Sampur’s imminent fall
SF commandos fight in 2.5 km Tiger territory, LTTE moving heavy weapons
from Sampur
War and Peace The Defence Diary by Ranga Jayasuriya
Early this month, the Tigers directed a heavy volume of artillery
fire on the Trincomalee harbour. That was as a prelude to simultaneous
attacks on Mahindapura, Selvanagar, Kattaparichchan,Pahalatopur military
camps and the Mutur jetty.
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As Tiger artillery pounded the China Bay Naval camp, a flotilla of
sea Tiger boats emerged from Soodaikudah, west of Foul Point to target
the security personnel carrier Jetliner transporting some 800 security
personnel.
As Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC) engaged with the flotilla of sea
Tiger boats, Jetliners safely sailed into the harbour. The sea Tiger
attack on the passenger vessel at the harbour mouth, though foiled by
the Navy gunboats, which destroyed a several sea Tiger boats was a
reminder of the growing threat posed by the LTTE build up in Sampur.
The artillery strike on the naval base also killed five sailors and
injured 12.
This incident reinforced the fact that the Trincomalee harbour, the
lifeline of 42,000 security forces and police deployed in Jaffna is not
safe, unless the LTTE guns and cluster camps in Sampur are neutralised.
Again on August 12, as troops battled a Tiger onslaught in the
Muhamalai and Nagar Kovil Forward Defence lines, several rounds of Tiger
artillery hit the Trinco Naval base.
That was a diversionary attack. A stray shell fell in the Prima
factory premises killing one employee.
LTTE build up
The threat posed by the LTTE build up in Sampur was frequently raised
by the security forces top brass at the National Security Council
meetings.
This led President Mahinda Rajapaksa to state that any cessation of
hostilities “should include modalities to ensure that the Sampur area
does not pose a military threat to the Trincomalee harbour and its
environs due to the LTTE military presence violating the Ceasefire
Agreement”.
In the wee hours of last Sunday, Special Forces commandoes embarked
on the mission to neutralise LTTE build up in Sampur. Troops advanced
from the Kattaparichachan and Selvanagar military camps towards the
Tiger territory. Artillery and Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRL) fire
was directed at LTTE positions in Sampur from the Monkey Bridge military
camp and Chinabay naval base.
One notable feature was that the LTTE did not opt for a close combat.
Instead, troops came under indirect fire of artillery and heavy
mortars. The area was heavily mined and booby trapped.
The Airforce Kafir fighter jets bombed LTTE artillery positions and ammo
dumps in Sampur and Ichchalampattu, south of Sampur.
In the ongoing military action, the Airforce proved to be highly
effective.
Following the air strikes on LTTE positions on Sunday, a notable
decline in LTTE artillery attacks has been seen.
As of yesterday troops have advanced two and a half kilometers into
Tiger territory, taking control of the Kattaparichchan village and the
Kattaparichan bridge which is a main road linking government and LTTE
controlled areas.
Sampur the main LTTE base is only two and a half kilo meters from
this point.
However, the plan is to take control of the entire general area of
Sampur. The Navy is expected to be assigned to carryout security of the
area. According to the latest reports, the indirect fire by the LTTE has
been tremendously restrained by the air strikes and counter fire power
by the security forces.
Imminent fall
The LTTE is reported to have been moving its artillery guns and heavy
mortar from the Sampur area towards Vakarai. This is a sign that the
LTTE in coming to terms that there would be an imminent fall of Sampur.
Apart from the sporadic fire from a single artillery gun from Vakarai,
the thrust of the LTTE resistance is portable mortar such as 60 mm,
which can be fired one kilometer away. Still, the main challenge to the
security forces, is the heavily booby trapped terrain.
Twenty-two soldiers including two officers were been killed in action
by Friday, while 130 soldiers were wounded. LTTE casualties are
estimated to be well over 100 cadres, according to the security forces.
However, no independent verification is possible on the casualties of
the LTTE.
The Tiger-stronghold of Sampur, is almost likely to fall within the
next few days. The LTTE has downplayed the battle for Sampur. Its
propaganda is conspicuously silent on the military action in Sampur.
Sampur has been LTTE’s political and military stronghold in the East,
which has been refortified since the signing of the ceasefire agreement.
From the very outset, the LTTE strategy has been to establish its
control over Trincomalee, which is, named as the Capital of the future
Eelam state. Trincomalee, which is one of the deepest natural harbours
in the world is also the nerve centre of the Sri Lankan Navy. It is also
the lifeline of the 42,000 troops stationed in the Jaffna peninsula.
De-stabilisation of Trincomalee and its ultimate slipping out of
Government control will be a deciding factor on continuance or else the
presence of Security Forces in Jaffna.
Before the ceasefire, there were no Tiger camps on the southern
perimeter of the Trincomalee harbour.
Routine security forces operations in the area prevented a permanent
LTTE presence in the area. In 1997, a joint army and naval search
operation was conducted from Foul Point up to Kattaparichchan in the
East and Ilankanthai in the South. In 1998, the Special Boat Squadron (SBS)
conducted a search operation from Foul Point up to the Elakkanthai
sea-board. Mullaitivu and Vakarai have been identified as LTTE
controlled areas under the ceasefire agreement. When arrangements for
sea transport of LTTE cadres between the East and the North were mooted,
the LTTE demanded the use of Ilakkan Thai as a transit point between
Mullaitivu and Vakarai. Despite the opposition by the Naval officials,
the then UNP government gave in to the LTTE demand. With this approval,
the LTTE initially used Ilakkan Thai as a transit point.
However, by April, 2003, Sea Tiger craft arrived directly from
Mullaitivu to Ilakkan Thai which was gradually transformed in to a major
sea Tiger base.
National security
Sea Tiger gun boats and suicide craft are now stationed there.
Situated only four miles from the Trincomalee harbour, Ilakkan Thai,
sea tiger base poses a grave threat to the national security. This is
the main launching pad of the sea Tiger vessels and suicide operations.
Since the ceasefire agreement, the LTTE had set up 14 camps around
the Southern perimeters of the Trincomalee harbour. This cluster of LTTE
camps are code-named 3-2 camp in Sampur, 0-2 camp in Villukulam and 0-1
camp, 32 MF camp, Dolphin, India one camp in Kattaparichchan, 1-1 camp,
73 camp, 0-0 camp and B-C camp 3.
With the setting up of a cluster of camps on the Southern perimeter
of the Trincomalee harbour, the LTTE have located its long range
weaponry in Sampur, from where the Trincomalee harbour can easily be
targeted. 122 mm artillery guns which can fire up to 20 km and 120 mm
heavy mortars which have an effective firing range of 6750-15400 meters
are positioned in Sampur and Ichchalampattu.
It is with these 122 mm artillery guns, that the Tigers targeted the
China Bay harbour early last month. According to military intelligence,
the LTTE has smuggled around twenty 122 mm artillery pieces during the
ceasefire. The LTTE is believed to be in possession of another three 130
mm artillery guns, plus two 122 mm artillery captured from the Mulaitivu
camp.
One of the main reasons for the success in the Security Force’s
counter offensive to the Tiger onslaught is the vital role played by the
air force.
Air strikes
According to reports by the pilots and ground intelligence, at least
four LTTE artillery guns have been destroyed by the air strikes since
August 11. This includes an artillery position in the Kalmunai Point (K
Point) on the edge of Pooneryn from where the Tigers targeted the Palali
Military Airport and the Kankesanthurai harbour.
Following the air strikes on K point, artillery guns in the K point
have fallen silent. Another gun position and ammo dump in Iyakkachchi,
Pallai has been targeted by the Airforce.
Since these air strikes, Tiger artillery fire has ceased in the
Northern front.
Kafir fighter jets this week also targeted LTTE artillery positions
in Ichchalampattu and Sampur as well as a sea Tiger base in Challai,
which is the main base of the sea Tigers.
According to the latest reports from the North, Tigers have withdrawn
from their original Forward Defence Line (FDL) in Muhamalai, after
sustained security forces attacks and are now fortifying a new FDL 500
meters behind the original FDL.
Security Forces top brass in Jaffna are surprised as to why sea
Tigers were not seen much in action. There were attempts for sea borne
attacks on Kayts and Kilali. But, its presence in the recent offensive
is disproportionately low.
There can be two reasons: The sea Tigers must be kept for future
offensives or the recent naval and air operations must have had a
crushing effect on the sea Tiger force. Sea Tiger bases and even boat
movements have frequently been targeted by the Air Force.
The Navy trounced the sea Tigers whenever they took to the sea on an
offensive operation- - in Pulmudai, Kilali, Trincomalee and Kayts.
In the wee hours of yesterday, ground troops in Kondimanar and PPD
could see the live action of Naval forces, battling a flotilla of 30 sea
Tiger boats.
Dvora FACs which engaged with the sea Tigers destroyed 12 boats,
including at least five suicide craft. (See page 1 story)
At least 80 sea Tiger cadres are believed to have been killed in battle.
Two FAC’s suffered minor damage to their gun systems and two sailors
suffered minor injuries.
Meanwhile, there are reports of growing disillusion within the LTTE,
especially in its Eastern sector. Eleven LTTE cadres surrendered to the
security forces in Kajuwatta.
Reports also suggest that there is growing frustration at the LTTE
ranks and a sign of a leadership crisis. Theepan, the Vanni Commander
who led the costly offensive on the security forces FDL has not been
replaced despite the mounting battle losses. This is against the earlier
practice of the LTTE. It is well known that Theepan is a blue-eyed boy
of Tiger supremo Prabhakaran. |