Man, Buddhism and Probabilistic Science

by Professor A. D. P. Kalansuriya

"Man, Buddhism and Probabilistic Science" is best explained by the key Buddhist concept of paticcasamuppada (PL.) or pratityasamuppada (Skt).

It is central to Buddhism. The Buddha testifies to its key role as follows: "He who sees causation sees the Dhamma" (Yo paticcasamuppadm passati so dhammam passati). But then, does the concept of paticcasamuppada express a universally valid truth? Or, does the paticcasamuppada reasoning render its conclusion ethically certain or highly probable only? If 'probability' is the case, "probabilistic Science" begins to play a keyrole in Buddhism although the two disciplines are differently located.

If "ethical certainty" is the case, "man" begins to occupy the central position. Nevertheless, it is a fashionable conceptual trend today to interpret Buddhism as scientific. This approach, I say, is popular yet is contextually out of order (A.D.P. Kalansuriya, The Buddha's Discourse and Wittgemstein, 2003).

In this short paper I shall attempt to make explicit "man's" intrinsic affiliation to Buddhism. An affiliation to probabilistic science certainly shall be deleted automatically in this regard.

Causation: Buddhism and Man

In the Majjhima Nikaya, the concept of causation is noted as follows: "imasmim sati idam hoti, imassa uppada idam uppajjhati: imasmim asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodha idam nirujjhati". It renders into English: "When this is, that comes to be, from the arising of this, that arises. When this is not, that does not come to be; upon cessation of this, that ceases also". Some instance of paticcasamuppada - causation are as follows:

1. "Depending on ignorance, there are volitional actions";

2. "Depending on craving, there is clinging". etc.

These are no more summaries of what has happened in the past. Nor can they be offered as evidence in favour of the so-called causal laws or bring 'about' causal law-like instances.

This point is established by the following note of the Buddha in the Majjhima Nikaya: "I am one of those recluses who profess the basis of true discourse that stresses doing of wholesome volitional actions and meditation rather than mere speculation, after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a super perceptual knowledge personally of a doctrine amongst doctrines not traditionally heard of before" (The Majjhima Nikaya. II 211).

This is an illustrative example which makes the Buddha's claim that he is a teacher or an adviser to the disciples or the listeners pertaining to the path that leads to nibbana or disentanglement. The two categories are clearly implied above, though mutual exclusiveness is not manifested. A few more illustrative examples would suffice, to make clear the point.

They are as follows:

(i) The Samyutta Nikaya contends: The Tathagata, brethren, who being Arahat is fully enlightened, he it is who does cause a way not brought about before: who is the knower of a way, who understands a way, who is skilled in a way.

And now brethren, is the distinction, the specific feature which distinguishes the Tathagata who being Arahat, is fully enlightened, from the brother who is fused by insight" (Samyatta Nikaya III 74)

(ii) Yet again, the Samutta Nikaya notes "I to counsel you; I to teach"; ("aham ovadana aham anuggahena aham anusasaniyati;").

(iii) The point is noted by the Digha Nikaya also: "But, I Nigrodha, say this to you. Let any intelligent man come to me, any man who is honest, candid, straight forward - I will instruct him, I will teach him The Truth-the Dhamma. If he practises according to my instructions, he realizes the goal for himself, here and now".

(iv) The Buddha, also brings out the following: "With super - perceptual knowledge, Uttiya, I preach the Dhamma to disciples for purification of beings, for transcending of grief and lamentation, for going to the end (attha) of dukka and distress, for attaining of the method for realization of nibbana." (Anguttara Nikaya. V. 194).

The significance of the Buddha as the first teacher who brings out a way, and proclaims a way is more than apparent from these four quoted passages from the Nikaya Literature.

It is emphazied also that the Buddha being the pioneer and the disciples, follower. The mutual exclusiveness of the categories of 'pioneer' and 'disciple' is clearly manifested here, though the conceptual tools of the Buddha's days may not have touched this point. The issue can be amplified in this manner.

The Buddha brings it about the path that leads to nibbana or disentanglement, but the disciple, even though he becomes a worthy one (arahat), he never becomes another Buddha.

There is no any other Buddha, logically. Two significant concepts are implied:

1. The establishment of two categories (a) the pioneer and (b) the disciple. This at once not only affirms the closed-class nature of Buddhism but also negates an open-class which is the nature of probabilistic science.

2. Characteristically soteriological overtones which logically negate probabilistic science.

All what the Buddha preached, uttered and expressed at (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) denote an original first explorer or an initiator of enterprise. Should an original first explorer be the case, perfect completeness and unconditionality are characterized. Subsequent ones or disciples fall outside the unconditional category.

That is to say, relative category is the case.Firstly, we explain how the establishment of two disciplines, Buddhism and probabilistic science as made known little while ago, gives rise to two very different functions inheriting two very different chains of reasoning.

Former discipline, namely, Buddhism is logically closed; but gives the state of highest perfection to "man". Whereas probabilistic science characteristically, makes explicit an open class giving an insignificant place to 'man'.

What the Buddha's taught delimits the nature and function of it together with exhibiting a unique chain of reasoning or a 'form of life' as noted by L. Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, 1953, sect. 23) For instance, the Buddha's reply to Upaka an Ajivaka, highlights the issue: "Conqueror of all, knower of all am I..." However, this is not the way most scientists use the word "know" in the language-game of science.

Again, most philosophers, to day, reject the view that one's introspection would guarantee one's given state of mind as one of knowing. It is poor logic, therefore, to entertain that if a person is certain, he then, ipso facto has knowledge.

In case this reasoning is also the Buddha's reasoning, it takes the following form: "The Buddha teaches a doctrine which claims to have been known by himself alone by way of his own super-perceptual knowledge; hence is unique" (Anguttara Nikaya). The logically closed nature of Buddhism is evidently seen here also.

But, then, what does the Buddha teach? He teaches a doctrine which claims to have been known to himself by him alone. This doctrine comprises an ethical system which prescribes a procedural guide and in turn is structured on an ethical code.

The Eightfold Noble Path is the name given to it which evokes a "means" in the matter of man's conduct alone. What is exclusively referred to is a "man", individual of genus Homo, distinguished from other animals by superior mental development and power of articulated speech.

An ethical code is logically appropriate only regarding "man" and not certainly regarding animals or birds or fish or outer space or spatio-temporal matrix. This is an ethical code embodying the middle mode of conduct ("ete ubhoante anupagamma majjhimena..... Dhammam desti").

From a glance once may see an epistemology-oriented discourse here which brings into special prominence truth or falsity of empirical statements. However, this is spurious because of the ethical nature of the Dhamma-oriented statements.

In the main, the doctrine elicits an ethics base so much the more because of its soteriology-orientation. Statements that enhance our point are abundant in all strata of the Nikaya literature. To heighten the issue, following are cited:

(1) The Buddha expresses: "I do not say that one can win the final knowledge at the very beginning; it is had from gradual discipline, a gradual mode of action and conduct ("naham adiken eva annaradhanam vadami, api ca anupubbsikkha anupubbakiriya anupubbapatipada anaradhana hoti") (Majjhima Nikaya. 1.479-80)

(2) Moral excellence ("Sila" (Majjhima Nikaya. 1. 145)

(3) The Majjhima Nikaya (346) emphasizes: practising of the virtuous life."

Our reasoning up to now clearly makes explicit the Buddha's Dhamma as a thorough-going ethics - oriented discourse. An epistemology-orientation and a probabilistic science-orientation are beside the mark.

Furthermore, practice of virtuous life, moral excellence, gradual mode of conduct emphasizes one and one only ethical path, namely, Ariyaattangika magga logically manifesting a closed class. The Nibbana-way hence is logically limited to man's purification alone.

It is inapplicable to any other creature, god or Brahma or any other non-man being. Two significant issues are implied, namely, (i) man's supreme importance with reference to his own emancipation from his own fetters in comparison with all other creatures, and (ii) the non-availability of any other "means" to attain it. To put the matter lucidly, the Nibbana-message not only is limited occupying a closed class logically but is also effective regarding 'man' alone characterizes as a closed-class member. "Upon birth, decay-death is necessitated" is what is bound together intricately in the Buddha's Dhamma. Should decay-death be ceased, birth also.

Within the ambit of Dhammic causation, the casual relations between causes and effects are but morality oriented necessary relations. The Buddha "experiencing" these relations not only is beyond human comprehension but is also unassailable and sacrosanct.

That "probabilistic science" together with its "causation" does not occupy any space, in this reasoning. This is the crux of the issue: but needs elaboration.

"The chain of reasoning" together with "the form of life" in Buddhism touches on man's emancipation - nibbana, by way of a closed-class ethics and anna-a state of mind manifesting final knowledge.

The Buddha's contention is expressed in the words "... there arose in me the knowledge - vision that my emancipation is unshakable, that this is the last birth and that there is no more future birth," Contrariwise, "the chain of reasining" together with "the form of life" in the probabilistic science discourse touches on the newness of ideas (I. Rabi the New Yorker Magazine, 20.10.1975) as well as human inquiry continuing indefinitely to yield important new truths. (Henry Stapp, American Journal of Physics, No.40,1972).

Philosophically, an epistemological study can be useful in the domain of probabilistic science. However, Buddhism offers "man" a soteriology away from epistemology.

Let the Buddha speak:

"Possessing naught, and cleaving unto naught,

That is that isle, the incomparable isle.

That is the ending of decay and death.

Nibbana do I call it Kappa, (said the Buddha)

That is the isle." (Sutta Nipata, verse nos. 109-4)

Causation: Probabilistic Science, Buddhism and Man

Moving into probabilistic science, a causal instance is appropriate: "whenever a gas is heated, its volume remains constant, its pressure rises." This statement expresses the relation between the two events. "a gas being heated" and "pressure rising". It expresses only "a relation of a high degree of probability" and not certain relation or a necessity or a moral necessity.

The concept of "one event necessitating this or that event," therefore, is not implicitly contained in the Buddhist causation - paticcasamuppada. This point needs elaboration: firstly the Dhammic causation - talk not only expresses a necessitation - production, but also emphasizes a necessary relation. Secondly it is unassailable.

The causation - talk ingrained in probabilistic science does not incorporate necessitation and unassailable nature. The idea is well-expressed by Oxford philosopher D. M. Taylor and British philosopher A. J. Ayer. With reference to the concept of necessitation, Taylor notes: "...the notion of one event necessitating another is senseless, (Explanation and meaning Cambridge, 1970.P.05).

Ayer comments on the concept of unassailable nature: "...no laws are sacrosanct, none is safe from rejection in the light of future experience because, while we have to rely on some laws in building up our picture of the world, they do not always have to be the same ones.... So there is no scientific hypothesis, no factual generation of any kind and no supposition of which we can say that it is unassailable" (Probability and Evidence, London, 1972, p.25).

Characteristically, as the Buddha's Dhamma accepts necessitation, unassailable nature and sacrosance, what emerges into explicitness are as follows:

(1) A logical distinction between the Buddha's Dhamma and probabilistic science, and

(2) The logical certainty of man's emancipation being stipulated in the Dhamma alone, probabilistic science, logically, has no role to play.