that the ceasefire was a good starting point. What went wrong?

Akashi: First of all the Wickremesinghe government lost its steam when the executive president, (Chandrika) Kumaratunga, jeopardised the government (in November 2003) by taking over three key ministries from Wickremesinghe.

Constitutionally she was justified in doing it. She had the power to do so. But the prime minister lost his leverage to pursue the peace by this action of the president. After Kumaratunga took over, she in her own way pursued the peace with the LTTE.

Then the tsunami struck (in December 2004).

It was a major tragedy for Sri Lanka, particularly for people on the east coast, on the southern coast, and on the northern coast. Only the west was spared. There was an imperative of humanitarian assistance and we were so heartened to see cooperation on the seacoast of Sri Lanka. People helped each other, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation; Tamils helping Muslims, Muslims helping Sinhalese, etc. etc.

We thought that was an opportunity to concentrate on humanitarian assistance, which created a godsend opportunity for people to learn to help each other. So the so-called P-Toms (tsunami relief deal) was negotiated. It took six months to complete.

When the final agreement was reached by the government and LTTE, lo and behold the Supreme Court decided that that P-Toms was against the constitution of Sri Lanka. So there were these two major setbacks in the tortuous negotiations to conclude a more durable peace.

I think Norwegians were very professional. They were relentless in trying to facilitate the process. At the same time they were aware that the facilitator is nothing more than a facilitator... International community cannot deliver peace in Sri Lanka. Only the people in Sri Lanka can do it. The international community can only support such a process. In other words, the onus of peace clearly belongs to the people.

IANS: You mentioned the two major setbacks to the peace process. Do you think these two events were alone responsible for the current situation?

Akashi: Both attempts - one by Wickremsinghe and the other by Kumaratunga - were attempts to create an interim structure of cooperation between the government and LTTE which could have led to a more permanent set-up. But I think the basic cause for the lack of progress is the deeply ingrained mutual distrust, which has decades of history behind it.

You can trace its origins to earlier decades of the 20th century and the more recent past of unfortunate history started in the racial confrontation in 1983. I think there are people (haunted by) the nightmare of the most bloody confrontations.

So it is not so difficult to bring back (memories of) these past tragic encounters; especially it is not difficult for politicians to depict the past history of Sri Lanka to show that somehow the Sinhalese and Tamil people, who are the two largest and second largest ethnic groups in the country, that we cannot live together.

But I think, I am convinced, that you can do if you wish... In the past they have peacefully and amicably lived together. Even a few years ago when I visited eastern (Sri Lanka), I spoke with peace committees, NGOs, church groups in which Sinhalese and Tamils as well as Muslims were together discussing and (their) children playing together.

IANS: You said Norwegians would have to look elsewhere. Is there a possibility of Japan joining the SLMM?

Akashi: We do not envisage such a possibility. As you know Japan has its rather unique constitution, which is very restrictive of our use of our Self Defence Force, our police. Often times we have to adopt a special legislation to enable us to send our soldiers for (policing), and often times it becomes a matter of domestic controversy.

Such controversy could be overcome if there is an umbrella by the UN. In the case of SLMM, it is done entirely outside the UN. So that is the reason we do not think that Japan cannot help SLMM in the present circumstances.

IANS: You were once misquoted in the media, as you pointed out, about your remarks in the UN. What is your idea of the UN playing a role in Sri Lanka?

Akashi: The UN has its presence in Sri Lanka through UNDP, UNHCR, Unicef and others. Additionally, the World Bank, IMF and others are present. They are all doing very useful work. Many of them are doing very constructive work in the humanitarian domain. Others are involved in the development question.

But the UN presence in the political and military sense is entirely different.

I think it is entirely up to the parties in the conflict, in this case the Sri Lankan government and LTTE, to make such a request or not (to the UN). Unless that is done, the question of UN presence is entirely hypothetical. My past remarks (about UN), being twisted to mean the entirely opposite of what I had said, was quite distressing to me.

IANS: Ambassador, you have met (LTTE chief Velupillai) Prabhakaran once. What are your impressions of the man?

Akashi: (Pauses) Obviously he is a man who controls his organisation. He is a man of conviction. He has certain clear-cut ideas about his mission. We had a lively discussion. I myself (argued) that this conflict cannot be resolved if the people in Sri Lanka only looked at the past, the past of persecution and racial antagonism. I strongly emphasized the need for people of Sri Lanka, irrespective of their ethnic origins, to look at their common future together.

It so happened that I saw Prabhakaran the day after I visited Muttur (in Trincomalee) and other eastern regions torn by conflict. I saw with my own eyes how the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese people were inflicting wounds upon each other. All of them were suffering. So I emphasized the need to put aside their obviously very tragic, very real experiences but to work for the sake of their children, their grandchildren. They have to find a new way of building mutual understanding.

IANS: What was Prabhakaran's response?

Akashi: He argued very strongly that the past history tells him that the Tamil people had to seek for their own so-called homeland.

IANS: This being the case, in a situation like this, in a situation where many feel that the Sri Lankan government is probably not doing enough to come out with a sincere package to devolve power to the minorities, what kind of scenario do you envisage?

Akashi: I think the solution to the present situation has to be looked at in three different ways. First to strengthen the ceasefire; this can be done with a more credible SLMM. For that, I think, it will be very shortsighted to weaken the SLMM, both in manpower as well as in giving it a more capacity to act. This should not require necessarily amendments to the ceasefire agreement.

That is why I was encouraged for a while that the government and LTTE and Norwegians will be discussing implementation of the ceasefire agreement. Perhaps not a large issue but it is a starting point.

Second, I think they have to also start thinking far ahead, of their common future, within a united or undivided Sri Lanka. (This) may require amendments to the constitution, which many Sri Lankans in the south seem to be willing to consider.

I think as in some other very controversial conflicts in the rest of the world, like the Middle East, you have to think of a comprehensive road-map with milestones at various stages. From one modest step to some of the more ambitious next steps, you go on... So (that) the LTTE and its areas of control are able to exercise certain self-rule.

I think the government has started what the south as a whole could accept as a (devolution) package. People are beginning to discuss the Indian model or south Indian model. Others are searching for other types of federal arrangements.

There are many, many variations of federalism in the world. It is up to the Sri Lankan people to find in their own genius the form which is most comfortable and acceptable to every single Sri Lankan group. It seems the south Indian model is something they want to examine most carefully in this context.

IANS: What is the third point?

Akashi: The second is the comprehensive package of the road map.

The third is the interim structure which we have mentioned on the way towards a final solution. You may want to discuss the steps towards that final destination where you practice certain self-rule. These are interim structures on the way towards the final destination.

These are three areas: the immediate situation, stabilise the ceasefire; second, look at where you have to eventually reach; and third one is the interim or transitional governance which each side finds acceptable.

The first one has to be tackled immediately. The second and third sometime later but the more efficient and speedy you can commence considering these steps, the better it will be. You cannot compartmentalise or you cannot put them in straitjackets in considering various questions.

IANS: What you have said are words of wisdom, ambassador. But such optimism has been raised in the past, only to be dashed to the ground. If the two parties do not rise to the occasion, is there anything Japan can do make peace possible in Sri Lanka?

Akashi: Japan has been the largest contributor of official development assistance to Sri Lanka. Japan has done it honestly and consistently and tirelessly. We will try to continue this kind of development assistance in the future as well. We are committed to those objectives. More recently, we have added another objective. Through our assistance we contribute to the consolidation of peace. Our prime minister has stated that one way Japan contributes to peace in the world is through its efforts for the consolidation of peace.

Once fighting stops and ceasefire is agreed upon, time begins for improving the livelihood of common people in all conflict areas. This is what Japan has been tying to do in countries like Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor as well as Sri Lanka. We are proud of the fact that after the Tokyo conference three years ago, we have redirected our assistance.

The bulk of our assistance still goes to the south of Sri Lanka. But approximately 20 percent of our assistance in the past few years has been directed to the north and east, including the LTTE controlled areas. This assistance, we hope, benefited not the LTTE as such but people residing in LTTE areas.

We have built a hospital and a job training centre in Kilinochchi, we are improving the Teaching Hospital in Jaffna, we have built or improved water tanks for irrigation in the north and we have repaired or built bridges and roads in the east. Taking into account the real needs of the people, we feel what we have done is to deliver the dividends of peace. Once people begin to enjoy such dividends, they will develop attachment to peace and abhorrence towards war.

IANS: The LTTE began to feel at some point that the international donors were trying to trap it. One reason they gave while walking out of the talks is the 'excessive internationalisation' of the conflict. What do you have to say?

Akashi: I felt that our objective was not understood. Some kind of entrapment was far from our objective. (Pauses) In fact LTTE wanted... in a sense by agreeing to the facilitation by Norway, I think they did not mind, in fact they desired, the international community somehow to have a role... Such desire on the part of the LTTE was understandable in view of their minority status, their position of relative inferiority towards the government.

The international community can play a useful role in Sri Lankan peace not only in economic and social reconstruction but also in giving advice, if asked, in the whole area of governance, human rights, democracy, etc. I think it should be understood by Sri Lankans, in the south and north, that the international community is there at their invitation. It is far from their intention to impose their will on the Sri Lankan people. (Akashi reads out relevant passages from the last co-chairs statement to back the point.) So the international community's role should not be exaggerated.

Courtesy: Indo-Asian News Service