exposé

A part of a larger secret package:

India gave LTTE Rs. 50 lakhs as compensation

Did India compensate the LTTE after the 1987 Indo-Lanka pact and the dispatch of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka? The US administration believed so, according to a cable sent by its embassy here and released by Wikileaks.

A cable dated April 5, 1988 cites newspaper reports, which quoted J.N. Dixit, then Indian envoy to Sri Lanka that a stipend was agreed upon and was to be paid to the LTTE by the Indian government in view of the tax loss it suffered after IPKF was sent. The US cable said Rs. 50 lakh was the compensation paid to the LTTE in July 1987 and only one payment was made before September that year when LTTE walked out of the deal over its participation in the interim council.

An unnamed LTTE spokesman in Madras is quoted as saying that the payment was part of a larger secret package of guarantees, which Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi offered LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran in July 1987 to get him to agree to the bilateral accord, said the cable.

"We were in the jungles when the amount was said to have been paid to the LTTE. There was no communication from the ministry of external affairs to us about the payment made to get Prabhakaran to agree to the terms.

It must have been a move by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)," said Col. (retd) R. Hariharan, an analyst of Sri Lankan affairs, who served in the IPKF.

Other features of the package for the LTTE included an assurance of an offer of 7 out of 12 seats to enable it to form a majority in the interim provincial council in the north and east of Sri Lanka. India said it would route Rs. 1 billion through the interim council to rehabilitate Jaffna besides $40million that was agreed upon by New Delhi at an earlier consortium meeting in Paris. The Indian government also promised to develop a police force after the formation of the interim council. Despite all this, the deal fell through almost the same day, said the cable.

As a parting shot, the embassy expressed doubt over the agreement itself. It said, "Left unsaid is an indication whether the package suggested above is still on the table in India-LTTE talks, which apparently have been going on for some time." Quoting a BBC correspondent, the cable said talks between the LTTE and India began in Madras in February 1988, but fell through a week later.

Courtesy: Times of India

CM went out of his way to demonstrate Tigers'commitment:

LTTE could have threatened Karunanidhi, says US

Tamil Tigers might have threatened the then Chief Minister, M. Karunanidhi, in 1989 "with a significant increase in the level of militant violence in Tamil Nadu" if he did not "boost their cause," the United States surmised.

"While all agree that it would be counter-productive for Karunanidhi to continue overt support for the several losers among the Sri Lankan Tamil political groups, his energetic and unwavering and totally uncritical agreement with the LTTE's every move is raising numerous eyebrows, and alienating members of his own party...

One extreme view, to which we do not subscribe, is that Karunanidhi is interested in a Tamil Eelam variant for his Indian state.

Another, perhaps more credible theory is that the LTTE has threatened Karunanidhi with a significant increase in the level of militant violence in Tamil Nadu, enough perhaps to lead to the imposition of President's rule, if he doesn't boost their cause," says a cable from the U.S. Consulate in Chennai to its Embassy in New Delhi and the State Department (90MADRAS1249_a, CONFIDENTIAL).

In its heyday after 'driving' out the Indian Peace Keeping Force, and burning bridges with friends in New Delhi and Colombo, the gun-toting Tigers had a free run in Tamil Nadu, till they over-reached themselves with the killing of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The cable speculates if Mr. Karunanidhi was becoming the LTTE's elder statesman, and details the understanding of the U.S. Consulate of the situation which led to Mr. Karunanidhi's change of stance.

Citing Mr. Karunanidhi's stance against the Indian Peace Keeping Force, his spin on the LTTE abducting Tamil Nadu fishermen and his futile but persistent attempts at forging unity among the fratricidal militant Tamil groups in Sri Lanka, the cable concludes that "the Chief Minister has gone out of his way to demonstrate his commitment to the Tigers - at what would appear to be significant political cost.

No political figure here, least of all from the DMK, can explain to anyone's satisfaction the gamebook Karunanidhi is using.

As he becomes more and more of a 'Tamil Eelam hardliner', some may feel he is burning bridges with Delhi. We are at present baffled."

Noting correctly that the LTTE "had never been Karunanidhi's favourite Sri Lankan Tamil militant group, principally because of their close ties with his arch-rival, the late M.G. Ramachandran," the cable says Mr. Karunanidhi's about-turn came soon after "mediation talks began in December, and specifically discussions between the LTTE's Anton Bala- singham and Karunanidhi."

After this, "the chief minister chose to ignore the other groups, advising them to bury their differences with the LTTE and support their obvious power position and assist in developing a viable Tamil political environment."

When the cable was brought to the attention of a Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam functionary, the leader responded that the U.S. and others were free to have their points of view. The DMK had stood for Tamil rights in Sri Lanka, and it had been dismissed from power too.

Courtesy: The Hindu