Response to Dayan Jayatilleka....

Dear editor,

May I be permitted to take issue with Mr. Dayan Jayatilleka who writes in your newspaper (July 9th 2006) under the sub-title Devolve or Die!

My main contention against Jayatilleka is simple one. He seems to think that nothing can be done without the concurrence of India, and he seems to say that India should underwrite any solution to the Sri Lankan conflict.

This thinking constitutes a very bad start, and I do hope there is no mimicry of this thinking in the all-party conference or the President's appointed body to look into a solution.

We are engaged here in an exercise of protecting our sovereignty, and protecting the sovereign state from being upended, by the machinations of the fascistic Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Our goal is therefore one in which we seek to re-assert out sovereignty, and in this, we should not expected to exchange India for the LTTE as the usurping force. If we ask India to underwrite our internal agreements, aren't we handing over our sovereign prerogatives to India?

Jayatilleka gives us five points to assert his position that 'a political solution arrived at with the concurrence of India would confer multiple benefits on India.'

But why should we for whatever temporary gain, want another country to 'concur' in a solution that is aimed entirely at bringing about a solution to our conflict? What does 'concur' infer in this instance? 'Concurring' infers that we are promoting India to a Viceregal position.

This is the sending of a wrong signal. Mr. Jayatilleks seems to underestimate the consequences of even the slightest attempt to barter our sovereign prerogative in this way.

To me the extent of his being misled on this seems to be similar to the extent he underestimates the JVP's position on this matter. He writes elsewhere in the article:

'There remains the residual matter of the JVP. If an Indian team helping Sri Lanka includes top officials of the CPI-M (I'd suggest Gen Sec Prakash Karat in overall charge, and Sitaram Yechury, who played a constructive backstage role in the management of the Nepali crisis, running point), then either the JVP could be won over or neutralised. Were the JVP to reject an Indian mediated autonomy package, such maximalist isolationism would have a politico-diplomatic cost.'

Having a Communist from India helping us neutralizing the JVP? It seems to be a stretch, or an exaggerated hope. Secondly, the JVP being home grown (isolationist) would not care too much about the poltico-diplomatic cost that Mr Jayatilleka seems intent on sticking to the JVP.

Pradeep De Vos.