LTTE air 'threat' and disaster management

by Wg. Cdr. C. A. O. Direckze (rtd)

The bombing of the SLAF Base Katunayake, the Army Camp at Jaffna, the CPC establishments at Kolannawa and the Muthurajawela Gas facility, by the LTTE utilizing 'light aircraft' brings in a new and very dangerous dimension to the current hostilities.

The acquiring of two or three light aircraft by the LTTE in my humble opinion does not constitute an 'air force,' but rather an 'air threat.' Nevertheless this air threat provides the LTTE with the ability to change the current disaster scenario, and create disaster situations the magnitude of which we have never experienced before.

The ease with which the LTTE came, bombed, and returned to base would indicate that our current air defences are inadequate to meet this air threat. This is a very serious situation, and needs to be evaluated and to be managed.

The purpose of this paper therefore is to evaluate the air threat, the air defence facility, to identify the worst case disaster scenario in relation to the air threat, and to attempt to formulate a disaster management plan to eliminate the LTTE air threat.

EVALUATION OF THE LTTE AIR THREAT: In order to manage the LTTE 'air threat' it is necessary to first evaluate the probable threat. From information available to the general public, the LTTE air threat consists of two or three light aircraft, an efficient engineering facility, a limited training facility, and an Improvised Explosive Devices producing facility.

The aircraft have a flying range of 1300 to 2000 km, a speed of 260 km/h to 460 km/h., and a take-off distance of 550 to 650km. It also has the ability to fly very low in order to avoid detection by radar. This information though very basic is adequate to formulate a strategy to manage the current air threat posed by the LTTE.

SMALL ARMS VS. LIGHT AIRCRAFT: I was seated by the window opposite the left wing of the SLAF DC 3 aircraft as it began it's descent into Jaffna airport. We were at an altitude of approximately 600 feet, when I heard a 'burst' of small arms fire from the ground.

There were three such bursts, and on the third burst I saw a small hole in the left wing of the aircraft approximately 10 feet from where I was seated. The SLAF DC3 aircraft had been hit by LTTE 'small arms fire' from the ground.

The time factor from the first to the third burst was less than 05 seconds, which indicates that the LTTE gunner had the aircraft in his 'sights' for not more than 05 seconds. It is therefore possible to hit and destroy a light aircraft with small arms fire from the ground.

This incident provides us with two important factors to formulate a disaster management strategy, first that the LTTE aircraft have to fly very 'low' in order to accurately bomb their targets and therefore they will be within range of small arms fire from the ground, and secondly their speed is approximately 75 to 125 metres per second which means that they will remain in the 'sights' of the Gunner for only a very short time, and therefore the Gunner must be very professional at his task.

The next step in the formulation of the disaster management strategy is to identify the probable LTTE targets, and to define the 'worst case disaster scenario.'

LTTE TARGETS: The first two LTTE 'air' targets were military establishments, and the third was a human and economic target. It would appear that the LTTE is shifting its focus from the 'hard military' targets to 'soft' civilian economic targets.

These three air attacks demonstrate that the LTTE air threat has the potential to attack any target they choose to in the south. At this moment of time it is not possible to defend all the probable targets, but the very high risk human and economic targets must be identified and protected from any further air attacks.

The Kolannawa Oil Installation and the Muthurajawela LPG facility are such very high risk targets, and we must consider ourselves very lucky that the pilot missed his targets. We must also realise that 'luck' is not a component of disaster management, and hence we must not depend on luck in the future.

PROBABLE 'WORST CASE' DISASTER SCENARIO: Had the bombs that were dropped on the Kolannawa Oil Installation hit their targets the disaster would have been of a very much greater magnitude than the ground attack in 1995.

There are other similar very high risk installations, such as the LP gas storage, LPG filling stations, power generation installations, etc. The WORST case disaster scenario would be where these separate very high risk installations are located in close proximity to each other in a 'cluster'.

If a cluster of these very high risk installations which are located in built-up areas is bombed, the cumulative effect of the resultant fires and explosions would result in an enormous disaster which we would most likely not be in a position to control or mitigate.

Therefore it is essential that the LTTE air threat is 'shot-down' before it can attack any of these targets.

PROTECTION OF TARGETS: These cluster targets are not precise targets like an air force hangar, and hence any pilot with minimum training would be able to cause maximum destruction to the entire cluster with two or three bombs.

With every 'bombing sortie' the Pilots are gaining experience and efficiency, and hence we may not be so lucky for the next bombing sortie. These targets are presently protected only by ground troops with small arms, and also 'chain link fencing' for protection from RPG fire.

All non-military very high risk targets are presently totally vulnerable from an air attack, and the military targets that are protected with 'air defence systems' to date have not demonstrated their ability to destroy the LTTE air threat.

COMPONENTS OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN: Based on the concept that a 'light' aircraft can be shot down by ground troops using 'small arms,' a disaster management plan to destroy the LTTE air threat can be formulated based on the following components.

This plan should be formulated and executed by the officer in charge of the troops responsible for ensuring the ground defense of the very high and high risk establishments.

1. 'Location' of the Gunner.

2. 'Early' Warning.

3. 'Duration' of the aircraft in the Gunner's 'sights'.

4. 'Training' of the Gunner.

5. 'Gunnery Discipline.'

6. 'Location' for shooting down aircraft.

7. 'Lighting' of target.

1. LOCATION OF THE GUNNER: The gunner must be located in a position where he has the maximum possible 'view of the aircraft approaching and leaving him. To achieve this requirement the gunner must be positioned as close to the 'horizon level' as possible.

The further below the horizon level that he is positioned the smaller his angle of vision of the aircraft approaching and leaving him. The higher above the horizon level the more he will be visible to the pilot who can shoot him down or take appropriate evasive action.

2. EARLY WARNING: The gunner should be given adequate time to prepare himself, to engage the enemy aircraft, and fire at least one burst of automatic fire. This early warning requirement would have to be provided by the 'radar' facility. In the absence of a radar facility forward observation posts would have to be established to monitor and transmit information of approaching aircraft.

The location of the forward observation posts would depend on the preparation time required by the Gunner and the speed at which the aircraft is flying.

3. DURATION OF THE AIRCRAFT IN THE GUNNER'S SIGHTS: The duration for which the aircraft will remain in the 'sights' of the gunner, will depend generally on the location of the gunner in relation to the horizon level, the height and speed at which the aircraft is flying, and whether the aircraft is flying towards the gunner or from right to left of the gunner.

The requirement is to ensure that the aircraft will be in the 'sights' of the gunner for the time required for him to aim and fire at least one burst of automatic fire.

4. TRAINING OF THE GUNNERS: The gunner must be given adequate training to the level that he is competent to shoot down the aircraft with the first burst of his gun fire.

Adequate training in my opinion and experience is the single most important component of the disaster management facility. At the commencement of the JVP insurgency in 1970 we were extremely short of weapons and ammunition, but in a few weeks we were provided with an abundance of weapons and ammunition.

Hence we were able to carry out night shooting training. We used a plywood target in the shape and size of a human being.

Every Gunner was required to fire several bursts at the target from approximately 25 metres. It was dark since it was past mid-night, but the target was visible. The results were shocking. For every 100 rounds we fired only 08 bullets hit the target.

In relation to his air defense function the Gunner is firing at an aircraft at mid-night, that is flying over his head loaded with bombs, at a speed of approximately 75 to 125 metres per SECOND, and it will remain in his sights for not more than a few seconds.

His task is therefore almost impossible unless he is 'lucky'. The training must be 'simulated' training. Light aircraft must be made to fly over his position at day and also night. The situation he is likely to be faced with must be simulated for him to achieve the required level of proficiency.

5. GUNNERY DISCIPLINE: The gunner must never squeeze the trigger of his weapon unless and until an identified enemy target is in his sights, particularly in built-up areas. If not some one is liable to die due to 'friendly' fire.

During the first JVP attack on the SLAF Base Katunayake it was the evening muster parade for the Airport Fire Services, when we heard the firing, and being curious continued to look in that direction, till a rifle bullet hit the wall a few feet above our heads. We were lucky. A rifle bullet also made a hole in the skin of an aircraft parked on the apron. All friendly damage?

6. LOCATION FOR SHOOTING DOWN AIRCRAFT: This is the most difficult component of the Disaster Management Plan. When the aircraft is shot down if it is still carrying the bombs, the Pilot will either drop the bombs or crash with the bombs which may explode on impact.

The location at which this happens is vital because the bombs will cause destruction to 'friendly' human beings and property. The ideal is to intercept and shoot down the aircraft above the sea. But this will depend on the flight path of the aircraft.

When formulating the Disaster Management Plan this aspect must be given very serious consideration. If possible aircraft 'shoot down' locations where available must be identified and the Disaster Management Plan formulated to ensure minimum destruction to our 'friendly' assets. People in these areas may even be advised to vacate in their own interest for the duration of the threat.

7. LIGHTING OF TARGET: The LTTE air attacks have been at night and hence there has been a problem of a good view of the aircraft. During the JVP insurgency in 1971 at China Bay we had a similar problem of lighting up suspected targets. The Air Traffic Control Centre had a very powerful search light which could be rotated.

We mounted this light on the top of the highest building and utilized it to survey the entire runway area. This type of search lights could be used to spot the aircraft and the operator could then fix the light beam on the aircraft and hold it to the aircraft for as long as required by the gunner.

CONCLUSION: But if LTTE audacity is not nipped in the bud the 'mosquito bite' that at present only causes an irritation can develop into the mosquito that injects the deadly dengue fever.

This menace has to be destroyed and destroyed soon, because the LTTE seem to have changed their tactics from attacking 'hard' military targets to 'soft' civilian economic targets. The Disaster Management Plan in relation to the LTTE air threat is to 'destroy' the light aircraft utilizing the ground troops and 'small arms'.

(The writer is a senior member of the Industrial Security Foundation (Sri Lanka) Inc.)