The 1953 'hartal' and aftermath of Leftist movement

By W. T. A. Leslie FERNANDO

After the shattering defeat of the LSSP at the 1952 general election, there was a tendency among a group in the LSSP to form a unity among the anti-UNP forces. This was brewing in them when the CP-VLSSP United Front formed. At the beginning they wanted unity among the Leftist parties.

At the LSSP conference held in October 1952, the resolution for a unity among the progressives was defeated but it was decided to have negotiations with other working class parties for a united front of the Left. Accordingly in November 1952, the LSSP invited delegations from the CP-VLSSP United Front and the Ceylon Indian Congress for a discussion.

Stanley Tillekaratne	Gate Mudliyar de Alwis	Reggie Perera	William de Silva

At the discussion the CP-VLSSP United Front insisted that there should be unconditional support for the Communist bloc and there should be a broad-based unity of the anti-UNP forces. However the initial discussions they had between the LSSP and the CP-VLSSP United Front failed because the LSSP was not willing to surrender its right to criticise the bureaucracy of the Communist countries.

In 1953, the balance of payments in Sri Lanka received a setback as the prices of the exports decreased and that of the imports increased. The Korean boom came to an end once the Korean War was over and the government aimed to withdraw most of the subsidies to conserve foreign resources. It wanted to restrict the import of rice and wheat flour. The speculation of these measures created artificial scarcities.

The real gravity of the situation came to the surface when in 1953, the budget proposals were introduced. The price of subsidised measure of rice was increased from 25 cents to 70 cents. The price of sugar and wheat flour too went up. There were drastic increase of presto rates and the train fare. The free mid-day bun was also withdrawn and approximately 750,000 schoolchildren were affected. Nevertheless no burdens were imposed on the rich.

The total effect of these measures were devastating to the poor. As all these came together the situation became worse for them. The affected both the rural and urban poor alike and these was discontent among them. The Leftist parties galvanized the people against the measures. They organised protest rallies processions, pamphlets and trade union action.

On July 23, 1953 the Leftists organised huge protest rally at the Galle Face grounds. It was presided over by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. On that day the LSSP and the CP-VLSSP United Front organised a strike in the Port. Some people who attended the mammoth rally stormed the Parliament buildings and the Police had to use tear gas to disperse them.

The LSSP, CP-VLSSP United Front and the Federal Party continued their agitations all over the country. They decided to organise a Hartal on August 12, 1953 as a mark of protest. Although the SLFP associated with the protests, they did not actively support the 'hartal' fearing some violence. Nevertheless the Federal Party joined the Hartal and as such it was not confide only to the Leftists.

The LSSP, CP-VLSSP United Front and the Federal Party got together and decided that the 'hartal' should be a peaceful protest without violence, a countrywide stoppage of work for one day and a day of mourning hoisting black flags. On the other hand the government and the private employees took counter measures to repulse people from participating in the Hartal.

Lakshman Rajapakse	D. F. Hettiarachchi	T. B. Subasinghe	L. W. Panditha

On the Hartal Day on August 12, 1953 there was a standstill in many public and private institutions. The transport strike was so successful that even the few who reported for work in Colombo could not return home. Garbage collection, post and harbour operations were all paralysed. This situation prevailed mostly in the coastal belt along Western and Southern provinces.

The people took 'hartal' beyond stoppage of work. They blocked roads, removed rail tracks, brought down telegraph posts and even stoned and burnt buses. When the Police went to quell the riotous behaviour, they were stoned. Shops were closed in many towns. Incidents of this kind occurred even in the North.

Although the 'hartal' was meant for one day, the protests and riotous behaviour continued unabated. The treatment meted out by the Police to protests, angered people and troubled continued. The LSSP and the CP-VLSSP leaders found that the situation had gone out of control and issued a statement that the 'hartal' is over and calling workers to resume duties. However the protests continued at a high pitch for several more days and the Police had to shoot eight people dead to control the situation. Hundreds were arrested including some Leftist leaders in some provinces.

Many acts of violence occurred during the 'hartal'. The government had to take stern measures to put an end to the 'hartal'. On August 14, it announced the death penalty for arson, looting and trespass and 20 years jail for sedition. These very steep penalties showed that the 'hartal' made the establishment uneasy.

1953 Hartal was a significant event in the history of Sri Lanka. This was the first occasion that the people rose in protest and some with violence, to show their discontent against a government. Some interpret that the hartal proved that the people could have been organised for a revolution as envisaged by the LSSP. They analyse that though the people were ready for a revolution, the Leftist leaders were not prepared to direct the people towards it.

Others contend that the categorisation of 'hartal' was a condition ripe for a revolution was really an exaggeration of events that occurred which were in the main restricted to Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa provinces although there were few incidents in the North. They point out that protests came only from the elements faithful to the Leftists and vast mass of people although opposed to cuts in the subsidy did not participate in the 'hartal'. They add that the major trade unions in the plantations had nothing to do with the 'hartal'.

Whatever the revolutionary potential of hartal, it was very effective. The government was compelled to reduce the prize of consumer goods to some extent. It gave rise to jittery in the government ranks. Dudley Senanayake resigned after the 'hartal' and Sir John Kotalawela was made the Prime Minister. The 'hartal' symbolised the resentment of people towards the government and paved the way for the debacle of the UNP in 1956. Although the Leftist leaders disowned the violence at the 'hartal' the LSSP leaders proudly proclaimed that it was the first occasion that the masses revolted against the capitalist domination.

The success of the 'hartal' strengthened the group within the LSSP that called for a Left unity. They maintained that leaving aside the theoretical jargon a unity of the progressives should be effected under a Left leadership. The leadership of the LSSP interpreted that the 'hartal' demonstrated the potentiality of a general uprising that would lead to a revolution. The LSSP leadership was intransigent to a Left unity.

At the LSSP conference held in October 1953, two sets of resolutions were mooted. The proposals the party leadership read that internationally the party should support the socialist bloc but there is bureaucracy in them and the party should support the workers in them in an uprising against the bureaucracy. Nationally the UNP government should be replaced by an anti-capitalist regime. For this a unity of working class parties was essential but a common programme was not necessary.

The dissenting group called for unconditional friendship with the socialist countries without ambiguity of words and closest possible links with the CP-VLSSP United Front and other anti-UNP forces. When the two resolutions were put to the vote, the resolution of the party leadership was passed with a small majority. The dissenting group left the party.

In the group that left the party, there were two MPs William de Silva and T. B. Subasinghe, former MPs Reggie Perera, Henry Peiris, Lakshman Rajapakse, D. F. Hettiarachchi, youth activists and trade union leaders like K. P. de Silva, Stanley Tillekaratne, Lionel Cooray, V. A. Samarawickrema, L. W. Panditha, K. A. E. Britto, U. E. Perera and M. S. Bakmiweva.

The breakaway group functioned as the Unity Fraction of the LSSP for some time but later majority of them joined the VLSSP. This made CP-VLSSP United Front more strong. The LSSP leadership became more rigid now and struck to its theoretical approach. This became a hindrance to the Left unity.