A road to nowhere:

A-9 opening scuttled peace talks
 

The sequence of events prior to the LTTE offensive in the East indicate the simultaneous attacks in the East was a pre-planned and well calculated offensive in a wider strategy.

The wider strategy was to destabilize the operations in the Trincomalee harbour, which is the lifeline of 42,000 troops and policemen deployed in the Jaffna peninsula and to squeeze the troops in the peninsula when the LTTE moved to the second stage of its strategy. That is to capture the city of Jaffna.

But, in Geneva, the Tiger political commissar S. P. Thamilselvan had a string of accusations against the government and a set of justifications for the LTTE military actions in the North and the East.

The military operation to open the sluice gates of the Mavilaru anicut was handled from the Kallar and Allai Kantalai camps in the proximity of Mavil aru.

But, the simultaneous military attack on the Kattaparichchan, Selvanagar, Mahindapura army camps and Mutur Naval detachment on the dawn of August 2 was part of a wider strategy. It was not a diversionary attack intended to divert men and material from Mavilaru.

Military officials I spoke during the past weeks visit to the East believed that the whole episode of LTTE military actions in the east as well as in the North, beginning from the closure of the sluice gates of the Mavilaru anicut were a pre-planned and well calculated strategy to seige the Trinco harbour.

The question

When the Tigers closed the sluice gates of the Mavilaru, did they anticipated an overwhelming military action?

Most believe, even though the LTTE anticipate a military action, it did not expect it to be overwhelming.

When analysing the sequence of the events, the logic of the closure of the anicut gates becomes clear.

By closing the anicut gates, the Tigers forced the security forces to a military operation. So the assumption goes like this: The Tigers closed the anicut gates to blame the security forces for reneging the ceasefire agreement as a pre text for its larger offensive.

But, a question remains unanswered.

When the LTTE forced the security forces to a military operation in Mavil aru, didn't it realise a military build up closer to its main target-Mutur-is detrimental for its wider strategy.

Such a military build up could make it easier for the security forces to send urgent reinforcement. Added with this, there was a greater fire power at their disposal since a number of weapon systems such as artillery howitzers and Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers had been brought to the area.

Indeed, this turned out to be a great advantage for the security forces in repulsing the LTTE offensive.

The LTTE strategy was to overrun the Kattaparichchan and Muttur security forces detachments.

If the Tigers succeeded, it could have taken control of the entire area of the Southern perimeters of the Trincomalee harbour given that, at the time Sampur as well as Ralkuli, Upparu and Gangee area was also controlled by the LTTE.

The Kattaparichchan military detachment received the brunt of the LTTE attack (see the box story) and fighting raged for six days.

While holding the seige of this camp at the entrance to the then LTTE controlled Sampur, the LTTE cadres infiltrated Mutur. Several banks were robbed.

But, the soldiers guided by a young Captain who was the then commanding officer of the Kattaparichchan detachment withstood the Tiger onslaught and repulsed it, indeed, at a heavy cost to the LTTE.

The attacks on Selvanagar and Mahindapura Army detachments were intended to cut off the reinforcements for the besieged Kattaparichchan camp.

The Tigers failed in the offensive and paid with a huge toll of casualties.

Despite the failure of the first leg of the plan, the LTTE went ahead with the rest of the plan. As fighting ceased in Mutur, it opened up a new front in the North and attacked the Muhamalai-Nagarkovil forward defence lines on August 11.

The ambitious Tiger offensive proved to be a miscalculation. Three repeated attempts to overrun the Northern forward defence lines were thwarted by the security forces during the next twenty days.

According to military estimates, at least nine hundred LTTE cadres were killed and twice of that number would have been injured.

Nineteen officers and 202 other ranks were killed and 900 wounded during the period. Of the number of injured, most of them classified as walking wounded.

In Geneva, the LTTE delegation insisted on the opening of the Muhamalai entry- exit point of the A 9 road linking the LTTE held Wanni with the rest of the country.

Why was the LTTE so obsessed with the A 9 opening?. General impression in the South is that the LTTE wants the road opened so that it could "tax" goods convoys bound to Jaffna.

According to well substantiated intelligence reports, this ensured a steady flow of some of Rs. 200mto 300m to the LTTE coffers every month.

This may not be the only case. Of course, the closure of the road may have resulted in the prices of essentials skyrocketing. But, even during the relative calm of the ceasefire, the cost of living in Jaffna was 25 percent higher than the rest of the country due to the so called tiger levy imposed on the good convoys passing through the entry-exit points and monthly ransom charged from all the Jaffna traders.

Naive to assume

It would be naive to assume that the Tigers would opt to discuss the core-political issues last week in Geneva, even if the government agreed to open the entry point at Muhamalai.

The LTTE behaviour in the peace talks is that it had come out with endless demands in each round of peace talks there by conveniently getting away from moving to the core-issues.

In April, 2004, the LTTE withdrew from peace talks demanding an Interim Administration. Later it suspended its participation in the Sub Committee on Immediate Humanitarian Needs.

It turned down two proposals by the Wickremesinghe Administration for development oriented mechanism to facilitate the immediate humanitarian needs in the North-East.

It presented its own Interim Self Governing Authority proposals which went far beyond any form of federalism. It insisted on self rule, while conveniently avoiding any reference to the shared rule.

Later, when the then President Chandrika Kumaratunga offered to hold talks on the core-issues and the ISGA, the LTTE insisted talks should be confined to the ISGA.

When the newly elected President offered to hold a fresh round of peace negotiations, the LTTE spent days arguing over the venue and finally agreed on Geneva. However, the political core-issues were not in the agenda. The meeting was confined to review the ceasefire agreement.

Then as the next round of meeting, scheduled on April 19-21 approached, the LTTE demanded transport for its Eastern leader to the Wanni to attend a meeting and it aborted a sea transport of its leaders at the last moment and later demanded a bigger chopper for their transport.

The stalemate dragged on and the second round of Geneva became a non event. Instead, the LTTE went to Oslo in June to discuss the operational arrangements of the ceasefire agreement, but, talks collapsed, even before they commenced, as the LTTE refused to sit with the Sri Lankan delegation citing the absence of a Ministerial representation.

The LTTE went to Geneva last week for a fresh round of peace talks, but spent the entire two days insisting on the opening of the A9 highway.

Given its previous conduct, perhaps only a naive optimist could say the Tigers would have acted differently, if the Government had agreed to open the A9 highway, once the highway of death, now a road to nowhere.

As this writer was told during a previous visit to the Muhamalai entry -exit point, the LTTE collected 200-300 million rupees every month by "taxing" good cargoes at its entry-exit points in Pallai and Puliyankulam.

The LTTE earned 285 million rupees as "tax revenues" from goods bound Jaffna during the month of March on the festive eve of Sinhala Tamil new year.

These figures are based on well substantiated intelligence reports.

LTTE's "tax" income from the same goods bound Jaffna peninsula during the month of April is estimated at 200 million rupees.

The "tax" revenue during the month of January and February are 222 million and 175 million rupees respectively.

LTTE levy varies from five to fifteen percent depending on the item. Infant milk powders are not taxed.

The LTTE also holds a monopoly in the whole sale business in the Wanni through three companies owned by the LTTE and based in Kilinochchi.

LTTE and company

Three companies, Seran, Pandiyan and Selan is believed to have earned 175 million in revenue from the wholesale business and hospitality trade.

Seran owns rice mills and is involved in wholesale trade of rice. Selan is involved in hardware and building materials business, while Pandiyan conducts restaurant and bakery trade in the Wanni.The ceasefire agreement dose not have a clause forbidding the tax collection by the LTTE.

However, LTTE imposed taxes on the goods cargoe passing its check points where prices in the Jaffna peninsula have resulted in the cost of living sky rocketing. Further added with high transport and payments for loading and unloading at entry-exit points on both sides of the boarder, cost of living in the Jaffna peninsula is 25 per cent higher than the rest of the country.

This is despite the fact that greater part of country's poor happened to live in the North-East, as underlined by the UNDP Millennium Development Goal report.

History

The LTTE is never known to discuss peace at a position of weakness. The LTTE strategy this time was to grab more bargaining chips. Had it succeeded laying seige to the city of Jaffna, it would be in a position of greater bargaining power.

A series of military setbacks in the North and the East in the past seriously compromised the LTTE's military strength. Then the security forces operation ahead the Muhamalai forward defence lines proved to be a costly confrontation for the both parties.

132 security forces personnel were killed in fighting and intelligence sources revealed that the LTTE had buried 198 cadres two days after the battle.A few days later, a lone suicide bomber blew up a truck full of explosives targeting naval personnel in Habarana, killing 115 sailors. Not surprisingly, attack came after the Norwegians announced dates for a fresh round of peace talks.

During the same week, sea Tigers carried out an abortive attack on the Dakshina Naval base in Galle.

Though the attack was foiled and fifteen attackers perished in the retaliation - bodies of eight of them have been washed ashore- it sent a potent message that the Tigers should not be taken lightly. This entire endeavour was to prepare itself for a greater bargain in the peace talks.

Post script: Defending Kattaparichchan

At the dawn of August 2, the Tigers launched a simultaneous attack on Kattaparichchan, Selvanagar,Mahindapura military camps and Mutur naval detachment. The attack was a pre-planned, coordinated offensive in the wider strategy to scuttle the operations in the Trincomalee harbour. The Kattaparichchan army camp on the border of the then LTTE controlled Sampur was to receive the brunt of the attack.

The LTTE attackers had sneaked into the government side, having crossed the river, which was the defacto boarder of the then LTTE controlled Sampur and Government controlled Mutur.

By the time the Tiger onslaught began at dawn on August 2nd, there were only 26 personnel inside the Kattaparichchan army detachment. Two platoons with two officers were out on routine night duty.

Young captain Wijitha Alexander was the Commanding Officer of the detachment. Alexander's immediate boss, Major Senaka Wijesuriya, the second in command of the 7 CLI was at the Pahalathopur military detachment.

When informed of the attack, Major Wijesuriya radioed his two officers and fifty men to return to the Kattaparichchan detachment. The timely decision increased the man power of the camp. Even then, the LTTE outnumbered the soldiers, with five hundred odd Tiger cadres surrounding the camp.

For his luck or instinct, Major Wijesuriya that day decided to send two teams to reconnaissance the rear of the Pahala Thopur camp. Usually, he sends teams to guard off possible LTTE attackers from the front. However his instincts saved him from a greater Tiger offensive.

The two teams came across a team of LTTE cadres, who were on the mission to attack the Pahala thopur military detachment from the rear. The soldiers ambushed the advancing LTTE team forcing the Tigers to retreat.

As this was taking place, Captain Alexander and his men had to fight against over 500 odd LTTE cadres. The LTTE overrun the defence bunker lines of the camp one after the another. As fighting raged, the security forces and LTTE positions were only 20 meters. It looked more like a medieval dual.

The enemy was at the entrance. The soldiers could also see a large number of enemy casualties laying around. Captain Alexander said this kept his troopers moral high. The battle waged for six days.

As days passed, troops were running short of ammunition. Major Wijesuriya instructed soldiers not to fire bursts, instead target and fire. Alexander called for air strikes at the close proximity to the camp.

The LTTE's rehearsal plan was to overrun the Kattaparichchan detachment in 12 minutes. But as the soldiers put a fierce defence, the fight dragged on.

One day, after the Tigers failed another attempt to storm the camp, Major Wijesuriya told the soldiers to jeer at the attackers, which they did.

By August 8, the LTTE gave up the attempt as its casualties mounted. Soldiers said they saw nearly 300 LTTE bodies laying in the vicinity. Two soldiers were killed and twenty four were injured in the fighting.

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