Devolve or Die!

India, USA lock-on to Lanka's Crisis

by Dayan Jayatilleka

A few pinpricks of light then, which could converge into a ray, illumining a path through the gathering gloom. In a felicitous coincidence, there were three recent developments, the one domestic, the others in our external relations, which provide a chance to escape the dark cavern of our crisis. These are (A) the change in the leadership of the ruling SLFP (B) the visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and (C) the confirmation of Robert Blake, former Deputy Head of Mission in New Delhi, as US ambassador to Sri Lanka.

SLFP shift

The accession of President Rajapaksa to the leadership of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party is a historic transition but it must become an irreversible and true transformation. That party had the distinctly dubious distinction of being the only one in the world to be a family heirloom; headed - actually owned- by a single family for over half a century; fifty five years to be exact, since its founding in 1951. Apart from its founder SWRD Bandaranaike, every one of its leaders achieved that status - and thus a crack at the leadership of the country - due to inheritance through marriage or bloodline, not merit; their path littered by the back-stabbed political corpses of potential leaders (eg. Maithripala Senanayake, Hector Kobbekaduwa, T. B. Subasinghe, Stanley Tillekeratne).

Mahinda Rajapaksa's hold on the party leadership requires stabilisation, deepening and consolidation, and the party needs as fundamental a reform as that which J. R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa effected in the UNP after the Senanayakes. The UNP was irreversibly de-Senanayake-ised; the SLFP must be irreversibly de-Bandaranaike/Ratwatte-ised and transformed into a modern progressive or social democratic formation along the lines of the US Democrats and Britain's New Labour, obtaining affiliation with both. This can be achieved only if the party apparatus and most vitally, its parliamentary group are overhauled and consists of those owing loyalty to the elected leader. President Rajapaksa can bring the party more fully under his command only if he opts for a general election, since that will enable him to decide on nominations. A general election also provides an opportunity for attracting UNP dissidents. An SLFP thus revitalised, more fully reflective of its new leadership and campaigning under the banner of a popular, recently-elected president, can beat both the Tiger-loving UNP and the obstructionist JVP-JHU. A strengthened centrist formation in parliament will reinforce the president and strengthen his hand in the implementation of a devolution package.

Saran Wrap

On the heels of the historic change in the ruling party's leadership came the second development, which in conjunction with the first and third, could change the entire Sri Lankan scenario for the better. That was the visit of India's Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and his expression of India's readiness to be of help in the search for a political solution to this country's crisis.

It is evident that the recent reactivation of concern in Tamil Nadu over the Sri Lankan situation, capped perhaps by a word of encouragement from Washington, has nudged New Delhi out of a posture of studied passivity. Judging from news reports in both Sri Lankan and Indian media, the Indian Foreign Secretary has been fairly emphatic on the need for speedy devolution. Delhi has indicated that its constitutional expertise is available to Colombo, and that devolution roughly approximating India's own arrangements would perhaps be the most feasible or desirable solution.

Veteran Prabhakaran-watcher MR Narayan Swamy, writing for India Abroad News Service provided an interpretation of the Saran visit: "After some hesitation and much thinking, India has finally given Sri Lanka its most trenchant message since a peace process began four years ago: Act now, politically, to keep the island nation united.

In his meetings with President Mahinda Rajapaksa and other Sri Lankan leaders over two days, Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran told them that Colombo needs to get serious about devolution of power if it wants to end Tamil separatism.

...The polite Indian missive was: the Sri Lankan leadership has to get its act together and devise ways of politically resolving a conflict that has raged for almost a quarter century with no end in sight.

India's understanding is that the security situation in Sri Lanka is very serious and only a working and widely acceptable package that devolves power to the minorities - the absence of which gave birth to Tamil militancy a long time ago - would lighten up the end of the tunnel.

The Sri Lankan decision to set up an All Party Conference and other similar steps aimed at preparing a devolution package has been noted, but the view here is that this should not become a dragging affair.

Saran also conveyed to Rajapaksa, on behalf of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, that India stands by Sri Lanka's territorial unity and opposes terrorism in all forms. India was also ready to share with Sri Lanka its expertise in constitutional matters, an offer that has been made in the past too.

At the same time, however, Sri Lanka needed to act - and fast.

...India has been repeatedly telling Sri Lanka's two main parties - the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United National Party - the need to get together to evolve a political answer to the ethnic conflict, whatever their other differences.

The Indian message to Sri Lanka is also more or less what other international actors in the peace process have been telling Colombo in recent times, privately and publicly." (IANS, New Delhi, July 5, 2006) India as Internal Mediator

I would argue that it is certainly in Sri Lanka's strategic interests not only to avail itself of that offer, but to swiftly engage - a cynic would say, lock in - India.

While Norway cannot be replaced in its role, which I would dub that of 'external facilitator', India should be invited to play the role of internal facilitator/mediator in our search for a solution. Let Norway be the conduit to the Tigers. Someone has to do it and no one else wants the job. It is against Sri Lanka's interests to have India in place of Norway, talking to the LTTE: given the Tigers' assets in Tamil Nadu politics, a softening of Delhi's stance cannot be ruled out.

However, it is very much in our interests to have India play the role of domestic mediator, helping to forge a democratic consensus on the devolution of power. The harsh reality is that no domestic player can bring the UNP and SLFP together, and such a convergence is necessary for any drastic transformation of the Constitutional architecture. India, supported by the USA, may succeed in bringing the UNP and the ethnic minority parties on board, and if the UNP and TNA do not play ball, then they will lose the goodwill of both Delhi and by extension, Washington. In such an event India can help the Colombo government optimise autonomy within the existing Constitution (the Douglas Devananda-Lakshman Marasinghe option/s), by renovating the Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th amendment.

A political solution arrived at with India's concurrence would confer multiple benefits on Sri Lanka which cumulatively would tip the scales decisively in our favour and against the Tigers. It will (i) give the Sri Lankan state considerable credibility in the international community (ii) neutralise Tamil Nadu by winning over its mainstream leaders (iii) split the TNA and the Tamil Diaspora, (iv) strengthen the Tamil moderates (such as Mr. Anandasangaree) (v) expose the LTTE's intransigence and isolate it, and (vi) significantly enhance the prospect of Indian and US support for our embattled military in the event of full-scale aggression by Prabhakaran.

There remains the residual matter of the JVP. If an Indian team helping Sri Lanka includes top officials of the CPI-M (I'd suggest Gen Sec Prakash Karat in overall charge, and Sitaram Yechury, who played a constructive backstage role in the management of the Nepali crisis, running point), then either the JVP could be won over or neutralised. Were the JVP to reject an Indian mediated autonomy package, such maximalist isolationism would have a politico-diplomatic cost.

Deep-Penetration Diplomacy

Colombo should therefore embrace Delhi's recent offer and request a small team of eminent persons, headed by a special envoy of India's PM, to interface with the All Parties Conference, the Advisory Committee of experts and the Peace Secretariat.

The Sri Lankan Government should simultaneously operate behind LTTE lines as it were, in Tamil Nadu, using unorthodox diplomacy by a 'deep penetration team' of moderate Tamils who in their long and intensive exile in India forged close relations across the political spectrum including with Karunanidhi and the Tamil Nadu Left. Minister Douglas Devananda and SCOPP Deputy Chief Kethesh Loganathan come readily to mind. Given also their excellent relations of two decades with the leaders of India's powerful Communist parties, the Delhi bureaucracy, mass media and intelligentsia, I'd strongly urge launching them in a lobbying effort in New Delhi.

The Fine Art of Filibustering

The APC and the Advisory Committee should not waste time reinventing the wheel. A dozen detailed proposals for devolution - 'home grown' and otherwise - exist and should be recovered for expeditious reassessment.

These pre-existing schemes for devolution are (1) the B-C pact of 1957 (2) Annexure C of 1984, (3) the Political Parties Conference proposals of mid 1986, (4) the 'trifurcation' proposal of November 1986 (Bangalore SAARC summit proximity talks), (5) the Chidambaram proposals of Dec 19th 1986, (6) the apex council/linkage plan of early 1987, (7) the Indo-Lanka accord and the 13th amendment of '87-'88, (8) the DPA Manifesto of late1988 (Mrs. B's campaign platform)(9) the Mangala Moonesinghe Select Committee proposals of 1993 (signed by Mrs Bandaranaike) (10) President Kumaratunga's 'union of regions package' of 1995 (11) its revised version of 1997 and (12) her admirable constitutional draft of August 2000 (evolved with UNP inputs).

The problem with a purely home-grown solution, arrived at, mind, after meditating on the planet's every exercise in devolution, is twofold: (a) we just don't have the time, because neither Prabhakaran nor the international community will give it to us, and (b) somehow, devolution does not seem to grow readily at home! The soil needs some imported seeds and fertiliser.

Delhi for its part, should obtain agreement from Colombo on a compressed time frame which will preclude the kind of filibustering that killed G Parthasarathy's pioneering effort in 1984.

Blake won't flake

The last of the three positive contemporary developments that constitute a triangular window of opportunity, was the June 15th confirmation by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee of Robert O. Blake as the new ambassador to Sri Lanka. The choice of Mr. Blake is hardly accidental. As Deputy Ambassador to Delhi he helped forge and manage Washington's new strategic relationship with India. As such he has excellent relations with the Indian political elite and state apparatus (including its defence establishment). He is perfectly positioned to reach out to his contacts in Delhi and coordinate a US-India response to the Sri Lankan crisis.

The appointment of Robert Blake, who moves here directly from Delhi, signals that Sri Lanka is being brought into the architecture of the new, vital Indo-US relationship. Taken together with the visit of Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, it indicates a Washington-Delhi convergence and growing consensus on the Sri Lankan crisis. The contours of that consensus were discernible not only in the message of the Indian Foreign Secretary but also in Ambassador Blake's replies on June 15th before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "We (US) have made clear where we stand. We support the government of Sri Lanka and that nation's territorial integrity. ...The Tigers were designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by our government in 1997, a status that remains in effect and richly deserved today....The Sri Lankan government must show it is willing to address legitimate Tamil grievances, including articulating a political vision for the future of the country that provides room for the aspirations of all Sri Lankans, from all religions and ethnicities.." (Asian Tribune)

So the big boys are here and are getting their act together. The choice for us is simple: either we lock them in, or we lose them and are left alone to face our enemy. To put it even more starkly and grimly: 'Devolve or die!'