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| Sunday, 03 August 2003 |
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| News Business Features Editorial
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Offer political solution to wider Tamil community by Raj Gonsalkorale Truth is regarded as the first casualty of war and this has proven as accurate as it always has been throughout time. The world is reeling in disbelief (some say in mock disbelief) about the gradual eroding of the truth relating to reasons why the US-led coalition forces went to war against Saddam Hussein. Humanity in general Surely, have we all been ostriches with our heads in the sand? The Ostrich Mentality seems to be contagious, and Sri Lanka has not escaped this syndrome with regard to its own problem relating to the ethnic conflict. Here too, either the truth is hidden or there is an alarming degree of ambivalence towards it, or we are constantly being fed with distortions of the truth, in the hope perhaps that we will start believing the untruth, as the truth. Goebbels did this masterfully for Hitler during the Second World War, and others are now surpassing that master. What are some of the truths that seem to belong to all or any of the above categories? The ongoing LTTE violations of the MOU whenever they feel like it, and reported building up of an arsenal of more than 600 long range shells, perhaps capable of reaching many key areas in the South, building up of an armed force of nearly 20,000 fighters (confirmed recently in Batticaloa by none other than the number two of the LTTE, Thamilselvan himself), recruitment of child soldiers, re-arming of its forces, administration of areas under its direct control as if they are a separate State, elimination of its political opponents by killing them, are widely believed to be the truth that is either being glossed over, or ignored, as an Ostrich would do with its head in the sand. Separate State To make matters worse, the Nation's own TV channel, reportedly, has readied itself to canonise the Tiger leader, and show the country and the world that he really is a cat in disguise, and he really has a heart of gold, which purrs for all the people of Sri Lanka, be they Tamil, Sinhala or Muslim. His political theoretician in waiting, and Number Two man, Thamilselvan, has finally let the cat out of the bag (pardon the pun!) by openly saying that the LTTE is well prepared for war, if they have to resort to it. He has even said that the LTTE has to be ready to go to war to pursue peace. We now come to truth number two as to how the LTTE has reached their ascendant position and managed to get the Sri Lankan government and the international community to reject the participation of all other Tamil political grouping in the peace process or the ongoing negotiations relating to the interim council. Some might justifiably say that there is not much one can do when a gun is held to your head and you are asked to sign a document of capitulation. After all, many have paid with their lives for opposing the LTTE. How has the LTTE achieved this position of strength? Their brute strength and organization capability? Undeniably so, but is it wrong to say that they have been given immeasurable help, paradoxically by their own enemy, the successive Sri Lankan governments since independence, but more specifically since 1956, who failed to recognise the existence of an ethnic conflict and offer a solution for it? And is it also untrue to say they have been ably assisted by corrupt politicians in the South, others with no vision, and some armed forces personnel as well as some bureaucrats who have profited from this conflict? Despicable acts What is the truth relating to the question whether the LTTE enjoys the support and confidence and above all the trust, of the larger Tamil community as their most able representatives? The answer to this question will be mixed, as some would regard them to be their best representatives because they (the LTTE) have managed to bring the ethnic conflict and the insecurity of Tamils in Sri Lanka to the attention of the world community, thanks in large part to the despicable acts of 1983 perpetrated by a section of the Sinhala community. If we are to take Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe at face value for comments he made in a recent article, he had not recognised any contrition leading to an apology on the part of the former President J. R. Jayewardene about the plight of the Tamils in 1983, giving weight to the belief held by many, that sections of the government of the day in 1983, had a hand with the violence perpetrated against the Tamils in 1983, either by omission or commission. Dignity and security Several independent surveys carried out recently amongst Tamils, principally by the National Peace Council, has indicated that an overwhelming majority of Tamils did not favour a separate State, and they were for a united Sri Lanka, with an adequate degree of devolution granted to the North, if not a combined North East province. Indications were that a majority of Tamils wanted to live with the Sinhalese and Muslims, in one country, but with dignity and security. Despite several measures taken by recent Sri Lankan governments, there are still doubts among many Tamils, whether they could in fact live in dignity and security amongst the Sinhalese and the Muslims. These fears and apprehensions make the LTTE even more powerful, and they are deriving this power not from the Tamils, but effectively from those who wield power in the South, who have not been able to lead and demonstrate their ability to give Tamils unambiguous equality with the Sinhalese and all other racial groups in Sri Lanka. . The current Sri Lankan government has recognised the need to involve the LTTE in discussions and afford them an exclusive position vis a vis peace negotiations, and the Prime Minister is on record saying that anything other than a separate State is negotiable. The President has not opposed this general principle. Therefore there is no doubt at all about the commitment to peace on the part of the government or the President or the political grouping she heads in the country. However, it appears now that the LTTE interpretation of a commitment is quite different to that of the Government or of the President. This is a major issue that either has not been realised, or has been thrown in the too hard basket, hoping that it will become a non issue over time. This divergence of interpretation is a conflict by itself and we may not make much headway with either the interim council proposal or the peace process itself, unless both parties agree on what they mean by a commitment to peace. If the LTTE's commitment to peace is to be the same as that of the government, there cannot be any statements on resumption of war even with a hundred provisos. A commitment is a commitment and it has to be an ironclad commitment. This is the only way that confidence-building measures can be put in place for the two parties to pursue a political solution. Strident demands that create and perpetuate perceptions about LTTE objectives which may go beyond a devolved unit within a unitary State, only creates more antagonism and mistrust, and certainly does not help the peace process. If the LTTE continues their stridency, and incremental demand frequency, it would not be out of place to think that they could very well have an agenda beyond what they have declared to the world. Deviation In this climate, if the LTTE shows a deviation from a commonly understood and accepted meaning of a commitment to peace, as they seem to be doing of late, then the Sri Lankan government, and the PA will have no choice but to look for other partners amongst the Tamil and Muslim polity who have no divergence of opinion on this issue, however difficult it might be to bring such people to the open and state their views in the face of LTTE thuggery, intimidation and murder. To the credit of these political organizations, and to their peril at the hands of the LTTE, they have made public statements condemning the atrocities of the LTTE. Unfortunately, the biggest Tamil political organization, the TULF, with the exception of their outspoken leader, Mr Anandasangari, has not thought it appropriate to condemn LTTE atrocities, even if they believe that Tamil interests are best served by the LTTE. The success of the peace process is dependent on two factors, trust and credibility. However, the objective of the peace process has to be clear amongst all parties and there has to be mutual acceptance of this objective. There cannot be a wide disparity between how these objectives are interpreted by different people. Mutual trust and credibility is relative to mutual acceptance of this objective, and it may be necessary for the peace process to engage in identifying and narrowing the meaning of objectives if we are to move forward with the peace process. For example, if the ultimate aim of the LTTE is to have a separate State despite some statements they have made about accepting a solution which basically gives them everything that a separate State would give, without actually having a separate State, it points to LTTE settling for nothing less than a separate State. If this is the objective of the LTTE, then there is a major divergence between their objective and that of the Sri Lankan government, which has stated their willingness to grant extensive autonomy within a unitary State. Interim administration Such a divergence of objectives cannot generate trust and it therefore does not give credibility to the peace process. We are in fact witnessing the after effects of this breakdown of trust and credibility, with the LTTE hardening their posturing with the setting up of their own "higher" security zones, barred even to the Norwegians, and refusing to discuss the Government's proposals on the shared interim administration. These developments do not augur well for the future of the peace process and unless there is some re-thinking of the LTTE's strategy, and the Government and the President, of their own strategy, the LTTE is bound to take the path announced by the hardline would-be theoretician Tamilselvem, which is, the resumption of war, of course as he says, for the sake of peace. In these circumstances, the Government and the President, and her political grouping, must explore other options available to them and possibly a large section of the Tamil community, which really do not support either the LTTE (except out of fear), or a separate State. The time has come now to offer a political solution to the wider Tamil community. In management parlance, to quote Edward De Bono, the Government needs to rise above competition and engage in "competition", and move away from the playing field that the LTTE has created according to their dictates. However powerful the LTTE is, the time has come to look beyond them and offer a solution that meets the aspirations of the wider Tamil community within a unitary Sri Lanka. In doing so, if the LTTE threatens war, the Sri Lankan government must obtain assurances from governments that have supported the peace process, that they will stand by Sri Lanka and assist Sri Lanka should the LTTE make good their threats of war. The proposals introduced by President Chandrika Kumaratunga a while back might be a good starting point to work out the framework of a political solution, and the LTTE could be presented with these proposals at the same time they are given to other established Tamil and Muslim political organizations. In a sense, it could be said that the LTTE has achieved an objective for the Tamils, to have brought the ethnic conflict, their insecurity, and their indignity, into the domain of international politics. Following this, it is counter productive for the Tamils, and for the Sri Lankan government to consider the LTTE as the sole representative of all Tamils. Credibility Logically, and the LTTE is bound not to see it this way, it would have been far better strategy for them to have formed an umbrella organization with other Tamil political organizations, retaining their position as the leading force in such an organization. This would have given them far more credibility, and they would have won many more friends. They are no doubt a considerable force to reckon with and they cannot be sidelined from any peace process if a meaningful outcome is to be achieved. However, there is a limit to which any negotiating partner can or should tolerate the possible existence of a hidden agenda, and the lack of a mutually understood and agreed commitment to the peace process. The LTTE has not endeared themselves to anyone with their stridency and their self opinionated smartness. They have spurned the Norwegians, the Japanese and other mediators who have taken conciliatory messages from the government, and they have raised their stakes after every visit by these mediators. A stage might come when one has to say, enough is enough. A resolution of the impasse relating to the interim council may be found by the Government capitulating more and more to the agenda of the LTTE, or at least is seen to be doing so by the PA and of course by the JVP. Such a situation will destabilise the Government, and very likely result in its downfall, and the emergence of a PA/JVP government. The country, of course, will be back to square one. For the sake of the country and all its innocent civilians, one hopes that we are far away from that point, though we may be heading in that direction. The Government can arrest this situation by joining forces with the President, forming a joint Peace Council and offering, at least, the principles on which a political solution would be worked out for the broader Tamil community, not just the minority represented by the LTTE. |
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