Tigers try sabotage tricks

Total annihilation of cornered Tigers:

by Ranil WIJAYAPALA

Sri Lankan High Commissioner to India, Romesh Jayasinghe was due to meet high officials of the Indian External Affairs Ministry yesterday at a specially arranged meeting. The objective of this meeting will be to discuss the incident relating to the killing of two Indian fishermen from Nagapattinam on the South Indian coast, while fishing off Point Calimere on July 11, 2008.

A highly volatile situation had arisen following this incident with Chennai based media pointing fingers at the Sri Lanka Navy for the killing of the two Indian fishermen and injuring another.

The allegation against Sri Lanka Navy has been raised at a crucial period; where eight SAARC leaders are due to meet in Colombo shortly and at a time when LTTE is getting a severe beating from the Security Forces in the battlefront, and on the verge of confining their activities to a section of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts.

The Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama has already taken the initiative to respond to the allegations levelled against Sri Lanka Navy by the Chennai based media, flatly rejecting the allegations that Sri Lanka Navy has been involved in the incident.

Issuing a press release on July 15, 2008 the Foreign Ministry gave ample evidence to prove that not a single Naval craft was operating in the area where the unfortunate incident had taken place.

It was after extensive investigations carried out by the Naval Headquarters in Colombo regarding the incident, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the said statement to the media.

The preliminary findings in this case, as reported by the Navy are that there were no Naval units operating on the Sri Lanka side of the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) in the area off Point Calimere on 11th of July.

But the Navy has detailed records about an incident that had taken place on the same night but at a completely different location, approximately 8 nautical miles East of Point Pedro when two Sri Lanka Navy Fast Attack Craft deployed on a routine patrol detected on their radar, a boat moving in a suspicious manner at high speed of around 34 knots.

It has been identified by the Navy, as having the configuration of an LTTE low profile boat and when the suspect boat failed to respond to warnings to halt, the Naval craft has been constrained to open fire.

The Fast Attack Craft of the Navy had fired 13 rounds at the enemy boat using a 30 mm weapon at a distance of 3.8 Km but has failed to destroy the target. The SLN FAC had then returned to its designated patrol area after the craft had disappeared towards the IMBL North of Point Pedro.

However, it was not possible for the Navy vessel to assess the outcome of the action taken by them and accordingly the possibility of the suspect boat having continued on its northerly course cannot be ruled out.

The Sri Lanka Navy assures that the incident took place in the seas off Point Pedro was well within the Sri Lankan territorial waters and any of their Naval vessels had crossed the International Maritime Boundary Line between India and Sri Lanka.

The Navy, referring to Chennai based media reports which states that the incident off Point Calimere refers to over 20 bullet injuries on the body of one of the deceased, also argues that such injuries can occur only through firing at point blank range from small arms and ruled out the possibilities that the incident off Point Pedro has no connection with this incident as the two Naval craft had to engage suspicious boat from long range as it was travelling at a high speed.

Though, the Chennai based media pointing the fingers at the Sri Lanka Navy over this issue before proper inquiries are conducted to ascertain who was responsible for this incidents, the recent history relating to such incident have proved that they were stage managed incidents by the LTTE to create a rift between the two countries.

The recent media reports on the incident highlight the manner in which some pro-LTTE politicians taking this incident to exert pressure on the central Government taking this incident as a stepping stone.

In fact there is no need for the Sri Lanka Navy to cross the IMBL and attack Indian fishermen since they are maintaining cordial relationship with the Indian Coast Guards and also with the Indian Navy in the process of handling the issues relating to the fishermen poaching in Sri Lankan waters and the Sri Lankan fishermen crossing into Indian waters.

It is important to recall what the Director General of Police D. Mukherjee revealed on the way the LTTE directly involved in the killing of five Indian fishermen from Kanyakumari on March 29, 2007. When these Indian fishermen were killed the Sri Lanka Navy came under severe criticism as they were made responsible to the incident at the initial stage.

The facts relating to this incident were revealed after the Indian Coast Guard arrested six Sea Tiger cadres on board the fishing boat ‘Maria’ on April 11, 2007 while it was on mission to smuggle arms from a ship to LTTE held areas and had drifted towards the Indian coast after developed an engine snag.

The arrested Sea Tiger cadres had admitted the fact that it was another group of LTTE cadres who had opened fire at the Indian fishermen killing all five of them. They also revealed that the LTTE had abducted 12 Indian fishermen, 10 from Kanyakumari and one each from Tuticorin and Kerala, on March 29 , 2007.

But they were later released by the LTTE after the Maldivian Coast Guard sunk the hijacked Indian fishing trawler ‘Sri Krishna’ which was hijacked by the LTTE in March 2007, while it was smuggling arms on May 17, 2007.

However, the Indian fishermen from Kerala who were captives of the LTTE along with the fishing trawler, jumped out of the trawler before it was sunk by the Maldivian Coast Guards along with the LTTE cadres on board.

Later he had revealed the way the LTTE had hijacked their fishing boat and the way the Indian fishermen were held captive by the LTTE.

It was in the middle of Eastern battles the LTTE made these desperate attempts to create a friction between India and Sri Lanka. LTTE made this attempt to get Indian Govt’s involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict since the LTTE cannot tolerate the way the Central government of India is backing the Sri Lankan Government in sphere of cracking down terror activities of the LTTE.

The story of the Selvam Sudesh Kannan from Madras an Indian national who was kept under LTTE custody was also another example to understand the behavior of the LTTE.

The 28-year-old Selvam Sudesh Kannan from Madras was brought under LTTE custody during his visit to Kilinochchi in 2003. After years in custody, Kannan was assigned with manual labour under the watchful eyes of the Tigers in one of their garages, for about three months.

He was arrested by the Navy near Talaimannar on Wednesday morning when he was fleeing from the LTTE along with three other friends.

Going through the efforts taken by the LTTE taking the Indian fishermen as a tool to damage the excellent relationship between India and Sri Lanka it is obvious to which direction the LTTE is heading now.

Firstly these allegations against Sri Lankan Government through the Sri Lanka Navy is coming at a time when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is due to participate at the SAARC Summit in Colombo. The LTTE is very well aware that Indian Prime Minister’s participation at the Summit at a time when the LTTE is facing defeat after defeat, a clear message against the LTTE.

On the other hand if the LTTE can get the Tamil Nadu politicians to exert pressure on the Indian Central government to boycott the Colombo SAARC summit it would be message against the military operations against the LTTE. Therefore, any person should be mindful about LTTE strategies adopted by the LTTE when their supplies across the Palk Strait is severely hampered with the recent moves by the Sri Lanka Navy to check Indian fishing trawlers poaching in the seas off Thalaimannar seas.

Not only they are losing their Sea Tiger bases with the fall of Vidathalathivu to Security Forces they are also losing the route through which they were getting their supplies under the cover of the Indian fishing trawlers poaching in the Sri Lankan waters.

The only way they can get through this situation is to create a friction between Sri Lanka and India using this fisherman issue at this crucial juncture.

Depriving the LTTE of its life line: Troops advance along the North Western coast

The capture of the Vidathalthivu the biggest Sea Tiger base on the Western coast was a severe blow to the LTTE. The fall of Vidathalthivu is the first step taken by the Security Forces in capturing the entire North Western coast which has become the only lifeline for the LTTE to depend on their supplies with their sea movements severely affected in the Eastern coast after the liberation of the East.

It was giant step by the 58 Division under the command of Brigadier Shavendra Silva who is also the Brigade Commander of the Commando Brigade to capture this strategically important Sea Tiger base within two weeks after the completion of the operation ‘Rice Bowl’.

As the Army Commander claimed the LTTE never thought that they would lose Vidithalthivu so soon after they lost the Mannar ‘Rice Bowl’ though it was obvious that it was going to be the next target of the Security Forces.

Giving no chance for the LTTE the troops are now consolidating the entire Vidathalthivu village including the jetty used by the Sea Tiger to launch their fast attack craft. As we mentioned in the SITREP the Wanni liberation has been fast tracked after the two offensive Divisions the 57 Division and the 58 Division were linked in the South West of Periyamadu.

Now the troops are poised to capture more and more Sea Tiger bases along the North Western coast after the capture of Vidathalthivu.

The wide front created by the Security Forces in the Western flank of the Wanni has given the LTTE to think of many possibilities of military advance.

Now they are not in a position to mobilise their cadres in one place like in the past as each and every place is vulnerable at this juncture.

That is the prime reason the Army Commander, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka is claiming that the ongoing military operations can bring about brought a turning point in August. Things are fast moving to achieve this task, now with the capture of Vidathalthivu is over.

It was after capturing the ‘Rice Bowl’ on June 29, the troops attached to the 58 division advanced a further four Kilometres north of the Rice Bowl area up to the 12th mile post on the A-32 Mannar-Pooneryn Road.

Advancing further northward they found another earth bund similar to the one found within the ‘Rice Bowl’ area from Pappamoddai to Parappakadattan. The aerial view of the bund showed that it ran from South of Vidattalthivu up to Piramanayankulam tank some 10 Kilometres east of Vidattalthivu.

The Southern front was created by the 581 Brigade under the Command of Lt. Colonel Deshapriya Gunwardena and 583 Brigade under the Command of Lt.

Colonel Suraj Banshajaya.

The 10 Gajaba Regiment under the command of Lt. Colonel, Sarada Samarakoon, 12 GR under the Command of Major Saliya Amunugama, 8 Gemunu Watch under the command of Lt. Colonel Suminda Jayasundera, and 6 Gemunu Watch under the command of Lt. Colonel Kamal Pinnawala formed the Southern front.

“We had decided to get the maximum attrition to achieve the Commander’s mission and we managed to kill over 100 LTTE cadres,” General Officer Commanding of the 58 Division Brigadier Shavendra Silva says while explaining the mission he had undertaken. Within ten days the troops were able to retrieve over 25 bodies of the LTTE cadres killed.

It was after the Army Commander directed that the time was ripe to capture Vidattalthivu the 58 Division began the offensive operation to capture it according to a concrete plan given by the Commander as a considerable number of Tiger cadres have already perished during this 10-day period.

“Another front from the East of Vidattalthivu was formed to achieve the mission given by the Commander,” the Brigadier says.

The Eastern front was created by the 2 Commando Regiment under the Command of Second In Command of the 2 Commando Regiment Major Shamal Silva in the absence of its CO Lt. Colonel Jayantha Balasuriya and by the 582 Brigade which consisted of Gemunu Watch under the command of Lt. Colonel Lal Chandrasiri, and 12 Gemunu Watch Under the Command of Lt. Colonel Nandana Dundunuwila.

It was after an initial attack on one of the selected portions of the 10 Kilometres long defence line that the troops understood the fact that the LTTE cannot withstand the fire power and the aggressiveness of the soldiers who assailed the FDL.

“They started to flee leaving behind their positions. They were running faster than they ran at the time we captured the ‘Rice Bowl,” the Brigadier added.

Their so-called commanders were not aware of what was going on there and were not in a position to control the demoralised cadres who had been forcibly conscripted to the outfit. The intercepted radio transmissions of the LTTE confirmed that they were totally disobeying the senior cadres and running for their lives.

By this time columns of troops advancing from an east to west direction were operating six kilometres behind the defence line but managed to get maximum killings targeting LTTE cadres fleeing Vidattalthivu.

As per ground confirmation a minimum of 35 to 40 Tiger cadres were killed after getting caught to ambushes laid by the troops operating east of Vidattalthivu whilst a considerable number of cadres were wounded and killed in the Southern FDL.

As the Commando troops came from east to west direction they observed dead bodies lying on the ground with vehicles and motorcycles on the site. It was on Tuesday that evening troops entered the main town of Vidattalthivu.

The continued interception of LTTE transmissions confirmed that LTTE leaders were searching for sub leaders and cadres but none of them had responded to the communications of the leaders.

Many of the Tiger cadres were mentally affected. Now the troops are dominating four kilometres south of Illuppakadavai after advancing further north of Vidathalthivu along the A-32 road. One of the highlighting factor in the Vidathalthivu battle is that the not a single soldier sacrificed their lives during this battle except for the three soldiers sustained injuries due to AP mines.