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Sunday, 7 May 2006 |
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Extra judicial killings hot potato for govt. - Henricsson
The chief of the ceasefire monitors, Ulf Henricsson says he is yet to receive relevant facts from the police on the suicide attempt on the life of the Army Commander. Hence, there is a delay in SLMM ruling on the suicide blast. He says Karuna is not a para-military group, but an armed group. He admits that it is a "difficult task" to pick insurgents from civilians in the North-East General Henricsson, a Swedish retired Army Officer with experience in conflict transformation in the Balkans spoke to the 'Sunday Observer' staffer Ranga Jayasuriya on a wide range of issues related to the peace process and the security situation. Following are excerpts of the interview: Q: Let's begin with your statement last week where you charged the government forces of involvement in extra-judicial killings. Later you toned it down to say that certain sections of the Army could have been involved without the knowledge of the government. How do you substantiate your observations? A: Well. It is well substantiated. We have handed over a list of incidents to the Inspector General of Police. And about the statement it is a matter of how you understand this word. The word we used was not controversial to me. We said we feel security forces could be involved in extra judicial killings and we had indications about that. That was a hot potato for the government and may be that is a matter of culture where you think, when you talk about security force, it is the whole security forces from top to bottom. What we said was that "we feel the security forces could not be involved, there can be an element. But you said security forces are involved...? A: Yes, we still feel that. But then after the discussions with the Peace Secretariat and the government, we hedged that, avoiding going back on this issue. That is why the new statement came out. We never said it was security force as a whole, we think there are parts of it, small groups or individuals, we don't know. That is why we said individuals belonging to the security forces are involved. Involved, does not mean they have done it. But they have not done anything to prevent it. They have not seen anything. They have not heard anything that is a problem. If you can commit a murder one hundred meters from the check point and if they don't see anything, don't feel anything, that is a cause for concern. That is the problem. We have handed over several cases and it is important that every one is aware that things like this happen. We are also very critical of the LTTE in the same statement. No one blames me if I used the same words against the LTTE. This kind of killings are done by both sides and we don't say, about the government side, that it is guided by the top. It could be small groups or individuals or whatever. Nevertheless some people are definitely involved in one way or another . Q: Can you name any individual security forces personal responsible for killings? A: It is not for me or the SLMM's task to do that. We are monitors. We are not making investigations. We are not criminal police. However in this case, I am talking about, one of the monitors is specialised in criminal investigation and he got very upset when police answered that, "well, we will come tomorrow", after the body is moved to the hospital. Q: Well, in the statement, while you were pointing finger at certain sections of security forces, you have failed to make any mention of the suicide attempt on the life of the Commander of the Army...? A: Not in the same place. But we have three statements on the incident. Q: Have you ruled that (suicide attack) as a violation of the ceasefire on the part of the LTTE? A: That is very obvious why we have not done it. Because we have not got facts from the police that we need. I had a meeting today with the Inspector General of the Police and asked for facts. But this is a case for the investigations of the courts and of course, police are little reluctant to give those to us, because those should be produced in court. But, I need certain facts before I make a formal ruling in this case. So that is why we have not made a formal ruling. Q: Practically speaking, can there be any party, other than the LTTE which can employ a suicide bomber to target a VIP? A: No. I don't think so. And that is why in the press statement we said clearly that we think that this looked like LTTE's and we criticised it. That is in the press statement. But you must separate what we are writing in the press statement from a formal ruling. Formal ruling contains a fact. Who did it, how did it happen, what was the meaning and so on. We have not got that. That is why we have not made a formal ruling. Q: I would say the definition of civilian is getting blurred, now with all these claymore blasts, firing at security force, all of which the LTTE say are done by the public. In this context, how do you identify the civilian from the insurgent? A: It is a difficult job to do. You must understand first the role of the SLMM and the number of monitors. we have sixty monitors. Of them we have 14 in Colombo, here in this office. Then we have 45 in the North-East. In the same area, security forces have, I think, a build up of 45,000 security forces personnel. If we count the East, that would easily amount to 80,000. They should be able to identify people from others. That is one reason that we are not doing investigations, we are conducting inquiries, that is why we say, "it looks like a violation" we ask the party to comment on them and once we get the comment, we are making the ruling. This looks like it is done, or hundred percent done by the LTTE or the government forces. That is the way it works. I think one of the problems we have, when we are accused of being biased, is that government side or people in colombo read or see all Sinhalese media. I think not many look into Tamilnet. Of course we were criticised much in Tamilnet as much as in the media down here. Q: One contentious issue is the High Security Zones. Given the current context, is it possible to dismantle them? A: Obviously no. The security forces do not want to do it. From a professional point of view, I understand that you have to look into force protection, if you are the commander in Jaffna. And so I think if the LTTE could make a guarantee of the safety of the troops, of course we might be able to pull down the High Security Zones. But in the present situation the commander in Jaffna is keen to have high security zones. I think the LTTE also have high security zones though they haven't admitted that. They are not for letting me coming there. They say no one is living there. I don't have an enforcement force to force my way over there. So I have to ask them, but they are not letting me in to their high security zones. I told them, "you complain about high security zones of the other side, first prove to me your high security zones are empty, so that we can discuss that". Q: So in this context how do we address this situation. With your experience in Balkans and other parts of the world, how do you think we can address the plight of Internally Displaced Persons, without compromising on national security? A: It is a very critical problem and it has been not solved fully anywhere. Of course the best solution is to remove the high security zones and putting people back in their houses. But, even in Balkans it has not yet finished, even though there it is on for over ten years. Q: Do you mean people will have to wait to move their houses (in the HTZ) till a permanent solution is reached to the conflict? A: May be or may not. I would not say that, it is for the parties to do. If you can get parties to lay down their weapons and go back to the camps, if you can build a little more confidence between them, then, I think you can also open up high security zones. For that you have to meet in Geneva too and you need to have more talks after that. I don't know how long that would take. But there is no solution at all, if we do not go to Geneva and have more talks, and still some more talks. Q: It seems a third party is also active in the east. Are you in contact with Karuna cadres? A: I would say my monitors had met them. Now we have their political people in Batticaloa, where we have been invited for the opening ceremony of their political office. We are in contact just for information gathering. But we have met people who claimed to be Karuna's. Q: But the government's explanation is that they (Karuna cadres) operate not in the government controlled area, but in disputed areas or areas controlled by the LTTE? A: I would say that what is government controlled area and what is not government area changes a little due to the situation. Some parts are identified as not government controlled areas today and next day it changes a little. Q: Now the LTTE is demanding the disarmament of Karuna's cadres. Practically speaking is it possible? A: You must talk to security forces. Q: Are your assessments based on your professional experience? A: Well, I think they (Security Forces) will have a lot of problems, if they do it. Further I don't see any reason for the government to do it. To be honest. If you have a warring faction against you and if your enemy is split why should you try to stop that. Have you read Machiavelli?. Q: And the government did not want them to split. It was the LTTE's internal struggle which caused the split? A: Of course the government wanted the LTTE to split, of course, it would be happy with a weakened LTTE. Q: Yes. It would have been happy. But it did not engineer the split? A: I have no idea whether they helped Karuna or not helped Karuna. But, I think the government has a lot of reasons to be happy about Karuna. That is just conflict theory. Q: Are they paramilitary cadres as described by the LTTE? A: Well, there is a lot of definition of paramilitary. But we don't say they are para military . We say they are armed groups. Q: Are you aware of any para military group working with the Sri Lankan Army? A: Well, I think, by definition the Special Task Force (STF) is a para military. In international definition it could be a para military group. Karuna is not a para military. Karuna is an armed group. Q: One question about any possible disarmament of Karuna loyalists is that they could fall prey to the LTTE soon after surrendering their arms. This happened to the EPDP and PLOTE. What guarantee can the SLMM suggest? A: We can not give any security guarantee for anybody here. Our security is guaranteed by two signatories to the ceasefire agreement. So I cannot give any security guarantee. Q: But, in case Karuna disarms, can you extract a guarantee from the LTTE for the security of Karuna loyalists? A: It should be included in the CFA. If they are disarmed, as Sri Lankan people, their human rights should be protected. Q: Meaning, if they disarm it would be suicidal to them? A: Don't ask me. I think same thing would happen if they were in the LTTE controlled areas even with arms. They are still alive, they must be somewhere. Q: Do you have any recommendations in your evaluation report on the security situation to be presented to the Geneva second round? A: Yes. Come to Geneva and talk about them. I have a recommendation for the two parties to read the Vienna Document implemented in Europe. That was the key issue that stopped the cold war. That document is about confidence building. Q: Have you given copies to the two parties? A: Yes. Both parties can read that and consider if there is anything they can take from it. There is a lot of clues which can be taken for confidence building and conflict transformation. Q: Perhaps the problem will be application of them in the Sri Lankan context? A: It is a matter of will. You never achieve peace, if you don't make bold compromises. It is just a matter of will. |
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