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| Sunday, 28 April 2002 |
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A greater pain than war Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA The Viking ancestors of Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen would surely be disappointed at their descendent's marked lack of spunk. After all, the likes of Leif Ericsson and fellow explorers (who were probably the first European settlers of North America) were at war most of the time as they daringly sailed, battled and burned their heroic way via Iceland and Greenland to reach 'Vinland', as they described the part of modern-day New Foundland they colonised about 1000 Christian Era. For them, and all Viking 'berserker' warriors, there was no greater glory than war. Our modern Viking, the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, who is here to make peace (a difficult task only brave people would attempt) among Sri Lankans, however, argues that there is no greater pain than war! At least that's what he asserted last week ('Sunday Observer' of 21-04-02) when addressing our local club of 'foreign' correspondents. I have a strong feeling that many Tamils, and at least some Sinhalas would disagree with Mr. Helgesen. There certainly is greater 'pain' than war, they would insist. The Tamils militants, especially with their prowess in suicide bombing, have certainly demonstrated that war, and death in war, are more desirable and, obviously, less painful, than something else. I know of some Sinhalas who vociferously advocate war presumably as being less painful than something else. And what is this something else? Community survival It is a matter of community survival - or, at least, perceived survival. This is no better expressed than in the recent Sinhala ultra-nationalists' statement opposing the Cease-fire Agreement (which they somehow managed to persuade the Most Venerable Mahanayaka Theras to sign). This statement, issued last Saturday and which was mysteriously missed out by every single Sunday newspaper (except the Iridaa Divaina First Edition), radio and TV station, warns Sri Lankans that: "For the first time in our history, ominous signs threatening the break up of the 2500-year-long unitary character of our motherland are already visible". The signatories, including the entire top leadership of Sri Lankan Buddhism, argue that, in the light of LTTE Leader V. Prabhakaran's statements in his Kilinochchi media conference, "hope of peace therefore has completely collapsed". Interpreting Prabhakaran's statements as indicating the intention of establishing "a powerful Tamil state within the territory of Sri Lanka", the Ven. Mahanayaka Theras and others warn that this "will result in the subjugation of the majority race by the minority Tamils and the extermination of the Sinhala race and the Buddha Sasana from this island". Very clearly, the possibility of a Tamil political entity within island Sri Lanka implies, to the drafters of this statement, the subjugation of the Sinhalas and the elimination of the Buddha Sasana! There is a considerable interpretation and 'reading in' going on here in the minds of these Sinhala ultra-nationalists who drafted this statement. That the Ven. Mahanayaka Theras themselves are not fanatic about this stance is indicated by the fact that that very Sunday, one signatory, the Most Ven. Udugama Sri Buddharakkhitha, Mahanayaka Thera of the Asgiriya Chapter of the Siyam Nikaya, made a speech in Kataragama supportive of the Cease-fire Agreement! Perplexing behaviour (Equally mysteriously all newspapers on Monday and all radio and TV stations gave prominence to this pro-Agreement statement. This perplexing behaviour by our supposedly reliable, 'independent', private sector mass media surely raises serious questions.) But the statement is a repetition of the general political position taken by Sinhala ultra-nationalist lay groups (some of them, such as the Sinhala Veera Vidahanaya, were signatories) in relation to any attempt to resolve the ethnic conflict by means of a negotiated power-sharing compromise. The Tamil political movement for self-determination (including the militant movement) has always had, for the past half-century, as its expressed objective, the formation of a breakaway nation-state of Thamil Eelam or, as a compromise solution, the setting up of a distinct, autonomous Tamil region. In the course of this half-century, there has never ever been a single instance of an organised political expression of a desire by the Tamil people, or even some Tamil political group to subjugate the whole of Sri Lanka and all its ethnic communities to a Tamil-dominated nation-state that controlled the whole island territory. In short, the Tamil nationalist political movement has only sought to set up its own political entity that is separate from, or independent or autonomous of the rest of Sri Lanka. It has never been interested in the rest of Sri Lanka or the population in the rest of that territory and only marginally interested in the Hillcountry Tamil people. Sinhala ultra-nationalism But throughout almost the entirety of that half-century, one facet of the Sinhala response to that Tamil nationalist struggle has been the perception that this struggle aims at the complete subjugation of the whole of Sri Lankan and the Sinhala community in particular. This has been a constant theme of the ideologues of Sinhala ultra-nationalism. It has also been part of a larger thread of thought in the general movement of Sinhala nation-formation with some discursive origins in late medieval (i.e. in the immediate pre-colonial and early colonial period) historiography (not the Mahavansa). And this historiography has been the basis of most modern historiography and early modern archaeology as well. And this, in turn was, and is, part of the intellectual foundation of Sinhala nationalism and ultra-nationalism. If the original conception of a Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan nation-state included this legacy of historical hermeneutics, the subsequent ideology of Sinhala ultra-nationalism has made this conception of a historic inter-ethnic contest part of its core doctrine. In fact this idea (ideal?) of a historic Sinhala-Tamil contest has become an ideological straw which Sinhala ultra-nationalism must clutch in its effort to defend Sinhala hegemony over all Sri Lankans and the whole island territory. It is this historiographical discourse that functions as the ideological handrail for Sinhala ultra-nationalist consciousness in its conceptual leap from the Tamil autonomy project to the perception of a threat of Tamil hegemony over the Sinhalas and the elimination of the Sinhala community. Normal logic (of even the Buddhist kind) will not automatically lead from Tamil secession or autonomy to Tamil conquest of the Sinhalas and the destruction of Sinhala community. Normal logic might construe that Tamil secession or autonomy would actually free the rest of Sri Lanka, and the Sinhalas who demographically dominate it, from further Sinhala-Tamil conflict and social instability. But no, Sinhala ultra-nationalist discourse insists on imputing a mortal threat to the very existence of the Sinhalas. How is this? The rationale for this interpretation is provided by the logic of history derived from that historiographical legacy mentioned above. It is the conception of a historic battle between the Sinhalas and Tamils and the perception of a social evolution on this island punctuated by "Tamil invasion" and Tamil "overthrow" of Sinhala kingdoms and destruction of Sinhala civilisation (e.g. the desecration of stupas) that provides the rationale for that imputation of a mortal threat. While the attrition of the war may have blunted much of the ethnic hegemonistic aspirations that earlier prevailed among the mass of Sinhalas, nevertheless, this fear of subjugation and extermination yet exists, often at a sub-conscious level. Living in an age of the (European-originated) 'nation-state', it is not surprising that ethno-cultural identity drives much of human society's current dynamic of formation of polities. Given the continuing destruction of pre-modern cultures and cultural communities of every sort (a process that is speeding up with globalisation) it is no wonder that ethnicity and culture becomes even more the core dynamic in 'nation-building' and nation-state formation. Threat perceptions If the Sinhalas, secure as they are in control of the Sri Lankan nation-state, can suffer from such threat perceptions as expressed by the ultra-nationalists, one can imagine the sense of threat felt by the Tamil community which was marginalised in the Sri Lankan nation-building process and subsequently was subjected to successive physical attacks in the form of 'race riots' over decades. The desire for an ethnic-based political community motivated the Tamil nationalist movement to resist Sinhala domination of the Sri Lankan State, and it was the issue of physical survival in the face of civilian ethnic violence and violent state repression - that drove that Tamil political movement to armed, violent action itself. The actually experienced physical threat of collective extermination as a community is what motivates the Eelamist secessionist militant and enabled the LTTE to build a movement inspired by a 'berserker' type suicidal activism. And what activism it has been! The pain of collective 'extermination', then, far exceeds the pain of war. That is why, for example, it has been found that soldiers of the United States' forces in Afghanistan are far better motivated than they were in the Balkans against Serbia or, much earlier, in Vietnam. They are motivated by the threat perception arising from the physical attack on US society and community that occurred on September 11, 2001. If Americans, who are nurtured in a highly individualistic social milieu, can be ready to risk their lives "for their country" in battle, the degree of ferocious militancy of nationalist militants in Sri Lanka should not be surprising, given the far more collective-oriented society in which we live. Survival of Tamil community In their fervent commitment to the survival of their community, the Tamil militants have demonstrated a degree of militancy that the almost entirely Sinhala Sri Lankan armed forces could not match. This was largely because, secure in State power, Sinhala hegemonism was too comfortable and complacent to match the potency of Tamil secessionism. Hence the mass desertions and the 'tactical withdrawals' in battle. Nor will the bulk of the Sinhalas ever feel the need to do match that potency as long as Tamil secessionism does not appear to transcend the boundaries of that secession and intrude into the rest of Sri Lankan space. Even the loss of Sinhala hegemony is not likely to move the mass of the Sinhalas towards a perception of a serious threat to their collective survival. The attrition of the war has taught them to accept that ethnic co-existence and equality is less painful than ethnic hegemony. But the power of collective ethnic consciousness should not be underestimated. The logic of Sinhala ultra-nationalism yet inspires a small group of Sinhalas and this logic stipulates Sinhala State hegemony as the survival strategy of the community. For them, the end of hegemony signifies 'extermination' and 'subjugation'. That is why, as we move closer and closer towards that 'end', the call to war will not only get louder from these quarters, but we should anticipate actual armed action. Then, we may see the emergence of the Sinhala 'berserkers' for whom war is a lesser pain. Such extremism cannot be dealt with by mere repression. The Tamil political movement should have taught us that lesson. So should our experience of successive JVP insurgencies. The problem is complex and poses the challenge to evolve equally complex and sophisticated responses. Sinhala ultra-nationalist politics must be allowed to play itself out as it is doing in the electoral process. The more political space it is given, the less legitimacy it obtains for a resort to armed action and the more legitimate becomes the State's suppression of such extremist violence. |
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