Tiger offensive repulsed in Kilali

War and Peace - The Defence Diary by Ranga Jayasooriya

As fighting rages in the North for the second week, the military strategy of the Tigers is becoming abundantly clear.

That is a strategy anticipated by the military top brass, indeed.

Everybody knew that the Tigers were eying Jaffna, but the military was equally confident that any LTTE effort to fight a frontal battle in the Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil FDL and to push all the way to the city gates of Jaffna would be a self inflicted annihilation for the Tigers. Even if they succeed in coming to Jaffna, it would be no more than a bunch of worn out armed cadres.

Therefore, the military anticipated that the Tigers would attempt a sea landing in Kayts and Mandativu Islands and also possibly in Manalkadu in the Northern edge of the Jaffna peninsula, while troops locked in the main battle at its Muhamalai FDL.

The fact that the attention and resources of the troops are diverted to the battle along the FDL could stand for LTTE's gain.

The Tigers followed suit.

While the battle is going on the Muhamailai-Nagar Kovil FDL, a flotilla of sea Tiger boats attempted to land in the Navy manned Mandativu and Kayts Islands.

According to military sources, another movement of LTTE boats was intercepted off Champianpattu, below the last security forces defence line in Nagar Kovil. Their destination was to be Manalkadu, which is identified as a possible landing site of the LTTE. However, the Tigers aborted their mission, when a truck mounted Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) was positioned at Manalkadu.

At the same time, a flotilla of sea Tiger boats sailed from Pooneryn towards the other end of the Kilali lagoon.

The aim was to carry out a seaborne attack on the FDL positions in Kilali and from there to push towards Jaffna.

Chronology of the fighting

The first LTTE attack on the Muhamalai-Nagarkovil and Thanankilappu FDL positions, which took place at 5.45 pm on August 11, was not a spontaneous reaction to the air strikes on the Tiger bases in Tharavikulam in the jungles of Batticaloa district on the same morning. The air raids on the two camps, one identified as a convergent point for the reinforcements and a training camp caused heavy casualties to the LTTE. Immediately after the bombing raid, LTTE Peace Secretariat Chief S. Pulithevan was heard complaining of heavy casualties.

The air strikes were carried out following an intelligence tip off that a large gathering of the LTTE cadres was present in the camp, which suggested that the LTTE was planning a fresh offensive either on the Batticaloa town or in Mavilaru.

Reports from fighters loyal to renegade former LTTE Eastern commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna has put the LTTE death toll of the air raid at 120.

These reports, however, could not be independently verified.

The attack on the security force's Northern FDL on the same evening was not tit for tat for the air raid in the morning.

Indeed, a day before the attack, the security forces received ground intelligence of an LTTE build up closer to the Tiger FDL in Palai. Troops were put on high alert.

Friday, August 11

The LTTE directed heavy artillery and mortar barrage at the FDL positions in Mahamalai, Nagar Kovil and Thanankilappu in the evening. While the ground battle was waging, a flotilla of sea Tiger boats was launched in Pooneryn and they moved towards Kilali.

The Navy gunboats engaged with the Tiger boats destroying four. The Navy confronted another attempt for a sea landing in the Mandativu and Kayts Islands. At least three sea Tiger boats were destroyed off the Kayts Island, while the other LTTE cadres launched an attack on the Navy manned FDL positions in Kayts, supported by artillery fire directed from Pooneryn.

The LTTE fought the whole day at Kayts. Later the Navy withdrew 300 metres from its initial FDL positions. As LTTE cadres advanced towards the FDL positions, barrage after barrage of Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRL) fire was directed at them. With that bombardment, the LTTE attack on the Kayts FDL positions ended.

Later in the day, army commandoes were airlifted to Kayts and Mandativu to mop out the remnants of the LTTE resistance in the town. Commandoes conducted a house-to-house search.

The Navy on Tuesday killed five LTTE cadres, supposed to have been sent to conduct special operations. A stockpile of weapons including T 56 guns, satellite phones and scientific computers was recovered.

During the first day of the offensive, troops vacated several FDL positions, four in Muhamalai and 16 bunkers in Kilali, amidst heavy LTTE artillery fire.

Commandoes were dispatched to Kilali to flush out the LTTE cadres who succeeded in the sea landing. Troops retook FDL positions in Kilali and Muhamalai by noon the next day.

Even then, during the next few days the troops had to vacate certain FDL positions during the night in order to avoid artillery fire by the Tigers.

Kilali offensive

Meanwhile, on Wednesday night, after scaling down attacks for a few days, the LTTE launched a daring offensive on the FDL positions in Kilali. This followed a series of setbacks for the Tigers in the battlefront, which began with a costly bid by the military to hold on to Mavilaru followed by simultaneous attacks on Mahindapura, Kattaparichchan, Palathopur, Selvanagar and Muttur.

After the rout in Muttur, the LTTE shifted the theatre of fighting to the North.

The LTTE believed that a large number of troops would have been shifted to the East for the Mavilaru offensive, even though in reality the number of troops shifted was 800. This turned out to be a fatal miscalculation on the part of the LTTE.

The LTTE offensive in the North proved to be costly. Twenty-seven soldiers and 150 LTTE cadres were killed on the first day itself. Battle casualties of the troops were mainly due to the extensive LTTE artillery fire.

During the next few days casualties increased as troops recovered 98 LTTE bodies from the Muhamail and Kilali battlefronts.

It was in this context that the LTTE fought an ambitious offensive on Wednesday night after a series of setbacks.

Intercepted LTTE transmissions indicated that top LTTE military leaders were directing the cadres. They included Sea Tiger boss Soosai, Vanni LTTE military commander Theepan, Palai Commander Laurence, Nagulan and a female military commander identified as Vithusa. This was the most fierce battle since the first LTTE strike on Friday. The LTTE launched 130 heavy artillery and mortar fire from the Kalmunai point (K point) in Pooneryn while Tiger boats attempted to cross the Kilali lagoon. Despite Navy and air force strikes destroying three sea Tiger boats, several others made their way to the beach.

Military sources said intelligence had been received on the possible landing site of the sea Tiger boats in Killai and that it was targeted with an MBRL bombardment as boats landed. The fight lasted for 10 hours from 6.15 pm to 4 am the next day. By dawn, the troops had beaten back the LTTE offensive and 50-60 bodies were seen left by the retreating LTTE cadres. Some of them were handed over to the Jaffna hospital, while police on Friday buried another 21 mostly decomposed bodies in Kilali after a preliminary inquest.

The LTTE's offensive on Wednesday was daring, but it proved to be costly. Security Forces said 150 LTTE cadres were killed in the battle while another 120 were injured.

Troops are shocked at the extensive use of children and teenagers by the LTTE. One officer referring to the battle on Wednesday night said," it is like the LTTE had sent an entire child brigade".

The death toll of the security forces is also mounting one hundred and thirty one security forces personnel, including six officers have been killed since August 11, when the LTTE opened a new front in the North. Over two hundred rank and files were injured.

Staff at the Colombo National Hospital, Jayawardenepura Hospital and Colombo South (Kalubowila) Hospital have been kept on alert to receive the battle wounded as fighting escalates.

The LTTE artillery fire is the main cause for the casualties of the security forces. The LTTE artillery fire has hit the Palaly military airport on several occasions. Though no casualties were reported and none of the aircraft was damaged, the threat posed by the LTTE long-range artillery has halted the air traffic of fixed wing aircraft. Only helicopters are functioning. Several rounds of LTTE artillery also fell in the Kayts Island.

Also, the Tigers through the tactful use of the limited number of field guns in their procession have hindered the troops movement beyond the Muhamalai FDL.

The LTTE is in possession of several medium 122 and heavy 130 mm artillery guns. When targeting the Palaly military airport and Kayts, the LTTE has positioned its artillery guns in Kalmumai point (K point) at the edge of Pooneryn. Even though extensive air strikes and artillery and MBRL bombardments have been conducted targeting these positions, continuing artillery attacks by the LTTE suggest that its guns, or at least most of them, are still intact.

However, according to ground intelligence, casualties are mounting on the LTTE side. They say 950 LTTE cadres have been killed since its rout in Muttur, which include 200 fatalities in Mutur, 150 killed by air raids and 600 LTTE cadres killed in Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil, Kilali and Kayts.

Military officials are also wondering why the first wave of LTTE cadres were not followed by another wave of far more experienced group of Tiger fighters, which is the usual tactic employed by the LTTE in the past offensives.

Does that mean the first group of LTTE cadres could not succeed in the objective so that the LTTE found it was not cost effective to induct its more experienced cadres.

But, as one military official suggested it was also not clear whether the extensive MBRL fire swallowed hardcore fighters who were deployed.

Exit strategy

The LTTE's military objective is clear; so is its battlefront strategy, but the political thinking of its leadership remains a mystery. Have the Tigers decided on an exit from the peace process altogether? If not, is this military offensive an effort to gain more bargain chips in order to discuss peace from a stronger position?

If the latter is the case, the mounting battle losses of the LTTE suggest it has failed, but that could only perpetuate the Tiger offensive, unless heavy firepower and mounting casualties kill the moral of the fighting cadres.