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| Sunday, 20 July 2003 |
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Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
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by KUMAR RUPESINGHE The temporary suspension of talks between the GoSL and the LTTE has provided an opportunity for all the parties to evaluate mistakes and problems associated with the negotiations process.
It is my view that the parties to the conflict and all stakeholders need to learn lessons so as to deepen and broad base the negotiations process, which can eventually result in a final settlement. Mid-Course Correction The suspension of talks is in my view a welcome midcourse correction. In a way the process and design had to be corrected because it was developing a momentum, which could have ended in disaster. There were weaknesses and gaps in the process. The Tokyo conference and the accompanying frenzied hustle and bustle also contributed to the overheating of the process. There were too many deadlines: for example, the insistence by Japan on fixing a date for the donor conference and the parameters established in Oslo, and too many third parties imposing different agendas without any substantial discussions between the parties as to the final outcome. The suspension of talks must be seen as a strategic shift in the negotiations process. It represents a shift away from a "problem solving mode " to a positional bargaining posture. In the first phase both parties had decided to engage in "problem solving" and only engage soft issues since it was felt that it was too early to engage in core issues. It was a 'playing for time' strategy where both sides envisaged that they could prolong the process until the next elections when the current President would move out of office. However the process faced major problems when the question of the High Security Zones (HSZ) could not be resolved by the Sub Committee on De-escalation and Normalization. The failure of the Sub Committee to deliver practical solutions to de-escalation and normalization resulted in the committee being suspended. Expectations by the LTTE that the ban on the organization would be lifted could not be fulfilled in the short term. It is important to remember that both parties were not in favor of an Interim Administration during the early stages of negotiations noting that the government was weak. They then agreed to a joint task force and eventually to the establishment of the Sub Committees on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN). It was the lack of implementation of the relief and rehabilitation programme that precipitated the current crisis. Washington The crisis was further heightened by the exclusion of the LTTE from the preparatory donor seminar in Washington. Washington served to accentuate feelings among the LTTE that they were not an equal party to the process despite the understandings between the two parties to joint action, which is similar to the bride not being consulted before the matrimonial ceremony! It is clear that the Interim administration is the focal point of concern because it can now be realized that it will be through such an Interim Administration that the development needs of the Northeast can be effectively realized. It is also clear that the existing administrative machinery has failed to provide relief and rehabilitation to the affected populations in the Northeast. There is overwhelming evidence that the Sri Lankan bureaucracy and public institutions have not delivered and dampened the expectations of a war weary people. Given this failure to deliver, which is fundamental to confidence building, the UNF government is called upon to deliver on its promises of an Interim Administration to the LTTE and utilize the mandate given by the people. The United National Party proposed "a short term interim council for the North East consisting of representatives from all concerned parties" in its 2000 Party Manifesto. The People's Alliance also proposed an Interim Council for the North and the East for a period of ten years. Currently the LTTE expects the GoSL to present its proposals as a first step to resuming negotiations. It would seem more meaningful if a draft was discussed outside the glare of the public so that a joint announcement could be made later. There is no way in which the Government is able to discern the views of the LTTE. There are some statements made by intellectuals supporting the LTTE that they would like to see an extra constitutional solution. The Government however is unable to move beyond the existing constitution. Feasible A compromise solution which could be reached is to restrict the interim solution to a mechanism where the resources necessary for an accelerated development of the North East, particularly the funds allocated to the Northeast by the Donor Conference in Japan flow in an efficient manner for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. This should be seen as an interim to an Interim solution and for a limited period of time. Such a solution would be perfectly feasible within the existing Constitution. However, as acknowledged in previous arrangements such as in the Indo Sri Lanka Accord and the August 2000 proposals such a Administrative Council should be under the political direction of the LTTE with adequate representation of the Muslims and the Sinhalese. In previous efforts weighted representation of the Muslims and Sinhalese and double majorities have been proposed. Such a package could be conceived where even the P.A. could nominate its representatives. Such a Council could be empowered to disburse and manage funds for relief and rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Government administrative system and the Provincial Council administration system could be rationalized for this purpose. The important point is that the people in the North and East must enjoy the benefits of the Peace Dividend and the LTTE needs to be engaged in the process of development. An Interim Administration, which goes beyond the disbursement of aid, cannot be achieved within the existing Constitution. It requires a constitutional amendment, which can provide the basis for a Federal structure. The 13th Amendment, which provided for Provincial Councils and the August 2000 proposals are two of the building blocks, which are available to us. The 13th Amendment itself was only possible given the five-sixth majority, which the UNP enjoyed in Parliament at that time. The 1978 Constitution promulgated by President J.R. Jayewardene continues to be the major obstacle to the formation of an Interim Administration for the North and the East. But what is clear from the initiatives is that the people in the South are prepared to share power with the LTTE with the provision that adequate safeguards are provided to the Muslims and Singhalese living in the North East. It is the political class in Sri Lanka, which continues to vacillate over this vexed question. Election The question at issue is how such a radical solution can be provided within the existing constitutional constraints. It is obvious that the UNF will have to secure the support of the P.A if this transformation is to be achieved. The President and several of her spokespersons have indicated that she is prepared to support the provision for an Interim Administration if it is within the August 2000 constitution. These statements may be rhetorical and made so as to outmaneuver the UNP. However they need to be taken at face value as a starting point for building consensus in the South. If the UNF is unable to secure the support of the President then it will have to seriously consider elections to obtain a fresh mandate from the people. Whether the President would agree to call for elections at the behest of the UNF is open to question. An election at this current conjuncture would seem to be an unnecessary and costly exercise. Those who argue that the PA-JVP electoral alliance would assure a parliamentary majority would find that the population is not prepared to face another quick election and that they would like the political classes to settle this matter once and for all. Failing on these options would mean a constitutional crisis which would plunge the country into chaos. The P.A leadership has an enormous responsibility to reevaluate its strategy and it might be worthwhile to explore the options available. Whether the PA would support an interim administration and become a stakeholder in rebuilding a multi-ethnic society or deny this vehicle for power sharing to the beleaguered community in the North East remains to be seen. It would seem to be in the natural interest to make the matter of the Interim Administration an issue beyond party politics. Even if a PA-JVP alliance comes to power they will inherit the same constitutional crisis. It could also lead to a resumption of war. LTTE and President The LTTE must also seriously re-evaluate its approach to political forces in the South. It is clear that they will have to consider a strategic shift in their approach so as to develop a multi-faceted approach and work with all the political parties and civil society organizations in the South. While maintaining bilateral negotiations with the UNF government, it has to enter into a constructive dialogue with the President and the constituent parties of the P.A. as well. The strategy earlier adopted by the LTTE in isolating the President and coming to a deal with the UNF cannot be sustained beyond the original context. The current speculations in the press regarding the readiness of the P.A. to engage in a dialogue with the LTTE, although it is intended to outsmart the UNF government, must be welcomed as it helps to broadbase the framework for the negotiating process. The LTTE must not restrict its widened approach to only the PA but should expand it to include the JVP and other political parties as well. I am not arguing for the creating of two parallel tracks but suggesting that, while maintaining the general bilateral framework, the LTTE contributes towards developing a multi-lateral framework. Fortunately the LTTE is responding to some of these concerns as exemplified by the qualitative changes in their relationship to the Muslims in the Eastern region where they have demonstrated a willingness to hand over lands back to the Muslims. They have started a process of political engagement with the Muslim community in the Eastern region. A political engagement between all stakeholders is the need of the hour. Design Both parties should seriously review the architecture, which governs the negotiations process. Is it necessary that talks should be held in different capitols and that six weeks have to lapse before the next meeting? Perhaps in the beginning this would have been necessary for the sake of ensuring legitimacy and to further internationalize the process but should it be so now when important core issue have to be tackled in face to face meetings on a more frequent basis? This could be done either by changing the venue from Colombo and Kilinochchi or in a fixed capital like London with easy access to both parties. There is no doubt that the initial trust, which existed between the two parties is now seriously eroded. We are moving from a period of joint problem solving to positional bargaining. It is evident that the current methods adopted by the two parties cannot build trust. Although the UNF Government allocated two senior Ministers to handle the negotiations process and established a Peace Secretariat to handle the technical aspects of the negotiations, there are some flaws, which need to be taken into consideration. There is currently no consistent evaluation and monitoring of the peace process as a whole. The principle of pragmatism is too risky an approach when such high stakes are involved. Perhaps the government could entrust the Peace Secretariat to evaluate and regularly monitor the ongoing negotiations process. A notable feature of the past 16 months is that only a very few people have been involved in the actual negotiations process. The two Ministers entrusted with the task have to divide their time and energy between competing functions and demands. The end result is that the quality of the work suffers. The fact that there was very little follow up of decisions taken is only one example of this problem. The Negotiations process requires absolute focus and attention and requires the full time attention of the Ministers concerned. Further, there should be mechanisms for follow up to ensure that action is taken on a regular basis. It is regrettable that national institutions have not been fully utilized and their expertise solicited in the numerous subjects, which come under the purview of the peace process as a whole. Even now very little work is done with regards the Federal structure, de-militarization, power sharing, de-escalation, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Very rarely are civil society institutions consulted and there is no structured process whereby leaders can listen to the voices and concerns at ground level. This distance exemplifies the failure of communication between the ground and the leadership where both the LTTE leadership and the Government negotiators were immune to the suffering and neglect of the problems of refugees in the North East. Role of International Community The International Community which has played such a significant role in providing an umbrella of concern and support needs to reevaluate its own role in the light of past experiences. These roles have been blurred in the recent past. This is particularly so for the Norwegian facilitators. What is the role of Norway? Are they facilitators purely playing a technical role as a go-between the parties, or are they mediators using leverage through the International community to ensure compliance? Their role must be further clarified. It is also obvious that the strength of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) should be doubled. It is important not to clutter the field with too many third parties. The International community needs to demonstrate coherence and evenhandedness in dealing with both parties to the conflict. If they are to be the custodians of the peace process, a role that they have inadvertently taken upon themselves then they have to win the trust of both parties. The International community needs to indicate a step-by-step approach as a precondition for lifting the ban on the LTTE. The ban remains a serious hindrance where one party is continuously in a weaker position. In the same way that the ban against the IRA was lifted based on mileposts to be reached it is time that the International community indicates under what conditions the ban would be lifted. Establishing such benchmarks may be a framework around which constructive engagement can be pursued. However unless the LTTE is prepared to stop political killings and allows greater political participation it would be increasingly difficult to convince the International Community to de-proscribe the organization. Japan has made an important contribution through the leadership it provided in the donor conference in Japan. In their early forays in international peace diplomacy Japan needs to rethink its role and ask themselves what role they can play based on their comparative advantage. It is better that the International community works through the established and legitimate facilitator, Norway, who was invited by both parties to play that role. Further, the International community must find ways to constructively engage with the LTTE and win their confidence and trust. Bullying tactics and impositions and decrees from above to gain compliance could become counterproductive. Safety Net If there are other lessons that we need to learn from the current suspension of talks it is that mechanisms need to be created and an understanding reached that a safety net is developed if and when talks fail. A unilateral suspension of talks may have been a mid course correction at this stage of the game but if there were serious disagreements then there must have been an agreed mechanism which can come into place. The Peace Secretariat should draft such a paper which would elaborate on such a mechanism. Negotiations by correspondence undermine confidence in the process making the population feel insecure. |
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