Will Blake bring down the walls of Kilinochchi or will he let the
answer blow in the wind? - Part III
 It is quite apparent that the majority-minority relations would have
moved on a more even keel if the northern minority too had dropped their
mono-ethnic extremism and decided to co-exist in a multi-cultural
society sharing the land in common with all other communities. But in
the dying days of the British raj Jaffna took to Tamil extremism without
any provocations from the Sinhala majority. G. G. Ponnambalam, the
astute and the aggressive leader of Jaffna Tamils in the last decades of
colonialism, launched his extremist 50-50 campaign, demanding 50% share
of power for the minorities led by the Jaffna Tamils. S. J. V.
Chelvanayakam launched his Tamil State Party (Ilankai Tami Arasu Kachchi
- ITAK) in December 1949, long before S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike had
dreams of breaking away from the UNP and embarking on the SLFP ship that
carried him into power in 1956.
Ethnic extremism
 In short, peninsular politics was whipping up ethnic extremism and
hate-Sinhala campaigns long before the Sinhala majority had acquired the
political power to initiate any acts of discrimination against the
Jaffna Tamils for them to take up the separatist cry. Though in the
prevailing political mythology Tamil extremism is attributed to
provocative legislation initiated by Bandaranaike (1956) the origins of
mono-ethnic politics of Jaffna go way back in time to the twenties,
according to Prof. K. M. de Silva who tracked it down to the breakup of
the Ceylon National Congress, and to the forties according to Dr. G. C.
Mendis who traced it to the divisive politics contained in cries of
50-50 etc.
The accusation that the Sinhala majority ran rough shod over the
minorities can be validated essentially in assessing their political
deliberations after independence for the simple reason that the colonial
masters would not have allowed the majority to exercise their power to
destabilize their imperial regime with explosive communal politics.
However, if there was any kind of oppressive majoritarian rule after
independence then it can lead only to one main conclusion: the Jaffna
Tamils too are guilty of being a part of the majority conspiracy to put
them down since the representatives of Tamils have been an integral part
of "the Sinhala-dominated" governments since independence. For instance,
would G. G., Ponnambalam, the astute and the aggressive leader of Jaffna
Tamils in forties, have joined "the Sinhala-dominated government" if he
and the Tamils were treated as second class citizens? Or did he join
"the Sinhala-dominated government" because he was given equal
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process at the highest
Cabinet level and derive benefits for his community? In the formative
years of the new nation did he not sit with the Sinhala and Muslim
leaders in designing the new national flag in which the Tamils and
Muslims were given special places? Did not ITAK (the Tamil State Party)
of S. J. V. Chelvanayakam join "the Sinhala-dominated government" led by
Dudley Senanayake government (1965-70) and declare that it was "the
golden years of Tamil-Sinhala cooperation" (Prof. A. J. Wilson) in which
"the Tamils got almost everything, if not all what they demanded" (S. M.
Rasamanickam, President of ITAK).
Historians from both sides agree that the ethnic tensions were not
prevalent in ancient, medieval and colonial times.
These tensions surfaced only after the Jaffna Tamils took to
"outrageous demands" (S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike) in the forties, starting
with their demand of "50-50" for 12% of the Jaffna Tamils in a national
constituency which consisted of 75% Sinhalese. Though they disguised it
as a demand of all minorities (25%), including the Muslims and Indian
Tamils , it was a cry initiated and launched exclusively by the Jaffna
Tamils who were hoping ride into power on the backs of other minorities.
The issue of discrimination was also raised by G. G. Ponnambalam when
he went before the Soulbury Commission and after his nine-hour marathon
speech the Commissioners dismissed it as stuff and nonsense.
Mark you, this issue of discrimination (meaning retaining and
increasing their disproportionate share of jobs in the public service
because government service was the only growth industry under colonial
times) was raised long before Sinhala-only was legalized in 1956.
Ponnambalam raised it in 1944 under British colonial rule.
However, as signified in the demand of 50% of power by a minority of
12%, it is clear that their hidden agenda was to grab a share of
political power that was quite disproportionate to their size and to any
other legitimate claims that could have fostered communal harmony and
peaceful co-existence.
Their obsession for power, essentially to keep the asangha (aliens)
out of the compartmentalized, water-tight vellahla zone within the neck
of Jaffna , was a peculiar political phenomenon confined to the ruling
vellahla elite in the peninsula. It was a sine qua non for them to
retain their feudal and colonial privileges together with casteist
supremacy, sanctified by the Hindu hierarchical codes.
The vellahlas were quite content with the colonial masters because
they were neither intrusive nor willing to overthrow their grip on the
peninsula, their most cherished, exclusive casteist haven. But the
universal franchise (1931) which empowered the low-castes with a new
political status, the cash economy insidiously breaking up the casteist
shackles that dehumanized them in the Hindu hierarchical system, the
democratization of the political system that introduced new values and
political consciousness opposed to casteism, the steady decline of the
British raj and the colonial patronage that went with it favouring and
protecting the upper-caste were emerging forces that threatened the
commanding position of vellahlas within Jaffna and the disproportionate
share of power in the British administration throughout the island.
Patron saint
Sir. Ponnambalam Ramanathan, an acolyte of Arumuka Navalar , the
patron saint of vellahla caste, opposed the universal franchise tooth
and nail because it meant the loss of power of vellahlas over the
low-castes. It meant increasing the political power of the low-castes
and liberalizing Jaffna society by equalizing the low-castes with the
upper-caste on the one-man-one-vote principle.
It meant that the high-castes would have to would have to go down to
the low-castes to get their votes to retain their power - a socially
despised act never tolerated in the Hindu ideology.
All these new political forces were unsettling the vellahlas. These
forces made it obvious to the vellahlas that their fortress in Jaffna
was standing like Bastille on the eve of the French Revolution. Even if
the low-castes were not ready to storm their fortress the process of
democratization and de-colonisation, which would decisively empower the
Sinhala majority, was ringing in their ears like the death knell.
The Marxists on the one hand and the Sinhala-Buddhists on the other
generated a political momentum that was intruding into their sacred
domain, threatening to cut them down to size. Their instinctive and
conscious political reaction was to turn their political guns to the
south. When the sun began to set over the British Empire , peninsular
politics took a turn for the worse, focusing exclusively on demonizing
the Sinhalese. All their problems were attributed to the Sinhala
majority denying them their rights, meaning the rights of the 52% of the
vellahlas. The fears they expressed were the fears of the vellahlas and
not that of the peoples of Jaffna.
In feudal and colonial times the Sinhala majority did not pose a
threat to their dominance inside and outside Jaffna . The main political
thrust of the vellahlas in colonial times was to keep the low-castes
under their heels. They were comforted by the dominant sway they held in
the political and administrative structures of colonial times even
though the low-castes were knocking on their gates, asking them to open
their temples, schools, buses etc for them to share everything as equal
citizens. It was only when the colonial masters were about the quit Sri
Lanka they realized that their next move to protect their feudal
fortress and the privileges within it was to confront the Sinhalese who
were bound to take over the reins of power from the British. This
explains why the Jaffna Tamils in the thirties and forties increasingly
and stridently turned against the Sinhalese without, of course, letting
the embarrassing and unwanted low-castes get out of hand.
The Sinhala leadership reacted with a meaningful gesture. When
Ponnambalam was demanding 50-50 the Sinhala leadership went out its way
to offer 46%. But the Tamil leadership rejected it, making its first
biggest blunder. Their mono-ethnic extremism insisted on 50-50 or
nothing. Their extremism and intransigence had its impact on the south:
it led to the hastening of the counter-revolution in the south which
woke up the sleeping giants. This counter-revolution which began as an
anti-imperialist movement from the 19 th century gathered a new momentum
under the mono-ethnic pressures of northern Tamils - the only minority
that refused to co-exist peacefully with them.
However, even at the height of the new wave of Sinhala-Buddhist
nationalism which peaked in 1956 the Southern forces were willing to
accommodate the linguistic, cultural and religious rights of the Tamils.
But the Tamil leadership was not willing to enter into compromises. They
went all out to confront Bandaranaike and make him, one of the greatest
Sinhala liberals, the bogeyman. They were joined by the Westernised
Sinhala elite who resisted the rise of the grass root forces which were
alien to them.
Making Sinhala the official language was a threat to the
English-speaking elite holding key positions in various professions.
They too were ready to align themselves with the Tamil professionals who
had a vested interest in preserving English as the chrematistic
language.
Bandaranaike was anathema to these Sinhala and Tamil professionals.
The vellahla elite in particular who dominated public and professional
positions resented him because his policies were undermining the
fundamental bases of their hierarchical society. Bandaranaike dealt a
severe blow to vellahla ancien regime by passing the Prevention of
Social Disabilities Act of 1959. The Sinhala Only Act affected the elite
of all communities. But the Prevention of Social Disabilities Act hit
the vellahlas directly and exclusively. The antagonism to the Sinhala
Only Act was a popular cry among the English-speakiing elites of all
communities who were generally united in opposing Bandaranaike.
Chelvanayakam exploited this resentment to the hilt. Though he was
"tip-toeing out of the caste issue" (Prof. Bryan Pfaffenberger) he went
pell-mell on the language issue. He went from kachcheri (provincial
centres of government administration) to kachcheri urging the Tamil
public servants not to learn Sinhala. It was the most opportunistic
issue that came his way to rouse anti-Sinhala racism.
It is, of course, mandatory for public servants of any country to
learn the language of the public. The Tamils had to learn Sinhala just
as much as the Sinhalese had to learn Tamil if they were to serve the
needs of the public. The alternative would have been for the public to
learn the language of the public servants.
Enthroning the language/s of the people was the primary means of
democratizing the colonial administration. But the English-speaking
elites vilified it as a provocative act designed to divide the nation.
The Marxists too joined the bandwagon. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva summarized
it when he said famously: "Two languages one nation; one language two
nations."
However, when they took up ministerial portfolios in Mrs. Sirimavo
Bandaranaike's government they accepted that English was the language of
the ruling class.
Then they flipped and argued that the working class had the right to
overthrow the language of the ruling class and use their mother tongue.
Ethnic interpretation
The Marxists gave it a class/economic interpretation. Chelvanayakam
twisted it into an ethnic interpretation, despite Tamil also being
enthroned as an official language. His anti-Sinhala campaign eventually
affected the Tamil public servants.
His advice not to learn Sinhala resulted in Tamil public servants
failing in their examinations. Gaining competence in the language of the
public was a requirement to get promotions and increments.
When they failed due to their own political motivations they cried
discrimination. Chelvanayakam was there to exploit their frustrations
for his political gain. But in fairness to Bandaranaike it must be
stated that he gave the options for the Tamil, Sinhala and Burgher
public servants to retire with full pension if they did not want to work
in the languages of the public. It was Bandaranaike who provided
facilities for public servants to learn both languages the Tamils to
learn Sinhalese and Sinhalese to learn Tamil if they wanted to continue
in service. Bandaranaike did nothing wrong. It was the right of the
public to be served in the language of the public.
The Sinhalese had a right to be served in Sinhalese and if the Tamil
public servants refused to comply then they were given the option of
retiring on a full pension. How much fairer could "the Sinhala-dominated"
state be to the Tamils?
Not surprisingly, the English-speaking elite in Sinhala, Muslim and
Burgher communities too ganged up to retain the colonial practice of
running the administration in English a language known to only 6 % of
the population. Today, if a Tamil does not receive a reply in Tamil a
hue and cry is raised to condemn it as an act of discrimination. But to
date hardly anyone argues that it was discriminatory and unfair by the
Sinhalese (75%) to be denied their right to communicate with the state
in their preferred language. It was labeled as "majoritarianism" because
the elitist minority suddenly found that their power and their
hip-pocket would be hit hard. The Tamils never stopped demonizing
Bandaranaike for giving the Sinhala people their historical right to
conduct their affairs in their mother tongue.
Predictably, they wanted minoritarianism to triumph over the
majority.
Democracy
Retaining privileges of the minority was their idea of democracy.
They continued their massive campaign against making Sinhala the
official language ignoring the fact that their language was also given
its rightful place.
This also appealed to the Westernised Sinhala elite who vilified
Bandaranaike. Even his Westernised children, who climbed to power and
prestige by standing on his coffin, haven't had either the gratitude or
the guts to defend their father who liberated the Sinhala people from
the shackles of colonialism. They would have been zeros if not for their
father's commitment to serve the grass root forces. His children invoke
his memories to remind the public that they are the heirs to the
Bandaranaike legacy. But once they get the votes they dance on their f
ather's grave, embrac ing the opposite of what he represented. The
founder of the SLFP, if he was living today, would be happy to embrace
Mahinda Rajapakse rather than his two alienated ingrates.
A part of the gargantuan myth that blames the Sinhalese is contained
in the political platform of the Tamil separatists who repeat ad
nauseam, the accusation of a "Sinhala-dominated government", implying
that it is not representative of other communities. Their distorted
propaganda is understandable. What is un-understandable is how
Ambassador Blake came to swallow this line. Besides, if he applies the
same argument to any Western democracy can he honestly say that they are
anything but white-Christian-dominated governments, without sharing
power with the minorities? On the basis of this, shouldn't Ambassador
Blake undertake a round the world trip visiting the capitals of all the
democracies saying that they are not representative of the minorities
before he tells that to the Sri Lankan government?
If the Sinhalese (75%), acting on basic principles of democratic
tolerance, had governed on accepted norms of majority rule without
segregating the minorities, without downgrading them to second class
citizenship like the Afro-Americans in USA, without treating them like
slaves, without genocidal extermination of minority tribes, making the
few remaining descendants homeless in their own homeland, without
grabbing their land at the point of a gun, without treating the helpless
minorities as guinea pigs for medical experiments (Nazi doctors on Jews
and American doctors on Afro-Americans in Tuskegee, Alabama), without
Belsen and Auschwitz concentration camps to dehumanize rejected
minorities, without using weapons of mass destruction to bomb the
enemies into submission in Dresden, Nagasaki, without napalming men,
women and children in Vietnam for dissenting with their politics,
without subverting democracy and rule of law by forcibly enthroning
fascist and unelected leaders like Gen. Pinochet, without imposing
embargoes on food and other essential items that led to the deaths of 5
00,000 children in Iraq (UNCEF figures), without amassing human rights
violations in every continent, not mention the islands on the globe
etc., etc., on what moral basis can the Western diplomats point their
fingers at "the southern Sinhalese" and walk with their noses up in the
air?
With all their aberrations, which were corrected as they went along,
"the southern Sinhalese" had an inclusive culture representative of all
communities.
It was the northern Tamils who were determined to run an ethnic
enclave excluding other communities. The Jaffna Tamils were bent on
building political, social and ethnic walls - mostly with cadjans - to
keep the "asangha" (aliens/outsiders) out.
The Jaffna Tamils were very much like the English-speaking societies
run by the domineering WASPish elite. The peninsular vellahlas ran the
most inhuman casteist culture that from feudal times consistently
enforced segregation, denied of fundamental rights, engaged in slavery
of the worst kind etc. Nothing has changed under Prabhakaran. In fact it
has got worse with him running concentration camps, ethnic cleansing,
and blatantly committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Clearly, Ambassador Blake's statement that "the southern Sinhalese"
are not inclusive or representative cannot be sustained by the realities
on record. He can, of course, argue on the perceptions of the Tamil
propagandists. But then perceptions are as deceptive as propaganda. The
task of diplomats is to separate the chaff of perceptions from the
grains of realities.
Bear in mind that historically the political platform for the current
crisis was engineered exclusively by the northern Tamil elite - the most
privileged political class - in the thirties and forties to push for a
disproportionate share of power in an equally disproportionate mass of
land. It began with the Jaffna Tamil (12%) demanding 50-50 which then
escalated into federalism in 1949 - long before S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike
swept into power in 1956 - and then finally morphed into separatism. It
is not that separatism was not in their agenda when Illankai Thamil
Arasu Kachci (the Tamil State Party) was launched in 1949 disguised as
the Federal Party. Separatism was in their agenda even before they
started blaming Bandaranaike for their extremism. They were masters in
disguising their political goals and tactics under various fashionable
theories and slogans.
Initially they posed as the non-violent Gandhians. The Jaffna Tamils
are the only known Gandhians who distributed wooden pistols at their
satyagraha sit-ins! Now they are campaigning for the Tamil Tigers, the
most brutal perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, on
high principles of human rights. In the thirties and forties human
rights was not a fashionable political weapon. Then Gandhism was the in
thing. Now they have replaced Gandhism with human rights not because
they are committed to human rights per se but because it is the most
marketable political tool to white-wash their inhuman politics that has
disgraced Tamils as a community in the eyes of the civilized world.
The obsession for a mono-ethnic enclave to retain their colonial and
feudal privileges and the political power to go with it was the
outstanding characteristic of peninsular politics dominated by the
vellahla elite. Equally characteristic was the willingness of all the
other communities to co-exist in harmony, whilst negotiating peacefully
for their rights.
Ex-colonies
In the fifties, Sri Lanka , like all other ex-colonies, was sloughing
the old skins of the colonial past and re-defining its national
identity. As in all other ex-colonies it was going through a period of
adjustment in which historical imbalances were being addressed to
restore the lost rights taken away by the colonial masters. The Founding
Fathers of the nation put together a coalition of all minorities and
placed the nation on multi-cultural, democratic and liberal path.
But in the peninsula, hidden behind cadjan walls, menacing
mono-ethnic extremism was raising its ugly head.
Jaffna never embraced liberalism, multi-culturalism, socialism, or
any other democratic and tolerant ideology that could have paved the
path for peaceful co-existence. Having consolidated their feudal
casteist grip on Jaffna during Portuguese and Dutch occupations, and
having reinforced their acquired advantages under British colonial
patronage, with, for instance, 12% Jaffna Tamils occupying 36% of the
British administrative posts in public service , the peninsular
political elite developed an ethnic complex of being superior to all
other communities, including the eastern Tamils and, more so, over the
Indian Tamils who were relegated to the lowest level of coolies.?
Besides, with S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, the father of Tamil separatism,
declaring "little now and more later" there was no room for
co-existence.
The political myth is that it was the abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam
pact, or the Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pact that pushed the Tamils
into extremism. The reality is that Chelvanayakam had established the
Tamil State Party in 1949 with the sole objective of pushing for "little
now and more later" like the camel in the Arab's tent, irrespective of
the compromises offered by the Sinhala majority. They were not going to
be satisfied with compromises. A good example is the rejection of the
offer of 46% when they demanded 50-50 in the forties. The Tamils even
tore up the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and the Oslo Ceasefire Agreement
which gave them more with international guarantees. The tendency of
Jaffna Tamils to commit political suicide is only comparable to the
misguided suicide bombers who are treated to their last meal by
Prabhakaran - the Grim Reaper of Tamils.
Their divisive, intransigent and extremist politics contained within
it the seeds of destructive and suicidal tendencies.
Their incremental strategy of moving to grab power for an exclusive
mono-ethnic enclave carried with it the potential for violence. Violence
and separatism are inseparable. From this came the Vaddukoddai
Resolution of 1976 - the Resolution that declared war on the Sinhalese.
It is the logical and the ultimate expression of mono-ethnic
extremism.
Though there have been sporadic communal clashes during the British
period no community has openly and aggressively declared war on the
other communities as the Tamils of the north. The Tamil political class
is now reaping what they sowed in the bellicose Vaddukoddai Resolution .
Ambassador Blake, like most of those who writes recipes for peace,
falls into the category of the notorious Sri Lankan medical specialists
who write prescriptions as the patients come through the doors of their
clinics, without even knowing what the ailments are. These Western
diplomats are in a free fall, hurtling down a credibility gap created by
the failure to grasp the imperatives of the mono-ethnic extremism that
drives northern politics. To reclaim their credibility and to regain
their objectivity in understanding the current and cross-currents of Sri
Lankan politics they will have to revise their premises based
essentially on propaganda and not on t he hard realities that
over-determine Sri Lankan violence and politics.
The ubiquitous cadjan walls planted round each house in Jaffna to
keep the "asangha" (the untouchable aliens) out is representative of its
culture. The openness, the inclusiveness and the liberality that
prevails beneath the neck of Jaffna are symbolic of the southern
culture. Whatever the defects of the southern culture may be "and there
are myriads" they cannot be accused of not being inclusive of other
cultures. The "southern Sinhala" culture can proudly stand up to any
Western liberal society and say that they have been superior in sharing
this land fairly with the minorities. It has embraced and given
protection to everything from Trotskyism, Stalinism, Titoism, Maoism,
Castroism, liberalism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam - you name it.
Jaffna culture is notorious for embracing only extreme racism for
which they are paying now.
For example, P. Saravanamuttu has the freedom and the right to speak
up for his beliefs, most of which are mistaken, in the "southern Sinhala
culture". But what place has he in the traditional Tamil culture run by
"the sole representative of the Tamils?" Saravanamuttu has the right to
go to courts in the southern Sinhala jurisdiction but what chance has he
of taking up a single case of child abduction in Prabhakaran's kangaroo
court in the north? V. Anandasangaree, the TULF president, says that he
had the right to protest when Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike went to open
the Jaffna University but now he can't even step into Jaffna now.
If Ambassador Blake has ears to listen why hasn't he heard these
voices of the Tamils who are waiting for the day when their society will
'return to tolerance, inclusiveness, liberalism and above all protection
of Tamils who have the right to dissent' Also if he has eyes to see he
would have noticed that it is the walls of Jaffna even though they are
made of coconut fronds that are rigidly and intransigently obstructing
communal harmony. No one expects him to bring them down like the walls
of Jericho . But as a diplomat he may agree that one of his primary
missions is to bring down walls wherever they may be. As a missionary of
globalization he would know that one of his tasks is to bring down
economic walls. He has also lived through the phase when political walls
(Berlin Wall) came crashing down. He is also witnessing attempts to
bring down the walls that divide north and south Koreas. To make Sri
Lanka more representative his mission is to bring down the tight,
compartmentalized walls of Jaffna .
And talking about walls, he might recollect the lines of Robert
Frost, his compatriot, who argued against walls that come between
people: "Before I built a wall I'd ask to know What I was walling in or
walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall, That wants it down." Of
course, Frost's last line says: "Good fences make good neighbours." That
is not because Frost endorsed walls. No. He wrote that to confirm the
folly of those who fail to understand that there is something that
doesn't love divisive walls.
Who wants to be on this side or that side of the walls when there is
much to be gained in the wide and free spaces, when vistas of new realms
open up, when "the narrow domestic walls" (Rabindranath Tagore) are
brought down and the people are liberated to walk the earth sharing it
in common as trustees, bearing the sacred duty to protect every precious
being in it? Finally, how can "the southern Sinhalese" make the polity
representative of all communities when those held behind fascist walls
are not allowed to come out and join the rest of civilized humanity? How
can you shake hands with those holding a grenade in one hand and a
kalashnikov in the other? So isn't the first duty of Ambassador Blake to
bring down the walls of Killinochchi if he wants to make Sri Lanka an
inclusive society? Perhaps, Ambassador Blake might prefer Bob Dylan to
Robert Frost and let the issue rest in the popular but inconclusive
lines of the lyric:
How many times must a man look up?
Before he can see the sky
How many years must one man have
Before he can hear people cry
How many deaths will it take till he knows
That too many people have died
The answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind
The answer is blowing in the wind.
(Concluded)
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