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| Sunday, 03 August 2003 |
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Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
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Military requisites of a sustained Cease-fire Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA It looks like the United States of America is going to have to learn things the hard way. I guess that's how all those who are omnipotent learn, wherever they are, at whatever level (in the human heap) they are omnipotent. Some empires have the grace to retreat into isolationism, as did the late Roman Empire, and into a decadent, 'splendid isolation' at that. At least until the barbarians come crashing through the gate. Other omnipotent regimes don't learn to learn and to see beyond the avijja. Then they wreak horror of sorts on everyone around before they are dealt with, themselves, in a mighty effort by others of humanity. Usually it is, as in the case of Nazi Germany, quite a 'Gotterdaemerung'. The current regime in Washington is already learning, via the returning body bags, that direct military occupation is not that simple nowadays (or, at any time in history for that matter ask the Romans or the Maurya). Of course the regime in Washington is, to some degree at least, representative of the American people. And, as opinion polls in the US showed these past two years, the American people have, largely been quite complicit in Washington's whole strategy of authoritarian, unilateral, politico-military intervention and domination worldwide. Mass destruction As many critical commentators in the West itself have noted, people in America tended to, consciously or semi-consciously, ignore the actualities and seize on the pretences and the make-believe (weapons of mass destruction, etc.) in giving tacit or explicit consent to Washington's imperialist schemes. Their duplicity is now being revealed quite shamelessly. Now more and more Americans are beginning to think that the intervention in Iraq is wrong or that the brushing aside (actually, in my view, it was, and is, a manipulation) of the United Nations is wrong, and that the UN should be more involved. Why "now"? Because the body bags are coming home and the economic cost is stark, and the military invasion has not succeeded in a quick subduing of Iraq. Cocooned as they are in their super-heated or super-cooled environs, the Americans are not ready to slog it out in Eden (the historical location of the Biblical 'Creation' legend has been identified as the valley of the Tigris-Euphrates rivers). So now they are back-tracking and, just as the Roman citizenry did in the late Empire, they will, at some point, turn on their 'emperor'. Neither were the Sinhalas prepared to slog it out in the North-East against the literally barefoot soldiers of the Tamil Elaamist insurgency. Of course, those of ultra-nationalist thinking are ashamed of the speed of the Sinhalas (not of the Damayanthi Dharshas and Susanthikas but of the fleeing sebalu) and hate to admit that reluctance to fight in the far North and far East. Plurality of culture But, fortunately, the sheer military persistence and valour of the Tamil insurgency has managed to rid many Sinhalas of that ridiculous ultra-nationalism. This is what sustains the truth of Sinhala civilisation: that the mass of Sinhalas have, indeed, learnt some lessons from the Tamil people's heroic resistance to ethnic hegemonism. Indeed, it seems that more rustic the Sinhalas are, and the less Westernised they are, the quicker they have been to shift from any illusion of an ethno-centric, exclusive State, and have acknowledged the plurality of culture and community on this resplendent isle. Now, it is largely the more Westernised, Western-aspirant, less rustic, social layers who continue to cling to the maya of ethno-supremacy. The opinion polls are showing it quite clearly and they are matched by the electoral vote. This does not mean, however, that most Sinhalas have worked out things in a dispassionate, logical manner. After all, there are many logics (not one as the totalitarian liberals would have us believe), and there is, and should be, much passion on this island, especially in the heat of continuing confrontation and social tussle. But a beginning has been made. Of course, the leaders of the Sinhalas, that is, the dominant social elite, who were pretending an ethno-hegemonism right through these post-Independence decades (for them it has always been a class hegemony rather than any 'nationalism') were the first to do the 'about-turn'. Heritage of Dharma The Sinhalas, despite their dreams of ethnic supremacy and spiritual omniscience ("The Dharma Dveepa"), seem to have, somehow, escaped the kind of disaster suffered by Nazi Germany, even though, the 'barbarians' in the form of the Tamil Eelamist army (the LTTE), did knock quite hard on the gates - in Anuradhapura, Kandy, and Colombo. At least, for the moment, one may say that the old maya of a 'Sinhala Only' empire has been set aside, and more realistic, pragmatic perspectives operate. How pragmatic, how realistic, will depend on how strongly and genuinely, the Sinhalas will remain true to their spiritual-intellectual heritage of Dharma. The same applies to the Tamils and Muslims as well. Right now, the war remains in suspense. And because the military-strategic equilibrium between the Sri Lankan State and the LTTE (I should actually say 'Tamil proto-State', but that is not a palatable term this side of the border) is not seriously shaken either way, the lack of any direct talks between the two sides has not seen any slippage toward a resumption of hostilities. It is reasonable to argue that, as long as that equilibrium remains, there is no danger of war. What are the requisites for this 'equilibrium' or, 'symmetry' as Kautilya would have called it? Firstly, there is the immediate military equilibrium. The Cease-fire Agreement (CA) 2002 maintains the military status quo as at February 2002. This status quo applies to both military capability on both sides as well as the general quantum of territory directly controlled by either side. Re-supply operation That is why both sides have equal right to re-supply and maintain force levels, combat readiness and general logistical capacities. Of course, both sides could try to shift the military balance in their favour which is the normal behaviour of the protagonists in a war. This can be done in two ways: (a) by undermining the enemy's re-supply operation and thereby militarily reducing their existing military capability or, (b) by greatly increasing one's own military capability far out of proportion to the February 2002 status quo. CA 2002, unfortunately does not lay down detailed provisions for the monitoring of force levels or, for that matter, for the maintaining of a certain level of capability. There are no limits or ceilings imposed on military build-up in CA 2002. This makes it virtually impossible to control such build-ups. Therefore, it is possible to argue that, as of now, the potential for continuing military build-up, that is, option 'a', is wide open. Since option 'a' is feasible, this is a potentially sensitive matter and one that can threaten the current cease-fire. If one side begins to build-up capacity significantly beyond CA 2002 levels, then that will certainly cause an asymmetry and this will, logically, prompt the other side to resort to military action before further disadvantage is caused to it. Logically, this means that both sides must then proceed with their build-up or, both sides must be held, in some way - the best way is monitoring of force levels by a third party to a ceiling on any significant build-up above CA 2002 levels. In any case, even if there is no new military build-up, both sides must maintain current capabilities and readiness. This requires re-supply and exercises and training activity. Here too that equality has to be maintained. If only one side is allowed to maintain existing capability while the other side's re-supply effort is undermined, this will result in a military asymmetry and will, therefore, prompt the side whose capability is threatened to resort to war before any further disadvantage is accrued. This is why, this column has long argued against the Navy's current adventurism against the LTTE's maritime re-supply activity. The second requisite for the maintaining of the CA 2002 status quo is the question of territory. While this is partly co-terminus with each side's military capability, it also has a pure political dimension. One very complicating factor is the fact that there are no fixed, contiguous, lines of control covering the whole theatre of war and none have been laid down in CA 2002. As this column observed last week, the East is dangerously 'porous' in this respect. Political implications The SLMM seems to think that a move must be made to draw actual lines of control. This has pure political implications, in addition to the military, and it may not be advisable to proceed with such demarcations without any prior foundation laid for negotiations on political matters either at national level or at local community levels. This is because, territory is one of the critical issues among the political fundamentals that are part of a final political settlement of the overall conflict. Thus, neither side must act in any way that seriously and significantly changes the current military and political equilibrium in the areas controlled by either side. This column last week argued that the LTTE incursion in Kinniya is not a major development in terms of its impact on the actual military-strategic equilibrium. making it a critical issue is an unfortunate political error. Tactical disadvantage The new LTTE camp does not cause serious tactical or strategic military disadvantage to the Sri Lankan armed forces (unless there is some important geographical detail of military value in that locality that this writer is ignorant of). Even if there may be a slight tactical disadvantage to the Sri Lankan forces, it does not cause any strategic imbalance. This is the same logic that applied to the off-shore operations of the Navy against LTTE supply ships. The LTTE, so far, has obviously not suffered a major strategic disadvantage, despite the loss of two re-supply shipments. But an accumulation of tactical losses could cause a strategic imbalance. This must be understood by both sides. This logic applies to the Navy interference in LTTE maritime re-supply as well as to the LTTE's territorial expansion effort. Both these must be considered as serious irritants in the current peace process. And while time may be taken over the larger political aspects of the process, such as the debate over the interim administration, that 'time' can only be ensured if these irritants are kept to a minimum. |
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