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| Sunday, 29 June 2003 |
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| News Business Features Editorial
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Interim administration: Inevitable, but is it timely? Sixth Sense by Raj Gonsalkorale Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's speech at the opening session of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (in Colombo recently) demonstrated, perhaps for the first time, his frustration with the LTTE for demanding an interim administration. His reaction seemed to be more to do with the timing of the demand and the very public way in which it has been made and handled, rather than with the demand itself. After all, the issue of an interim administration has been on the cards since the Thimpu talks and it is no surprise or anything new for the country to get so excited about. However, the very public and strident LTTE demand on the eve of the Tokyo donor conference, their refusal to even meet the ceasefire "broker" Solhiem, and the very accommodating Prime Minister's frustration with them, have for the first time since the ceasefire and commencement of peace talks, cast a serious gloom over the future of the cohabitation arrangement with the LTTE. Whether these strains will result in a resumption of war is too early to say, but the current stalemate does not augur well for the future. Some are likening the demand to the story of the camel that threw out his master from his tent after first getting his head in the tent and then pleading with the master to give more and more room for him in the tent, ultimately taking the entire tent and driving the master into the cold dessert night. In the current situation the LTTE cannot be regarded as a helpless camel, while it may be considered equally cunning and resourceful, and neither can the Sri Lankan government be regarded as a master, though the Sri Lankan State should be regarded as the master of all citizens in the country. The LTTE however cannot attempt to usurp the sovereign rights of the Sri Lankan State, and the writ of the State has to be in force throughout the country, and any type of administration must fall within the bounds of the sovereignty of the State. If an interim administration is to be discussed and agreed upon, it has to be done within the scope of this principle. And it certainly needs discussion as to the degree of authority given to it, its stakeholders and its validity within the Sri Lankan constitution. The reasons given by the LTTE for pressurising the Sri Lankan government to respond to its demand if they are to attend the Tokyo conference may have some validity, but the demand itself, at this juncture, is certainly pre-mature. Their timing, as always, has been totally opportunistic, and has placed the Prime Minister in a spot he would rather not have been. It appears that the LTTE has over played their cards on this occasion, and weakened the very person who is their best hope for securing them as much autonomy as they could. The LTTE has fought a war for twenty years and one cannot believe they are in a hurry to achieve their compromise objective of a Nation within a State within an year or two of cessation of violence, when in fact they have already made significant progress towards this objective in one year since the ceasefire than what they did during twenty years of war. Lack of progress by bodies created to speed up rehabilitation and reconstruction may very well be a reason for the LTTE to demand an interim administration at this point in time, but progress, or lack of it, has to be viewed in context, the environment within which everyone operates after twenty years of war, the lack of organisation, infrastructure, facilities and mistrust. If there is inefficiency and lethargy on the part of the Sri Lankan government in not expediting these activities, then there is clearly a greater need for the LTTE to work with various government agencies to overcome these hurdles. A political demand that destabilises the Prime Minister is not the answer to the problem, as his destabilisation only strengthens the hand of the President, who from the outset had argued for settlement of major political issues before moving into other administrative issues, a position which the LTTE had strangely rejected during her tenure in government. It is difficult to imagine the LTTE virtually biting the hand that has fed them so far, but that's exactly what they seem to have done by making this demand at this stage. The President is clearly for the peace process, considering she began the process and has always supported it, but she has her own terms for it, and those terms are not as flexible and open ended as the ones articulated by the Prime Minister. In fact the LTTE demand plays right into her hands, and she would emerge stronger as a result of it. The President's strategy might be a better strategy for the country, but from an LTTE point of view it would not be so as they will have a less accommodating person to deal with in Chandrika Kumaratunga compared to Ranil Wickremesinghe. The LTTE strategy is therefore inexplicable and counter productive to them, and it smacks of amateurism in political strategy thinking. The LTTE must surely realise that the climate is not right yet for an interim administration, and for any major political changes and that the enmity between them and many others in the rest of the country has to abate quite considerably for an interim administration to come into being. This demand and the conditions attached to it if it's not accepted, its timing, as well as the LTTE's preparedness for war (its increased armed force, acquisition of arms), does give observers an impression that contrary to their public pronouncements, the LTTE intends resuming terrorist acts and war, as a means of achieving their real objective of a separate State. The proposal made by the Prime Minister, for a powerful development body to replace the current reconstruction and rehabilitation body, is the right strategy for the present, and the LTTE should have negotiated for more power and authority within this structure. If the LTTE is serious about remaining within the Sri Lankan State but with considerable autonomy, they should demonstrate their willingness to achieve political progress incrementally and over time. One wonders whether the recent sidelining of their chief negotiator Anton Balasingham and the Tiger himself assuming the role of a political strategist, is the cause for this misjudgement, because that's what this is. It might be the first lesson for the Tiger, that he has a lot to learn in politics however masterful he has been in war. (Raj Gonsalkorale, a management executive domiciled in Australia, is a founder of the Sri Lanka Forum, Sydney, and has long been involved in expatriate peace activism.) |
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