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by Lakshman Gunasekara

The Kshatriya, discussing the contours of a State and the disposition of troops, is in his element, just as much as a Brahmin excels in expounding the Dharma. Professor Gamini Lakshman Peiris, legal scholar, and one-time Vice Chancellor of the University of Colombo, that bookish author of numerous legal tomes, has made the transition to a Cabinet portfolio easily.

His knowledge of constitutions transmuted so quickly into statecraft, the new Minister of Enterprise Development, Industrial Policy, Investment Promotion and Constitutional Affairs has no difficulty, today, in discussing military rules of engagement and dis-engagement, and the demarcation of frontlines. Indeed, not only was he one of the architects of the previous ceasefire, in 1995, and later of the elaborate Constitutional Reform package, but he is, once again performing this vital function for the Sri Lankan State, if with a more businesslike set of political colleagues.

Is the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam a capitulation to terrorism by the Sri Lankan State or, is it the desired, successful, negotiation out of the abyss of war; a step towards transcending military conflict? Minister Peiris, in the following brief interview he gave last week, argues that it is a step toward peace. Perhaps he is clinging to that same hope of most Sri Lankans.

Q. How do you respond to complaints that the Ceasefire Agreement merely provides for a cessation of hostilities and that there is no foundation laid for any development thereafter that is towards negotiations for a substantive political settlement of the conflict?

A. The very first paragraphs of the Agreement commit the two parties to precisely that : to move towards a fully-fledged negotiated political settlement of the conflict. This Agreement, which is but a first step in the process towards peace, begins with the two Parties agreeing that their overall objective is a negotiated solution. To achieve that, however, we have to first stop the fighting.

The Ceasefire Agreement is a first step in a process that aims at resolving this problem at the political level. But it is only the first step - to achieve a halt to violence on the ground. Because you can't possibly hope to achieve success in the substantive talk in an environment that is pervaded by violence.

The Agreement is actually nothing very new in that a cessation of hostilities has been in effect since December 24. But it was an unilateral action by the LTTE on one side and the Government on the other and there form very uncertain and unstable. There were no guarantees of any kind, and if we are to move beyond that point, we had to establish guarantees of some sort, such a commitment to a ceasefire and arrangements to prevent any disruptions.

That is why, the Government moved quickly to stabilise the situation by means of a Memorandum of Understanding. We wanted to put in place a properly structured agreement with terms and conditions that are mutually acceptable. That is what has now happened, with Norwegian facilitation.

We will ensure that the security of the state is in no way jeopardised by this Agreement. The Government has made crystal clear to the police and the armed forces that their obligation is to maintain law and order. Specific instructions have been given that, that duty has, in no way, been diluted by the MoU.

Once this is put in place, there is the Monitoring mechanism. The Monitors have an obligation to ensure that the duties of the two sides are fulfilled and that, that fulfilment is enforced. The Monitors have a critical role. We are moving quickly on this. I understand that the Chief Monitor, who is due to arrive shortly, has already met Anton Balasingham in London while on his way to Colombo.

Q. But the Agreement is not simply about a cessation of hostilities, is it? You have detailed provisions for what is 'confidence-building measures'.......

A. While this Agreement is open-ended and not limited to a fixed time period, it has been so structured as to arrange the obligations of the State and the LTTE to be fulfilled in fixed time spans in a series of stages.

That is, in the first 30 days, certain things have to be fulfilled and certain things are allowed, in 60 days more things must be completed and by 90 days since the Agreement came into force, various other things have to be completed. For example, in the first thirty days, only a very limited number of unarmed LTTE cadres will be allowed to enter the cleared areas.

By the end of the first 90 days, there will be much greater freedom of movement allowed for unarmed LTTE cadres. But this would allowed only if the LTTE also fulfils it obligations according to that time table.

The 90-day period is significant in that we hope that the two sides will be ready, by then, to begin talking directly to each other on the possibilities of political negotiations. Our Government has already declared its readiness to begin serious talks in the next three months. We hope, then, to draw the agenda for the substantive talks.

Q. The Agreement bans what are termed "offensive" operations by either side. In a combat situation on the ground, field commanders have to decide quickly whether or not to take action. How do they decide for themselves whether a strike against advancing enemy forces or to counter aggressive preparations by enemy forces, will 'offensive' action?

A. That is clearly indicated in the Articles providing for an end to hostilities. No direct attacks can be carried out by either side against the other. However, there nothing stated in the Agreement that will restrict defensive actions. That is a legitimate right.

Q. That pivotal Article 1.3, which supposedly authorises the Sri Lankan armed forces to "perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka", has the caveat "without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE". Is this a restrictive blanket thrown over all armed forces operations against the LTTE's maritime supply line?

A. There is nothing in Article 1.3 that, in any way, inhibits action by the armed forces to prevent the LTTE from bringing arms into the country. The interpretation of this Article, especially the reference to "offensive operations against the LTTE" is not vague as some people are trying to imply. It is quite categorical. That is a reference to direct offensive attacks of any sort.

It does not refer to defensive action by the armed forces to prevent arms smuggling into the country. Action that is taken to intercept a boat that is thought to be bringing arms into Sri Lanka is certainly not "offensive" action. It does not come within the ambit of "offensive operations" because it is defensive action to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

Let us look at the rules governing activity on land. If a group of armed people are seen approaching, you challenge them. And then if they do not respond in accordance with the laid down procedure, you will take defensive action. This same principle will apply to the sea as well.

If the Navy sees a boat approaching and challenges and does not get a reasonable response, or the boat opens fire or behave in a evasive manner, the Navy is bound by duty to react in a way appropriate to defend our territory. That is defensive action. That is not offensive action. It is crystal clear. It has been accepted by the armed forces. For example, the way the Navy reacted in the incident off Mullaitivu recently is correct. They must take action. And they will do the same even now, after the signing of the Agreement. Let no one have any doubts about that.

The 1995 Agreement signed between the PA Government and the LTTE has identical provisions in this regard. The only difference is that the 1995 Agreement has an additional clause that provides for greater room for fisheries activities. This has been left out of the 2002 Agreement which, therefore, strengthens the Government's hands and is not to the benefit of the LTTE at all.

Q. The provisions regarding the separation of forces have been picked on by some who fear that there may be loop holes in this to enable the LTTE to encroach on areas previously not under its control......

A. The Agreement provides for both sides to remain static, where they were at the time the Agreement came into force. There is an average distance of 600 metres to be maintained between the two sides. In places where there isn't 600 metres, the Agreement provides for procedures to demarcate the frontlines in accordance with the ground situation and the topography of the area. The 1995 Agreement did not go into these details and this helped gradually weaken the hold of that cease-fire.

Q. The Monitoring Mission will have a major role to play in this...?

A. Yes. They will be called upon to supervise arrangements. It has to be done. Otherwise there is the danger of mis-understandings and provocations and, that is how a cease-fire could break down. The demarcation of frontlines under the supervision of neutral Monitors will prevent the clandestine attempts at encroachment that we have seen in the past.

The less incidents we have like this, the quicker we can get away from the tensions that could cloud progress towards peace talks. We must move away from the military aspects and towards the civilian side of things.

Q. Then there are the other anti-LTTE militant groups like the PLOTE and the EPDP. The Agreement says they are to be disarmed. Knowing the LTTE, this looks like the death sentence on these groups which were the only groups that dared to dissent from the LTTE and ended up taking the side of the Sri Lankan State. They helped gather intelligence for the military, helped in covert operations, in deep penetration strikes.

Doesn't the Sri Lanka State owe it to them to ensure that they survive in the new conditions?

A. The Agreement clearly provides for their well-being as well. They are being offered inclusion in the armed forces and will be stationed in the South, well away from LTTE areas.

Q. Will the provisions for the entry of unarmed LTTE cadres into the cleared areas enable the Tigers to flood into the rest of the country? A. You have only to look at the clauses of the Agreement to see how tightly controlled that is. The numbers are extremely limited.

In the first 30 days, no one is allowed in. After the first month, only fifty are allowed in, and it is only after the second month, that is, after sixty days since the signing of the Agreement - what is called D-Day plus 60 - that another 100 will be allow entry. Even this will be governed by procedures such the requirement to carry LTTE identity papers.

The regulation of LTTE movements in cleared areas are successively defined in Articles 1.11, 1.12 and 1.13.

And military areas will be out of bounds. In any case these stages will be operative only if the LTTE is seen as implementing its side of the Agreement, such as the opening of the A9 road up to Jaffna along which unarmed Government troops will be allowed to move. By the 90th day, we expect the talks to have started. This regulation of LTTE movement is in sharp contrast to the situation prior to the Agreement when there was no control at all and the LTTE was free to intrude into cleared areas if they could avoid army patrols.

Now they have to submit to monitoring.

Some people ask why there is provision for the LTTE to enter cleared areas but there is no provision for the armed forces personnel to enter LTTE-controlled areas. That is because, the Sri Lankan Government has never conceded that we have lost control of these areas, and we do not want to concede that now. By normal law our personnel have all the right to go to any part of the country.

We do not need to legitimise that right of access through any new agreement. Such a provision would only legitimise the LTTE's control over certain areas. In any case, the civil administration has always covered the un-cleared areas and our civilian officials have all the time moved freely in these areas in their work. We have only lost the policing powers.

Q. The Agreement provides for the restoration of normal life for civilians, but mention is made of the Muslims. What about the Sinhalese civilians living in the border areas and in the East?

A. Article 2 clearly emphasises that the aim of restoring normalcy covers all inhabitants of Sri Lanka. There is a stress on 'all' in the Agreement text itself. This is to ensure that people of all communities will be catered to in the confidence-building measures required by the Agreement.

The Agreement Preamble specifically mentions the Muslims because of the special problems they have faced in the East where their settlements are located in between Tamil community settlements. Article 2, however, categorically states that all people have to be catered for. This clearly includes the Sinhalese population in settlements close to the war affected areas.

Q. In the allocation of districts to the Monitoring Mission for purposes of monitoring, there is no mention of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi. Why are these two areas, which are in the heartland of the LTTE-controlled ares, exempted?

A. It is simply that the monitoring is required in the conflict areas, to ensure that the conflict is not recurring. There is no need for a monitoring mission, for example, in Colombo or Matara. Neither Kilinochchi nor Mullaitivu are in the conflict areas themselves today.

If you take the 1995 Agreement, there is mention of Mullaitivu in the provisions for the separation of forces and for monitoring because, at that time, there was a military base there and, therefore, it was an area of conflict. But even in 1995, Kilinochchi was not near a conflict area and so even that Agreement did not mention it.

Q. Article 2.12 of the Agreement seemingly renders ineffective the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which, admittedly, has been much criticised in both the North and South. Can such an Agreement render inoperative an Act of Parliament?

A. All that we have done is that the Government has proclaimed that it will act with flexibility in accordance with the Prevention of Terrorism Act. That is part of the duties and roles of the Government. In our administration of the North and East, including our enforcement of law and order, the local authorities will implement the PTA according to the needs of the situation.

Q. Then there are claims that since the President, as the Executive Head of State did not sign the Cease-fire Agreement, it is not a legitimate one. After all, declarations of war are matters of State and so are declarations ending war.....

A. Declarations of war and peace become Presidential duties only when they pertain to relations between nations and not for internal matters, especially not for an insurgency. There is no need for us elevate the LTTE insurgency into an inter-state war. In doing so we would be distinguishing the LTTE as holding the status of a national government .

Q. Would you say that there is little new or unusual in the current cease-fire agreement when compared with the last such agreement concluded in 1995?

A. That is why when I addressed Parliament, I pointed out that there are "significant elements of continuity between the 1995 and 2002 Cease-fire Agreements. We have not attempted to re-invent the wheel, as it were, because the 1995 Agreement had many provisions which are suitable for today's needs. So many provisions in the 2002 agreement were there in the 1995 one as well.

It is true of the provision about the sovereignty and integrity of the country, it is true of the provision about the distance to be maintained between the forces, it is true of the provisions with regard to fishing. Annex 'A' which is about the goods to be transported into the un-cleared areas is identical to the 1995 provisions.

Q. Then why should the PA and its leader, President Kumaratunga, complain that they have not been consulted adequately? Cannot one assume that since the two Agreements are almost identical in many ways, the PA leadership should be familiar with the provisions and does not need much time to arrive at a decision about the new Agreement?

A. The cease-fire process is an evolving one, and we are committed to a consultative process with all parties, especially the President and the PA. The President was kept informed as we made progress.

The President was regularly briefed by the Prime Minister about the formulations and the provisions. What I must stress is that the peace process must be taken out of the realm of confrontational politics.

What our Government has done is directly in response to the mandate given by the people to us in the last general elections. Nobody can deny that dealings with the LTTE was the principal issue in the parliamentary elections campaign. It became an emotive one.

And there is no doubt that the electorate entrusted Ranil with a mandate to take the initiative for peace. In our country, sovereignty resides in the people and we derive our authority to make peace moves directly from the people's mandate. It is both illegal and undemocratic to subvert that popular mandate for peace.

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