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| Sunday, 5 February 2006 |
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Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
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'Talks' for homeland -'Strategy' for one land Grand strategy must always remember that peace follows war.
"If you wish for peace understand war, particularly the guerilla and subversive forms of war" - Capt. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (1944) 'Homeland' is defined as the state, to which one belongs or, from which one originated, or as native land or as a country, from which one's ancestors came while 'unitary' and 'united' as not divided and politically joint, respectively according to the Oxford dictionary. As far as the talks are concerned, the manner, in which the LTTE behaved at previous talks, differs from one another. This means, that they, often had a 'hidden' agenda at talks; at Thimpu, they managed to effect troops withdrawal from the northern coastal belt; this facilitated their cadres, who received training in Tamil Nadu, a safe return, across the 'Palk' strait. Talks with President Premadasa enabled them to get rid of the IPKF, while the same with Madam CBK helped them to re-establish control in the east, which they had lost, and smuggle a consignment of new weaponry system, such as 'stinger' missiles. At the fourth one, they consolidated, themselves 'politically'; thus terminating the three phases of guerilla warfare- 'preparatory', 'resistance', and 'active-resistance' and entered the fourth, which is 'open/strategic offensive'. Many interpreted the LTTE's entry to peace process in many ways - international pressure on LTTE following WTC attack by Al-Qeada, LTTE-military stalemate, threats to LTTE leadership by 'coup-de-man' military operations, change in the attitude of the LTTE leader, pragmatism of the, then PM, etc. Having, so optimistically talked about the LTTE's change to politics from military, at the beginning of talks, various analysts including media, then began to talk about their readiness to combat; by just speculating from their recent violence and past behavior - this shows the lack of understanding and professionalism, and also biasness in comments for political and individual gains. The actual reason for the LTTE to enter talks has, now been proved by the way the LTTE maneuvered their affairs since the beginning of truce. Fighting The LTTE, however never had a habit of fighting, in vain just because, they have a record of violence, and fighting for over 20 years - they fight, only when it is necessary; for anything that is, in need of Eelam. But, they will, never ever waste their cadres or resources for nothing. They will strike at the 'right time'- 'right target'- 'right way'. At present, what they haven't or couldn't achieve/d , militarily is the taking control of townships, such as Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trinco, and Batticaloa while, politically they failed to effect their own administrative and judiciary systems in those 'cleared areas'. However, the combination of these two politico-military ambitions is likely to form the background, conducive towards a federal /separate structure in the future. So, if the fighting resumes for once, the LTTE would be aiming to achieve these military and political objectives. Hence, at talks they would be, primarily focusing on these aspects. Keeping these future goals in mind, the LTTE is unlikely to resort to 'open offensives' thus abandoning peace talks at any juncture; but their involvement in possible isolated attacks on military targets and assassinations, in 'retaliation' may take place, if the LTTE feels that their security is being undermined by means of 'clandestine' operations conducted by the military. Because their 'ultimate power', however depends upon, as quoted by Mao Tse-Tung - 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun' (1966). The LTTE, too are aware of the fact that the talks are so important; not only to gain legitimacy over a political deal but also to gain international recognition, enabling them to establish direct 'diplomatic links'; so that their self-confidence is secured for an independent homeland as opposed to the status of 'unitary' or 'united'. Truce talks As a preamble to talks, truce talks must begin in the presence of the facilitator and monitoring mission. Though, many said that moving to peace talks, directly was the most appropriate step, the LTTE in much professional outlook said that the first round must be dedicated for truce talks, thus asserting their political 'maturity' as that of their military skill. This, once again reminds one of the fact that the professionalism in both political and military is a must for the government in this hour of need. Therefore, future talks must be represented by both political and defence officials, who are competent and professional in their respective fields. After all, the effectiveness of the truce will depend on their competence at this work. Although there is no laid down procedure for organizing and observing a truce between/among warring factions, there are important aspects- to establish joint communication centres/posts, particularly in areas where both parties maintain boundaries of their own. If the LTTE, the monitoring mission and the military are not agreed, to be under the same roof, they could be co-located in close vicinity from one another; so that the 'speed' for action on ground; avoiding 'low level' belligerence; regular meetings at all levels; passage of information; and more importantly to implement action on ground according to the decisions taken at peace talks, from time to time, etc can be ensured. Also, it is absolutely necessary for both parties to refrain from engaging in 'covert' - 'clandestine' missions that undermine the safety of the other. Besides, all armed groups other than the military and the LTTE must be withdrawn from the north and east, to avoid skepticism, retaliatory violence and talks being interrupted during progress. At the same time, it would not leave any room for the LTTE to place responsibility for violence committed by themselves on some other party. Peace talks One of the major shortcomings of all the successive governments that dealt with the LTTE, at previous talks was 'un-preparedness' and failure to arrive at decisions, even on minor matters during talks. On the contrary, the LTTE had everything in order - but, it is understood that, unlike the LTTE the government had to deal with many political parties, whose standings were different from one another and besides that it had to consider the 'Muslim factor' as well. And, now that all the parties have agreed to maintain a common standing following the APCs, this problem may not arise until the 'crux' of the deal is taken for negotiation. The LTTE demands are, however not new - they have not dropped anything from what they, originally had demanded for - so knowing this 'intransigent' attitude of the LTTE, the government delegation needs to attend talks with 'readymade' solutions, including alternatives, rather than trying to seek them during the progress of talks. Nevertheless, it would be necessary for the delegation to refer certain important matters to the president for the final decision - so might as well have them in readiness (this needs to identify all probable issues that might arise at talks; like in a 'military appreciation') then, the bargaining through compromise and consensus at talks can be made, successfully. The LTTE demands are very clear- Independent Tamil homeland; self -determination; self-administration; recognition of Tamils and their rights. So, for each demand, the government must have a number of solutions with alternatives. Of the demands, the most complex could be self- determination and independent homeland - yet, granting autonomous powers sufficient enough to solve the problems of Tamils in the north and east should be the solution - because, according to them, 'racial discrimination' and 'deprivation of their rights' were the 'main cause' of their struggle; 'historical living' was the evidence they used to support the main cause. What gave them more 'concerns' and 'legitimacy' at local and international levels was 'discrimination' - and not 'historical living',. So, whatever the political power being devolved to them must be of administrative importance; and not of 'geographical importance'. Strategy The LTTE has, unofficially gained a substantial scope of political power and legitimacy in the administration of north and east under the cover of ceasefire - they should have gained these powers through proper dialogue. Although one may look at it as positive signs towards politics than 'open combat', their 'cold war' violence unleashed through 'covert' means during truce cannot be approved at any cost. Nevertheless, the LTTE much conscious of the fact that they could gain more 'political leverage' - the 'ultimate power' for a separate state, at talks. And, also they know that 'popular support' is the 'ultimate tool'. In view of these two factors, the LTTE are very unlikely to deviate from talks as they might lose everything they have gained, so far. However, the LTTE, by appreciating the present vantage background that kept them open to international forum, and particularly the outcome of the last election, in which a majority voted for a 'unitary' state, is likely to play more 'flexible role', at talks. It is, also possible that they might accept a framework of governance that would provide them sufficient grounds to consolidate themselves, politically and militarily for the time being. So they can steer these efforts to remove their present label of 'terrorists' and to gain more 'political identity' as that of PLO - thus, Prabakaran may become Sri Lankan 'Arafat', with a privilege of holding his militiamen for the safety of his party and himself. Therefore, what the government, now needs is strategy - to prevent the LTTE from surpassing the 'limits' of whichever the governance they would accept initially, towards a separate state. However, it should not disturb future talks or exercising their political powers in governance; but it must be able to create an environment capable of 'defusing' their future desires for separation. It can be implemented as a part of the political restructuring that needs to effect devolution of powers to the LTTE. Thus, homeland becoming 'Independent' must be nullified by 'interdependence' - this would require a strategy of both politics and economy to convince the people in the north and east; its image must pervade at regional and international levels. The 'east' and the 'Muslim factor' can be used as a 'trump'. Also, the 'people' in the north and east, are the most 'powerful weapon' - it must be used, effectively by tactful means. In this regard, psychological warfare will be of paramount importance. Defence needs to be reorganised, based on a 'national strategic defence initiative program' (NSDIP) Above all, the relocation of the country's administrative capital in a 'strategic area' of the north central province within a 'standoff' distance from the north and east should be the first, giant step of this strategy, and what follows, thereafter would be of advantageous against separatism. And, it would, also pave the way to solve most of the burning issues of the country as well.
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