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Sunday, 8 February 2009

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From Mavil Aru to Mullaitivu

A tribute to the heroic servicemen of Sri Lanka:

It can be said that after Mavil Aru we had only victory. (Paraphrasing Churchill after the battle of El Alamein).

The score sheet of the Ottoman Turks (the first exponents of blitzkrieg but on horses) when they ruled a quarter of the known civilised world were : Courage 100, Integrity 100, Justice 100, Mercy 0, Will Power 100, Endurance 100, Compromise 0, Forgiveness 0.

Leadership

It could be said that the above were also the qualities of the leadership the SL Forces since 2006. The victory of the Forces over the LTTE from Mavil Aru (2006) to Mullaitivu, routing it from its `HQ' at Killinochchi and taking the supposedly impregnable lair of the LTTE in Mullaitivu, was not without great sacrifice. The near three year continuous campaign will be studied in the years to come by armies especially in the sub continent that wish to defeat terrorism. The honour and credit of these victories must first be given to the fighting troops in the Wanni and to their junior commanders who led them in battle sharing the dangers and travails with unwavering belief in victory. The grievous sacrifice of life and limb that brought victory must never be forgotten. The resolute and hard driving battalion and formation commanders who belying their years but not their experience, under the command of Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, planned and directed the battles with unshakeable confidence and determination to play a vital part in the victory. It was undoubtedly Lt Gen Fonseka who was the driving force that inspired the battling troops and their commanders as well as an anxious nation to stun the world having accomplished the impossible. His will power had prevailed over the most accomplished if elusive terrorist leader the world had seen and broken the spirit of the once indomitable LTTE.

To achieve this dramatic victory, the SL Forces had to overcome the ferocious suicidal resistance of the LTTE which had developed its conventional military strength to include artillery and light planes and an ocean going sea wing in addition to its ultimate weapon, the suicide cadres. It was not so long ago the LTTE had not only prevailed in battle against the SL Forces, overwhelming at least four well established garrisons, but also the IPKF from the second biggest army in the world which is today a nuclear power. Worse the LTTE had brainwashed the minds of at least three Army Commanders, (but not ever their continuously battling officers and men) to meekly accept the craven leadership of the defeatist politicians in power at that time. They became partners in guilt and were willing to retreat both mentally and physically from battling the LTTE. One `army commander' and `two defence `secretaries' (2 retired Generals) succumbed to the abominable pressure applied by a former C in C, Premadasa. They obeyed treasonable orders to secretly hand over truck loads of weapons, ammo and explosives to the LTTE in 1989 and even more distressingly more weapons both by land and air after the murder of 600 captive policemen in the East, who were instructed to surrender in 1990. Other politicians and some policemen in 2002 betrayed the Special Forces Long Rangers whose audacious deep penetration operations so panicked the LTTE that it sued for peace. Those guilty have still to face the consequences of their perfidy.

Manthrams

Consequently it conditioned the later responses of many senior officers and service commanders to neglect/abandon their sworn duty to defend their country in a manner unheard of elsewhere. They became adept to repeat NGO concocted `manthrams' that `terrorism could not be defeated' and `wars could not be won'. That must have meant that a democratic government faced with terrorism had no option but to simply surrender to survive. Two of these Generals continued to repeat these manthrams to the crafty anti national media even in retirement, encouraged by a swarm of diaspora funded, dollar padded NGOs.

This epic victory was achieved against a now cornered force which over 30 years had destroyed 70,000 lives including the very Tamils it said it was fighting for and civilians. It is now ignobly but cunningly dispersed amongst 150,000 of the very Tamils it had promised to defend using them as their mobile and disposable human shields. Its depleted strength is now limited to their leader's Praetorian Guard and the much battered survivors including the spearhead Imran Pandyan and Charles Anthony units. The LTTE has ordered a shameful change of shield holders to save not the Tamils but itself, as its leaders grovel like troglodytes in the pits they have dug, praying for intervention by the IC or TN.

Travails of the infantry

The SL soldiers had to overcome a well equipped and experienced enemy who though far less in numbers and weapons, fought bitterly whereever it chose to make a stand and then retreated tactically and in good order until its defeat at Mullaitivu. It cannot retreat any more. Fighting raged in one of the most severe monsoons in recent times, acerbated by a devastating cyclone which together flooded the country side giving the defending LTTE much more than the conventional advantage of 3:1 in defence. The LTTE even breached the Kalmadukulam tank bund on the A35 road, hoping to drown many of the advancing troops and disrupt logistic support. Another attempt on 1st of February to breach the Iranamadu tank bund at night was however foiled by alert patrols.

The infantry had in November and December 2008 marched through dense jungle and scrub forests in rain and mud in sodden clothes and boots, rarely eating a hot meal and almost never being able to rest on dry ground, far less sleep. Many fell ill. They had also often to wade and even swim to close in with the terrorists, protected by formidable 15 to 20 km long, 12-20 foot high earthworks/embankments/'bunds' below which rain filled ditches made what the LTTE believed and some media expounded were impregnable fortresses. Some went completely overboard looking for similarities to the battles of the (first) Somme in WW1 and El Alamein and Stalingrad in WW2. This drove others anxious also to make waves to compare them with Dunkirk (WW2- 1940) and Cannae (216 BC). This conflict was in the jungles of the Wanni, pitting the SL Forces against a guerilla/terrorist force of about 7,000 in 2008/9. It is an epic on its own. Each positional battle ended ingloriously for the LTTE which cut and ran despite initial resistance. Mud and slush deprived the infantry of the intimate fire support of the tank guns which meant the SL artillery had even less rest.

The weather often denied fire support from the air and most importantly immediate casualty evacuation. Unlike the sophisticated NATO and other forces fighting the Taliban and Al Quida at long range in the forbidding mountains of Afghanistan and the Fedayeen in the deserts of Iraq, or the Indians and Pakistanis in the plains of the Punjab, the fighting in the Wanni was at its most basic, eye to eye, face to face where nothing but the most demanding warrior qualities of courage, daring, skills and endurance and as one soldier said, the first with the `double tap' prevailed. The forces had also to overcome the enemy within, known to all. Like Prabhakaran, they must be vetting their Plan B.

The Victors

These epic victories in hard fought battles were gained on land by a total of nearly 50 battalions of SL Light Infantry, Sinha, Gemunu Watch, Gajaba and Vijayabahu infantry regiments working closely with the Commando and the Special Forces Regiments, helped continuously by the Armoured (Tank & APC) Regiments, SL Engineers, SL Artillery and the SL Signals and the support services including the Medical Corps upon which troop morale depends very much. They were supported around the clock by the intrepid pilots of the SLAF mainly in fire support and casualty evacuation missions in addition to their sorties in depth and the `silent service' rendered by the SLN which despite cyclones and monsoons, virtually sealed off any re supply from the sea after sinking the 10 biggest ships of the LTTE. Its innovative 100 boat `wolf packs' of dozens of well armed small boats foiled the attempts of the LTTE sea wing to reopen its supply lines.

Propaganda

Few armies if any could out perform the SL Forces in counter insurgency operations in the terrain, conditions and within the rules of engagement that the battles were fought against an enemy such as the LTTE. There were stringent constraints imposed by the state to avoid if not prevent non combatant casualties. (There were reportedly 250,000 but actually just 130,000 IDPs forcibly intermingled amongst the LTTE). Until the Mullaitivu operations began, for nearly 3 years, there were no allegations of any wrong doing of the SL forces. The international community (IC), and more so India, observed this restraint with amazement if not disbelief. The LTTE as a last resort incongruously, responded with a spate of allegations of HR violations by the SL forces. It was given unrestrained and hysterical support by the Tamil Nadu (TN) government. However the unhurried mid January 2009 visit of the Indian foreign secretary Mukherjee and India's almost unqualified support for the SL military campaign cut off the LTTE and the diaspora funded foreign media propaganda blitz. The LTTE being listed as the world's foremost terrorist group, now close to annihilation and resorting to shooting fleeing IDPs, had little if any international support or sympathy. The LTTE refused the evacuation of even wounded IDPs.

They then spread a canard that 300 IDPs had been killed and 1,000 wounded by retaliatory SL artillery fire. The ICRC said categorically that just `dozens had been killed' by artillery fire but did not apportion blame. The Bishop of Jaffna's remarks that the `LTTE should not place its artillery amongst the IDPs gave the lie to this `tale'. Responsible foreign media like AP then retracted their reports. Even Tamil Nadu (TN) government, knowing that any hesitation at this time would result in thousands of casualties to the Wanni Tamils, weighed in. It demanded like the UN and the SL government that the LTTE allow the IDPs free passage out of the designated `safe zones' TN had no illusions about the barbaric self preservation tactics of the LTTE, remembering the Jaffna Hospital episode when the IPKF was there and wished to play no part in its diabolical strategy.

Credibility

The LTTE then compounded its devilry by preventing 100s of wounded IDPs from being transferred by the ICRC to Vavuniya General Hospital. Pressure mounted on it by the ICRC and the UN proved too much and the LTTE relented. The number of IDPs coming over to the government side which started as a trickle is now developing into a stream and will soon turn into a flood.

Last week on a single day 1,000 IDPs arrived at Vavuniya. They will despite the deployment of execution teams, certainly include LTTE cadres judging by the recent discovery of abandoned uniforms and weapons. Very soon the numbers of IDPs fleeing will dramatically drop. The LTTE will then give a facile explanation that they have all been killed by the forces, hoping to conceal the fact that not only the IDPs but also its own cadres have broken land speed records for sprinting - away from the LTTE towards the SL guns!

Colombo's collaborators, NGOs and their political patrons and secret supporters, now bereft of the comfort of LTTE blankets, are beginning to shiver. The mood is somber and no longer cocky and these aren't the Tamils either. An epidemic of pneumonia is about claim its harvest.

The path to victory

The country must at this time remember with gratitude the brave and heroic soldiers who sacrificed their lives and limbs in 30 years of conflict.

Great commanders of the past like Generals Kobbekaduwa and Wimalaratne and their battalion commanders in the 1987 victory at Vadamarachchi (two of them are the architects of the final defeat of the LTTE today) and subsequent battles, from the lifting of the EPS siege after a bitterly contested historic unrehearsed sea landing at Vettilaikerni and the re-taking of Jaffna (1996) showed clearly that the LTTE could be defeated if the will power was there.

It will do well to also reflect somberly on the humiliating defeats of four garrisons which demoralised the nation but from the ashes of which an almost totally unrecognisable army arose.

There was now a long line of battle hardened warriors, amongst others Brigadier Shavendra de Silva and Major General Jagath Dias (who survived EPS) and a host of others who have known combat from the day they were commissioned.

This pool of veterans is the pride of the SL forces which any army will dearly love to have. The victories they gained were crafted and guided by the only Army Commander who consistently insisted well before he took over command that the LTTE must and could be defeated. He was oblivious to condescending contrary opinions of at least three of his predecessors and wimpy politicians of many hues.

Heroes and hostages

SL must also remember with gratitude the contributions made by hosts of fearless Tamils who were martyred by the LTTE from politicians Amirthalingam to Kadirgamar, together with the thousands of militant Tamils massacred by the LTTE for opposing them. There are others like Douglas Devananada, Anandasangari and Prof. Hoole who were responsible for showing the Tamil diaspora and the IC, on pain of ever present death, that the LTTE could never aspire to be the sole and now even simply a representative of the Tamils.

There are also the pioneering Eastern Tamils led by Karuna and Pillayan who threw their lot in with incredible and devastating intensity to help the SL forces to resoundingly defeat the LTTE in the East. They then entered public life with the intention of making the East a growing example of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese unity, cooperation, goodwill and development. Lastly the country should never forget that the strife, the deaths and the continuing agony for 30 years especially of the Tamils under the LTTE, were the result of what Sinhala mobs did to innocent Tamils in 1983. Yet, despite that near genocidal stroke, the overwhelming majority of Tamils even if the perpetrators were never punished and their own aspirations were not properly met, did not join the LTTE, despite its near heroic stature and grudgingly not only in their eyes. Instead these Tamils continued to live comparatively happy amongst the Sinhalese as they have for over 2500 years, contributing well beyond their share in all fields to the development of the nation. This was despite under going avoidable humiliation in seeking a better and honourable future. Hopefully, this must also be their victory.

Will to win

In years to come people will wonder why for most of nearly 30 years SL floundered in its conflict with the LTTE. Only one C in C, giving all the material support needed, directed his Army Commander to defeat the LTTE. Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka has "with affection and the will to win" brought victory to the nation. He has had to face not only the LTTE and suicide bombers for the entirety of the conflict but treachery and subversion from within including some media and local NGOs. He inspired the forces and the nation. His resolute field commanders and brave, hardy and gallant troops stood the prophets of doom (military, political and media) on their heads.

It was a case of his will power prevailing over Prabhakaran. It did. Will he now be promoted 4 star General?

The Forces victory must be consolidated by keeping the Armed Forces well funded together with good governance, development, gainful employment, rehabilitation, big budgets for health, education and housing, infrastructure building and national integration. It will ensure the scourge of the LTTE will not rise again. A super highway and reactivation of the railway to Jaffna would go a long way to bring all communities closer together again. The IC will help because they have seen in SL the light to overcome the scourge of the century.

Soldiers have to do their duty even if it means that in doing so they may die. Will the officers and men who made this victory possible be rewarded first by not having to go through the same horrors of bloody conflict, especially against their own people, again?

When the time comes will they have guaranteed second career jobs on demobilisation? Finally while the heroic dead are honoured by remembering them and building monuments, it is by looking after their NOK, the widows and orphans and also the disabled and destitute ex combat and wounded servicemen that the contract of the state with the soldier lives on in perpetuity. It must.

"I vow to thee my country, all earthly things above.......... The service of my love..... the love that never falters, the love that pays the price, the love that makes undaunted the final sacrifice".

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