Sri Lanka will always have them!
 

Dr. R. W. Senevirathne (Author is a Lecturer in University of Ruhuna and an officer in the Sri Lanka Army Volunteer Force)

In 1761, after 100 years of uneasy peace, full hostilities broke out between the Dutch Army of Ceylon and the Kandyan Army, forerunner of today's Sri Lanka Army. Kandyans made a determined bid to wipe out the Dutch from all their costal strongholds.

As a part of overall strategy Kandyan division commanded by Megastanne Adikarama (Rala of Dumbara), undoubtedly one of the greatest worriers this Nation has seen, laid siege to the strong Dutch fortress at Hanwella which was under Commandant H. W. A. Bremer. Governor Schruder in Colombo was confident of the well stocked fort's ability to hold. Kandyans ringed the fortress with troops and batteries and placed snipers in every conceivable locations.

Attacks were regular and artillery were poured into the fort but defenders parried well. Seasoned European troops of the day were past masters of siege warfare. Yet after six weeks, the Fort fell to the attacking forces. What went wrong?

There were some prisoners within the Fortress who were closely watching the activities of the Dutch. Whether they were purposely sent in by Kandyans for sabotage activities is not known. They identified one main weakness in the garrison. Its water supply depended on a single well as the river was away and separated by the Kandyan patrols and snipers.

Under the cover of darkness and confusion of battle the prisoners managed to pollute the well with festering carcasses of animals, no doubt writing their own death warrant in the process. Dutch efforts to purify the well failed and those who drank from it died.

Their attempts to fetch water from the river was foiled by attackers. Magasthanne repeatedly requested the garrison to surrender on honourable terms but when they finally surrendered out of desperation, the situation was too sour.

Garrison was put to sword. Noble virtues of local Commanders were illustrated by the fact that they allowed safe passage for Commandant Bremer, his four children (his wife died early in the bombardment), Lt. Van Langanburg, Sergeant Asmus and his wife to Colombo. The kindness of locals to women and children, not only ensured their safety but saved the lives of their soldier husbands and the fathers.

Names of the brave sons of this island who sacrificed themselves for the Nation's cause at Hanwella in 1761 are not recorded. This voluntary sacrifice in the hour of the nation's need differs from brainwashed, programmed way of suicide bombing. These warriors die with their soul on.

It's the duty of grateful citizens to cherish the memories of such heroes who have paid heavily towards the safe passage of the nation through difficult times. Such attitude is essential for regular emergence of such heroes and consequent survival of the nation.

Many noted historians and military analysts are fascinated by the ability of the Kandyan Kingdom to survive as a Sovereign State for over 200 years against determined invasions by three successive European powers.

Many analysts correctly identify the concepts of Kandyan strategy against attacks as one of politico military Unison. Although in Diplomatic duplicity, foreigners were ably matched by Kandyans, it was their innovative military abilities which saved themselves against technologically superior Western regular armies.

The latter include buying time with space, allowing nature and troops to work on the enemy without open warfare and mounting diversionary raids until the enemy's will to stay breaks down.

However, it is too naive to assume that their essentially conscript based Army could have consistently defeated the finest armies the world had seen up to those times with simple methods. By studying the experiences of European columns which invaded Kandyan territory the author argues that the locals had a brilliant operational concept to deal with unwelcome empire builders.

The Kandyan Army and their weapons

The Kandyan kingdom which was formed by King Wimaladarmasuriya in 1589 spanned a turbulent period in the history of Sri Lanka. The Kandyan Army was officered by upperclassmen who were intelligent and knowledgeable in the art of war.

The wartime army was manned almost entirely by conscripted peasants as the regular force which was an amalgam of local faithfuls, foreign deserters and mercenaries numbered only a few hundred.

These citizen soldiers who came to take 15 day turns were ill-trained but economical, as they brought all their equipment from home. Some of them had locally made or captured hand guns but most were armed with traditional weapons such as bows, arrows, swords and axes.

The foreigners who are either runaways from invading armies or converted Prisoners of War contributed well to the military strength of the kingdom and some became officers. The army had few pieces of mobile light artillery, and their heavy artillery was static in the permanent forts commanding key routes and vital points. Kandyans however had highly mobile light artillery units called Attapattu units using locally made guns called "Gingles".

These guns emitted iron balls of 1 inch in diameter and could be carried, maintained and fired by two men. Gingles suited ideally for the running battles in difficult hilly terrain which encouraged Portuguese and Dutch to copy their design.

This situation continued until 1815 and whatever the operational and tactical concept designed could not afford to expose the loosely trained and poorly armed peasant soldiers to direct methods of open warfare against disciplined and trained European regulars, the finest soldiers in the world at the time.

Want of a novel operational concept

Of the two main threats the kingdom faced at its very inception, one disappeared with the death of Sitawake Rajasinghe. But Portuguese continued to torment the infant kingdom. In 1594 Kandyans faced their first major challenge of having to face large Portuguese Army led by Pedro Lopez de Sousa.

The situation did not have any parallels for locals to draw experience from. The kingdom which was economically and technologically backward with a small standing army had two advantages-heavily forested, mountainous terrain and an able King, an ex-officer in the Portuguese army who was well versed in Western military methods of the day.

The grand operational concept Kandyan military leaders employed to destroy the invading force was to defeat two other major Portuguese invasions (Constantine De Saa in 1630 and Diego De Mello in 1638), two Dutch invasions (Baron Van Eck in 1763 and 1765)and two British Invasions (Hay McDowell in 1803 and Arthur Johnston in 1804) not to mention numerous raids.

Grand Operational Concept-The Dynamic Box (DB)

In many wars throughout the history defenses were conducted by troops in Box formations. These boxes were static and the enemy was outside. The defense was conducted inside out. Had Kandyans employed a similar method open warfare would have been the order of the day and the box will be compressed out of existence.

The kandyan approach to the situation was different. European regulars of the time travelled and fought in close formations. Up country terrain compelled any invading column to become thin and long when negotiating its narrow winding tracts.

The operational concept the Kandyan Army employed was complex in its simplicity. This was the probable reason why the veteran European Generals could not understand it adequately to invent effective counter measures.

It essentially consists of sequential deployment of their own troops in the shape of a box, a rectangle where the front is formed first. Followed by long sides (flanks) and finally the rear. This box then shadowed the enemy causing damage until it left the kingdom. Kandyan defense was conducted from outside in.

There the simplicity of the concept ends. Considering the flexibility in this mode of operation and mobility of its components as well as the "Box as a whole" this operational design can be termed "Dynamic Box (DB)".

DB-The Front

Front of the box greets the invaders with long range fire and runs ahead of them after effecting maximum casualties. On some occasions they were in the form of artillery ambushes, a method employed much later by German Field Marshall Ervin Rommel in a different war.

Van Eck and later Colonel Bailey faced artillery ambushes in the Kandy-Hanguranketa route in which the latter lost his brigade major. The front, usually manned by Kandyan army regulars, spread the warning. They also moved civilians from villages away from the intended path of the invaders together with any useful stocks.

Many European columns have recorded their disappointment in finding deserted houses devoid of provisions. They also felled trees, destroyed flimsy bridges, laid booby-traps enabling maximum delay.

Sometimes front troops speedily mount field fortifications on the intended path which they readily abandoned after a short fight. When Major Davy was withdrawing from Kandy with remnants of his force he was discouraged from crossing the Mahaweli in the night by the front of the DB on the opposite bank exhibiting an inflated strength with lights.

DB-The Flanks

Within the first two days into jungle terrain Van Eck lost almost all the drummers and many of the officers as a result of effective snipping. Drummers are used for signalling and to install morale which was affected while officer loss played havoc with the effectiveness of drilled European armies. This was one of the first recorded events in military history where officers were selectively targeted.

They were forced to wear uniforms of privates to avoid decimation, a practice which had to be relearned at a terrible cost in several subsequent occasions including recent wars. Boulders came crashing down on the flanks at most unexpected moments.

The absence of targets was frustrating for the Europeans who were trained for open battle. They vented their anger by shooting anything that moves thus expending valuable ammunition. Father Quarose has recorded an incident where Portuguese "firing at anything that moves" state of mind resulted in finding a pig killed with nine bullets.

On the other hand Kandyan officers were given freedom and flexibility (together with responsibility as seen by General Leuke losing his head for a Military failure) in the command to take advantage of any opportunity without a delay.

This they did very effectively. In an incident during Johnston's march in 1803, Kandyan flank attacked within minutes of the explosion of one of the British ammunition carts to take advantage of the confusion. This concept is known today as "command-push" method of military leadership and is gaining increasing popularity. Flanks also snatched any patrols or individuals who dare to venture out of the main column even for their daily ablutions.

In a recorded incident in 1803 a wife of a Malay officer who accompanied the troops was thus captured, killed, mutilated and shown to terrorized troops to persuade desertions. As a counter to the threat from flanks, Asavadu advised his successor to keep his troops together in Kandyan terrain, always to send sizable patrols and even then not more than half a day's march so that they can join the main force in the night.

DB Rear

Once the end of the column is well inside the jungle terrain the rear of the Box is closed. It will do credit to Azavado that he managed to realize the danger and withdrew from Kadugannawa just before the rear lid closes.

The Rear picked up stragglers and the wounded who were left behind and also attacked supply columns if they appear to be weak. Information provided was invaluable. Van Eck in 1765 and British force occupying Kandy in 1803 had serious difficulties due to the harassing of their supply columns.

Rear of the box together with near ends of flanks encircled rearguard at intervals destroying enemy column piecemeal. Constantine de Saa's force was attacked this way until his main body was annihilated at Randeniwela.

Achievements of DB concept

DB concept provided a board operational frame on which higher politic of Military (Strategic) and ground level tactical designs could be employed by Kandyans. Kandyans value the importance of buying time. This was bought by three main methods - DB concept, trading space for time as Russia did against Napoleon (1803) and Germans (1941), and negotiations.

Of these roles, DB was the most important, as the Kandyan Kingdom did not have vast stretches of land to give in, as in Russia. Time bought enabled environment, illness and the will of local commanders to act on the invaders thus melting them down.

Fatigue, depletion of supplies, desertions, diseases such as malaria and dysentery took their toll on the invaders. Many negotiations happened with the Dutch and British while they were boxed at Kandy.

This reduced their own casualties. Van Eck who initially refused the peace offer later agreed to it after his columns to Hanguranketha was severely mauled by Sub DBs.

In 1803 when Major Adam Davy's troops occupying the temple of the tooth successfully resisted a dawn attack by Kandyans Pilimatalave, in command of the Kandyan Army, tricked the British to leave their position and captured them without a single casualty to own troops.

Direct confrontation

Usually DB shrank in for the kill, resorting for direct confrontation only when and if invaders are reduced to such a state that they were unable to mount an effective response. However the DB would switch to 'annihilating mode' at any stage of invasion if those prerequisites are met.

Azavadu was nearly boxed at Balana just after he entered Kandyan heartlands. Diego de Mello's troops were killed before he reached Kandy at Danture while Pedro Lopes faced his end on his return from Kandy at Gonnoruwa. Constantine De Saa almost left difficult terrain when his troops were annihilated at Randeniwela.

Heavy losses the Portuguese suffered in their Kandyan Campaigns are sited by many historians as a major contributory factor for the fall of their empire. High-born Dutch Army troubleshooter Van Eck got away with some of his troops, thanks to one of his Mudaliers showing a secret tract while his remnant was boxed to death piecemeal. He died shortly in Colombo, probably committed suicide.

General McDowell escaped to Colombo in time to die seven years later in a shipwreck while returning home. The fate of his unfortunate troops fell on the hands of Major Adam Davie due to the death of some senior colonels. Davie was boxed at Vagolla before crossing the Mahaweli river and spent the rest of his life as a prisoner-of-war. Captain Johnston achieved a brilliant feat with intuition, ingenuity and courage when he escaped with his relatively small column, stealing a march on the DB at all time.

One of the Kandyan commanders later commented that Johnston must have possessed some supernatural powers to make the right move several times when the DB was about to close on him. It is not surprising that this officer later became the commandant of the British Staff College then at it's embryonic stage.

He wrote a popular text book on the conduct of military campaigns in warm countries. In order to preserve independence, the Kingdom of Kandy was forced into wars against global superpowers of the day. Having no external support, they designed and executed an operational concept which consistently defeated invaders.

This design utilized local strengths of numerical superiority, climatic conditions, geography etc while preserving the lifestyles of people and the economy of the country as much as possible. A key value of this design is that it did not expose minimally trained citizen-soldiers to dangers of open warfare which was the strength of Europeans.

The military genius in local kings and commanders were backed by high moral values which they upheld even when dealing with foreign invaders.

Nobleness of these virtues which governed the success of Sri Lanka civilization can be sensed in the words of King Rajasingha II when he saw the severed head of Constantine de Saa "How often I have prayed on you not to make war on me or destroy my realm, but to let me live in peace, while you kept the best part of Lanka: But if your successors follow in your footsteps, you will not be the last".