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| Sunday, 17 November 2002 |
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Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
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The distant 'core issues' : Problems of consensus on both sides Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA The 'co-habitation' in power is real. Unfortunately, so is the
hostility between the two inhabitants. That hostility was never more
apparent than at President Chandrika B. Kumaratunga's recent celebration
of the anniversary of her presidency.
The President may have sounded extra-ordinarily conciliatory to both the UNP and the LTTE in her anniversary speech but she was addressing empty rows of seats as far as her Prime Minister and Cabinet was concerned. Figuratively speaking, there was no one willing to listen. The UNP Government's boycott was total on that occasion. But then, can one expect the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues to voluntarily attend a function that was not a constitutionally obligatory one and, therefore, liable to be misused by a rival party leader who has shown a penchant for crude, hostile verbal attacks on the UNP Leader and his ministerial colleagues on every possible occasion accept those formal, constitutional proceedings that effectively preclude political partisanship (civil or uncivil)? Those who claim that there is no co-habitation or that 'co-habitation is at an end' are either living in a dream world or do not know (or are deliberately glossing over) the meaning of 'co-habitation'. The hard political reality is that, thanks to the wishes of the electorate and despite the deformities of the J.R. Jayawardena Constitution, both the UNP and the SLFP, the arch-rivals of Sri Lankan capitalist democracy, jointly inhabit the core institutions of power of the Sri Lankan State. Negotiating process Given the competitive compulsions of capitalist democracy, however, neither party likes this co-habitation. Worse, after nearly a year of co-habitation they have not succeeded in transcending that dislike in order that they may use this golden opportunity for the political collaboration that is essential for a comprehensive political settlement of the ethnic conflict. That is why Minister G. L. Peiris' riposte to the President's conciliatory tone was a combination of procedural intransigence and the promise of vengeance for past actions. The Liam Fox Agreement does not stipulate a decision-making role for the Opposition in negotiations with the LTTE, Minister Peiris has argued in response to the President's proposal for joint Government-Opposition committees to oversee aspects of the negotiating process. Professor Peiris has also claimed that when it talked to the LTTE, the PA government had not consulted the UNP and, therefore, the current UNP-led regime had no obligation to consult the Opposition either. Both the UNP boycott of the Presidential anniversary as well Professor Peiris' retorts to the Presidential overtures are very much in the spirit of the continuing hostility between the Government and the Presidency. On her part, the President's objections to the new ministerial appointments (the UNP's hypocrisy in making such appointments after long criticising the PA's ministerial superabundance is another matter) are concrete evidence that the hostility flourishes on both sides, despite conciliatory verbiage. What this all means is that both parties are locked in a political dynamic in accordance with the basic compulsions of the capitalist parliamentary system as it is structured by the Jayawardena constitution. That this competitive dynamic is not necessarily as pervasive in other capitalist democracies as it is in the Sri Lankan polity may be seen in the way the Indian national political parties deal with basic issues of foreign policy and the British national parties deal with the Northern Ireland question. In both these countries, these issues are points at which inter-party contest ends and consensus and mutual interests take precedence. In both cases such a transcendence is more the result of ideology and political strategy and less the result of constitutional requirement and institutional facilitation. In both cases this consensual dynamic in relation to selected national issues are primarily the result of a combination of two things: (1) an ideological consensus deriving from socio-political interests of the political formations concerned and, (2) a conscious political praxis, based on moral-cultural impulses, of avoiding divisive politics in the larger interests of the Nation-State. But political practice over decades, if not centuries (in the case of the UK), has seen the evolution of well-established norms and procedures that the political formations concerned can take recourse to in order to deal with these selected national issues. Consultation and consensus Sri Lanka has lacked such a practice and, therefore, has not seen the evolution of such norms and procedures enabling inter-party consultation and consensus. That is one reason why the ethnic conflict has reached the proportions it now has, to the degree that the very existence of the Sri Lankan State, as it is currently formed, is in question. More importantly, the re-formation of political community on this island could have taken place much earlier and without any of the tragedy and devastation of society and ecology if not for this lack of consensual politics. possible strategies If the peace process is ever to reach the stage of a comprehensive political settlement, such a consensual process is essential. How the country can get there is the challenge that Sri Lankan society as a whole must take up. The 'core issues' will remain the subject of research and theorising until and unless we get there. These columns have argued more elaborately previously on possible strategies for a societal effort towards political consensus and systematic negotiation. Interestingly, this lack of consensus has emerged on both sides of the current negotiating process. As events (not unexpected) in the East as well as the crisis within the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and some dynamics in the last round of the Thailand talks have indicated, the LTTE's claim to be 'sole representative' is not as convincing as Mr. Prabhakaran would like it to sound. It cannot be convincing when the LTTE Leader is unable to completely restrain 'Batticaloa Tamil' mobs in riots between Muslims and Tamils in the East, when he cannot contain the sub-regional power of Eastern Tiger leader Karikalan and, when 'Batticaloa Tamil' Tiger troops insist on transfers from their stations in the North back to their 'homeland' in the East (presumably in solidarity with their leader, Karikalan). In short, even the seemingly monolithic LTTE is not as monolithic anymore in the aftermath of its success in winning recognition for Tamil self-determination and self-rule. internal dissension While the larger problem is the lack of institutional frameworks to facilitate internal debate and consensus-building, the more immediate problem is the growing internal dissension, currently on regional ethnic issues (Tamil-Muslim, Tamil-Sinhala), but also, in the future, on caste and socio-economic class issues. Right now, however, the Tamil leadership must evolve some kind of consensus in the North-East at least on the most sensitive question of Tamil-Muslim-Sinhala ethnic co-existence within a new regional polity, which is one of the 'core issues'. The problem of the East cannot simply be seen as one that has to be dealt with by Colombo and the political formations headquartered in Colombo. As I have argued above, the problem of ethnic co-existence within the emerging North-Eastern polity must be seen more as a question internal to the North-East, with 'cross-border' ramifications, especially as far as the North-Eastern Sinhalas are concerned. There is little evidence that Muslims outside the North-East are organically concerned about the fate of North-Eastern, especially Eastern Muslims. political plurality Thus the North-Eastern political leadership must, on the one hand begin to deal unilaterally with the minority Muslim and Sinhala communities in their region and, on the other, evolve institutional mechanisms and political structures that will enable such minorities, as well as other regional interest groups (such as sub-regional Tamil communities and caste/class groups) to build up their own leaderships with the capacity to politically engage with the current North-East hierarchy. We are talking of some forms of political plurality here, although such plurality need not take the form of conventional liberal democratic structure or bodies (like parties). Thus, the problem of 'consensus' is there on both sides of the peace process and, while economic rehabilitation, economic recovery and other confidence-building measures will consolidate the current interim peace, a comprehensive settlement of the 'core issues' remains distant as long as consensual politics is unattainable. |
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