Anatomy of a confrontation
by Jayadeva Uyangoda
Behind the failure to reach a compromise is the incompatibility of
the Sinhalese and Tamil nationalist projects.
Sri lanka's peace process and Sri Lanka itself is in serious trouble.
The escalating violence between the government and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has pushed the country into a major crisis. And
the crisis is deepening, with an undeclared war intensifying. Its latest
victim is the third highest-ranking officer in the Sri Lanka Army.
Neither of the two main protagonists in the conflict, nor the
international community, not even Sri Lanka's powerful neighbour, appear
to posses the capacity to arrest this sliding back to a major
conflagration.
There are three aspects to the current phase of escalating violence.
First, civilians have been targeted for attack. Each side would deny
responsibility and then blame the other side. Secondly, violence,
whether it is perpetrated against civilians or combatants, has a
retaliatory dimension. Thirdly, each side has been targeting high-value
military assets, or personnel. It started in 2003 as a shadow war
between the intelligence wings of the Sri Lanka Army and the LTTE. Now
the targets are senior cadre and officers.
Looking at the way in which civilians have been targeted during the
past few months, one can even say that the dirty war phase of the
conflict has earnestly re-surfaced. In this backdrop, the challenge
today is not about settling the ethnic conflict, but about breaking the
vicious cycle of retaliation.
Has the war really begun in Sri Lanka? This is the question that
baffles not only ordinary citizens, but also professional civil
war-watchers.
It is probably the case that this time, the war has new dimensions.
It unfolds while the two sides remain technically committed to the
ceasefire agreement of 2002. It has a low-to-middle intensity character,
focussing on limited military operations, brief retaliatory attacks,
targeted assassinations and the attacks on civilian communities. Major
military campaigns as in the period of 1996-2000 do not seem to be in
the immediate agenda of either side. But the logic of spiralling
violence might change, sooner or later, the entire complexion of the
war. What appears certain at present is the impossibility for the
government and the LTTE to return to substantial political engagement.
Failed Peace Process
Why did the peace process, initiated in 2002, fail? In the political
debate, there are many answers to this question and they, despite where
they originate from, provide useful insights. Sinhalese nationalists and
critics of the LTTE make the point that the rebel group was never
interested in a negotiated settlement and that it was merely trying to
gain unilateral advantage through the ceasefire and negotiations. The
LTTE turns this argument around to accuse the governments of not being
interested in a political settlement. Those who view Sri Lanka's world
of conflict from a non-partisan perspective see another lost opportunity
for peace through compromise.
Compromise has been the most difficult result to achieve in all the
negotiations in Sri Lanka to resolve the ethnic conflict. Assessing it
from the perspective of the potential for compromise, the peace process
of 2002 had a truly promising beginning. The ceasefire agreement,
facilitated by the Norwegians, was a major compromise that froze the
military ground conditions between the two sides. But that also was the
compromise which irked almost all political forces in Sri Lanka except
the two signatories to the ceasefire document. In the absence of a
political agreement, the agreement was unsustainable. With no will to
making dramatic political compromises, the negotiations could not
produce an agreement to settle the problem.
Crisis in negotiations
Interestingly, negotiations ran into crisis at two crucial points
that required parties to work together for historic political
compromises. The first was immediately after December 2002 when in Oslo
the two delegations agreed to explore a federalist option within a
"united Sri Lanka". The second was in October 2003 when both sides put
on the table their proposals for an interim administration for the North
and the East. Even the opportunity offered by the tsunami was not
utilised by the political forces to move towards a sustainable framework
of cooperation. It may be the case that the ethnic conflict, even after
20 years of civil war and a huge humanitarian disaster, is not yet ripe
for settlement.
At the heart of the failure to reach a compromise is the enduring
incompatibility of the Sinhalese and Tamil nationalist projects. The
dominant Sinhalese nationalist argumentrefuses to acknowledge the
presence of an ethnic conflict. It views the entire ethnic conflict as a
terrorist problem, or even a minority conspiracy, that requires a
military solution. In the vision of Sinhalese nationalist ideologues who
are quite influential now in shaping the thinking of the polity, a
limited measure of power-sharing may be possible after a
military-administrative unification of the "nation". Some argue that the
Indian model, without its federal features, is best suited for a
post-conflict Sri Lanka.
This limited vision of Sinhalese nationalism is matched by the
secessionist objectives of Tamil nationalism as spearheaded by the LTTE.
The LTTE's compromise framework is one that approximates
confederalism, a fairly advanced form of regional autonomy. The
conceptual foundation of the proposal for an Interim Self-Governing
Authority which the LTTE presented to the government in October 2003 was
confederalism, which laid greater emphasis on self-rule and a little on
shared rule.
The talks that began in 2002 did not lead to a negotiation between
these two qualitatively different ethno-nationalist imaginations.
Interestingly, when the talks entered a phase of crisis, the differences
between the two projects were re-sharpened. Now they stand, their paths
crossed, with no possibility of finding a meeting point in the near
future. The unstated assumption currently shared in both camps seems to
be a troubling one: a drastic alteration in the military balance of
forces might create new conditions for a new phase of political
engagement.
Meanwhile, the re-escalation of violence has occurred in the backdrop
of the recent failure of the two sides to restart the stalled peace
process. The first such attempt under the government of President
Mahinda Rajapaksa was made in February this year in Geneva. Facilitated
by the Norwegian peace brokers, the two sides met there after an absence
of direct talks for three years. The immediate context for the Geneva
meeting was the increasing violations of the ceasefire agreement and the
threat of the resumption of full-scale war.
In Geneva the two sides agreed to renew their commitment to honour
the agreement fully and take immediate steps to prevent future
violations. But that was a pledge that remained on paper. Within two
weeks of the Geneva accord, killings resumed on a larger scale, each
side blaming the other for re-escalating violence.
Meanwhile, the European Union (E.U.) on May 29 listed the LTTE as a
terrorist entity in the backdrop of an increasing risk of full-scale
hostilities breaking out. The E.U. said that its decision "should not
surprise anybody" because the LTTE had systematically ignored prior
warnings. It seems to have been quite concerned with what it saw as the
LTTE's disregard of its repeated insistence that the parties in Sri
Lanka "show commitment and responsibility towards the peace process and
refrain from actions that could endanger a peaceful resolution and
political settlement of the conflict".
The meeting of the Co-Chairs - the E.U., the United States, Norway
and Japan - which took place a few days later blamed the Sri Lankan
government and the LTTE for the crisis and insisted that both parties
should take immediate steps to "reverse the deteriorating situation and
put the country back on the road to peace". The Co-Chair statement
demanded from the LTTE to re-enter the negotiating process, renounce
terrorism and violence and "be willing to make the political compromises
necessary for a political solution within a united Sri Lanka". From the
government, the Co-Chairs demanded that it must address the legitimate
grievances of the Tamils, take steps to prevent acts of terrorism by
armed groups and protect Tamil civilians throughout the country.
More important, the Co-Chairs insisted that the Sri Lankan government
"show that it is ready to make the dramatic political changes to bring
about a new system of governance which will enhance the rights of all
Sri Lankans". The formulation "dramatic political changes" meant
federalist state reforms.
There is an international consensus that federalism is the only
alternative to Tamil separatism and Sinhalese unitarism
If the Co-Chairs thought that by being "tough" on both sides, they
could pressure them back to the negotiation table, it was only a
shortlived hope.
Responding to intense international pressure, the LTTE agreed to meet
with the government delegation in Oslo on June 8. The two delegations
did go to Oslo. The most unexpected happened in the morning of June 8
when the LTTE delegation, led by the head of the rebel group's political
wing, refused to meet the government delegation. The LTTE's explanation
was that since the government had sent a junior official delegation, its
representation would not meet them.
The government responded to this unexpected move by recalling its
team. Most embarrassed, the Norwegian facilitators fired a letter to the
government and LTTE leaders demanding them to re-commit themselves to
the ceasefire agreement and ensure the security of the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM). As the things stand now, the international
actors are realising that they have little or no role to play in
re-convening Sri Lanka's peace process. It may be the case that the
international actors are looking for an honourable exit strategy.
Why did the LTTE go back on its word in Oslo by not taking part in
negotiations with the Sri Lankan government delegation, when it had
promised the Norwegians that its intention of coming to Oslo was to
resume talks with the government?
Excuses given by the LTTE apart, it appears that the rebel group
implemented in Oslo a major political decision to terminate on their
terms the peace process that began in 2002.
Actually, the peace process has been in crisis for about three years
and it intensified particularly during the past six months in a context
of regime change. Both the government and the LTTE have repeatedly
expressed deep dissatisfaction with the peace process, for their own
specific reasons. The present Sri Lankan government assumed power six
months ago on a Sinhalese nationalist platform promising the electorate
that it would amend the ceasefire agreement and start a new peace
process. Its thinking has been that the peace process, initiated in 2002
by the United National Front government, accorded unnecessary legitimacy
to the LTTE, and gave the rebel group several concessions, placing at
risk national security and sovereignty. The LTTE's negative assessment
of the peace process is based on the view that it did not produce any
political outcome favourable to it.
The E.U. ban appears to have provided the context for the LTTE to
bring the 2002 peace process to a political end, without saying it in
writing or officially announcing it. The Oslo communique which S.P.
Tamilselvan, the head of LTTE's political wing, announced on June 10 was
a further step in the direction of a unilateral path that the rebel
leadership seems to explore. The LTTE's unilateralism is also a response
to the E.U. ban. It seems to entail separating the E.U. from thepeace
process. It is now becoming clear that the LTTE is experimenting a
strategy of re-internationalising the conflict and peace processes.
Normalisation of relations with India would be one of its key
components.
Three dilemmas
It appears that in the context of the current crisis facing the 2002
peace process, which has now approached what may be seen as its final
phase, the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE and the international
community are facing three sets of dilemmas.
For the Sri Lankan government, the dilemma is to prevent a major war,
while weakening the LTTE militarily and politically. The government does
not want to be seen by the international community as taking any direct
initiative to bring the peace process to a formal end. Meanwhile, there
are groups within the government that continue to argue that the
opportune time has come to defeat the LTTE militarily. The radical
Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a key member of the ruling
coalition with 39 parliamentary seats, has launched a campaign saying
that "enough is enough" and telling the government to move to defeat "LTTE
terrorism" once and for all. The JVP and sections of the military have
been making the point that the war with the LTTE is necessary and
winnable.
But President Rajapakse appears to be cautious about a large-scale
war. Politicians know that a big war will give an opportunity for the
LTTE to launch massively destructive attacks on economic and
infrastructure installations. Maintaining the low intensity war, which
would weaken the LTTE's offensive capacity, seems to be the government's
preferred option for the moment.
The LTTE's calculations seem to be quite interesting too. Although
not officially stated, it has bid farewell to the 2002 peace process.
Its dilemma is essentially about what next.
The LTTE too does not want to be blamed for unilaterally initiating
the next phase of war. But at the same time, the government's low
intensity offensive has hurt the LTTE militarily.
With the defection of Karuna, the LTTE's military commander in the
Eastern Province, to the side of the government in 2004, the LTTE's
military strength and control of the Eastern Province suffered a
considerable setback. With the assistance of the Karuna group and other
armed groups, a number of LTTE's local military commanders and key
civilian supporters have been assassinated in recent months. The LTTE's
claim that it can protect the Tamil civilians is also coming under
serious doubt, particularly in the context of continuing abduction and
killing of pro-LTTE civilians by anti-LTTE armed groups. The government
has also begun a policy of launching retaliatory air and artillery
strikes against the LTTE in response to the rebel group's offensive.
Thus, from the LTTE's perspective too, a major war seems to be a
necessity.
But, as the rebel group's recent official statements clearly suggest,
at the centre of its strategic preoccupations at present is the project
of militarily consolidating what it views as the regional sub-state,
with its own notions of shared sovereignty that include the claim to the
air and sea space. If war-making has been a process of state-making, the
coming phase of the conflict would be seen by the LTTE as one of
consolidating the state-making process. That would, if one may hazard a
risky prediction, logically preclude a full-scale war.
LTTE's new plans
The LTTE's new attitude towards the international community is worth
studying. After the E.U. ban, it seems to be exploring possibilities of
redefining the role of the international community in Sri Lanka. The
LTTE has also realised the limited nature of the role of Norway as peace
facilitator.
From the LTTE's perspective, Norway has not been able to ensure that
the Sri Lankan government implemented promises made at negotiations. The
LTTE might look for a bigger power, with the capacity for power
mediation. Yet, there are probably no volunteers to take up this
responsibility, particularly in view of the international community's
frustration and disappointment with the Sri Lankan government and the
LTTE.In this backdrop, the international custodians of Sri Lanka's peace
process do not seem to have many options.
In banning the LTTE and in the Tokyo statement, the international
community reasserted its role in Sri Lanka. But there are limits to what
the external players can do especially when the domestic actors in Sri
Lanka are not in a mood to work together for peace.
The United Nations might be the next in line to get involved, though
reluctantly, in the Sri Lankan conflict.Meanwhile, the escalating war
has opened up space for a new kind of role for the international
community.It entails the setting up of an international verification
commission to investigate incidents of violence. Although there have
been many recent incidents of gruesome violence against Sinhalese and
Tamil civilians, including the recent massacre of Sinhalese bus
passengers in the remote village Kebithigollewa, the SLMM does not have
power or capacity to conduct thorough investigations, and identify the
perpetrators. While the government and the LTTE exchange charges and
counter-charges about responsibility for such acts of war crime, the
presence of other armed groups in the Northern and Eastern Provinces has
made such violence against civilians a crime with impunity.
It is time now to think about an international verification
commission for Sri Lanka with powers of investigation and compliance.
That would be a small, but necessary, step towards humanising a conflict
that looks truly intractable.
Finally, Sri Lanka's crisis tells us three fundamental lessons about
settling the country's ethno-political armed conflict. Every failed
peace attempt only redefines the conflict in new terms.
A protracted civil war requires a protracted peace process for its
termination. A political engagement between the Sri Lankan state and the
LTTE can produce a settlement process only when it is backed by a
dialogue among the island's many ethno-nationalist projects.
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