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| Sunday, 7 May 2006 |
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POINT OF VIEW Ockham's view of why Geneva 2 aborted Only the minimal assumptions essential to support a theory should be included in its assembly. Called Ockham's Razor, this elegant principle of intellectual parsimony, is a foundation of good science. Likewise, "Brevity is the soul of wit" says that good writing should use only the necessary and correct words. Best of all however, if you are just an ordinary sort of chap, you will say, "Cut the crap and get to the point". by Kumar David Geneva 2 was stillborn because the two sides failed to deliver on the core, bottom-line promises, they gave each other at Geneva 1. If William of Ockham whipped out his razor to shave redundant verbiage and stripped the deal to its barest bones, his laconic summary would read rather like this. "The LTTE agreed to cease attacks on the military; GoSL undertook to stop armed groups from its side of the demarcation line operating against LTTE cadres and supporters". The rest is all padding. Political commentaries and newspaper column inches in the last two months defining paramilitaries, discoursing on Day D+30, fretting over the LTTE's elusive 'conducive conditions', debating whether Karuna is an internal problem of the LTTE or not, helicopter rides, and so on, these are all tangential, factitious. The core issue for both sides is none of this; it is about prioritising military survival. In the first weeks after Geneva 1 the LTTE did in fact deliver on its promise and thereby proved two points. Unwittingly, it proved that the attacks on the military since November were not the work of little green men from Mars - it could call hostilities on and off at will, and that showed who pulled the strings. Secondly, the LTTE showed that it could deliver on its promise of military restraint if it wanted to - the corollary being that the escalation of the last few weeks is a calculated message. The situation on the GoSL side is murky and theories in circulation cover the spectrum from intrinsic inability to purposeful strategic unwillingness. Perhaps, it is said, it is very difficult to apprehend and control the Karuna forces; another theory speaks of a disconnect between the government and what it can induce the military to do at ground level. A third thesis contends that these 'paramilitary' forces are a vital component in its long-term strategic arsenal and must be carefully nurtured. There is no one correct answer and as with Rashomon truth is a blend of many layers of reality. When the core agreement fell through the two sides attempted to express their displeasure in different ways. GoSL wanted to go to Geneva again, expose the LTTE's duplicity in front of the world and apply international pressure. The LTTE in effect said, 'if you are reneging on your undertaking, what's the point of meeting again, stronger medicine is in order'. In April the LTTE and the paramilitaries have been unremitting in ceasefire violations and the last step of using a woman heavy with child as a suicide bomber is an abomination. As for the military offensive, since truth is the first casualty of war, the extent of civilian casualties and people driven from their homes surely exceeds what GoSL admits and is less than alleged by the LTTE. In addition, GoSL is guilty of permitting racist mobs to run amok in Trico - shades of 1958 and 1983? Neither side has gained in credibility, though, unsurprisingly, the national media give prominence to the LTTE's culpability. Back to basics Thus far the commentators who have pressed for renewed efforts to reiterate and honour the Geneva 1 pledges have been the most constructive. The deal was a clear-cut one; GoSL stops the activities of armed groups operating from its territory and the LTTE stops attacking the military. Either, both sides deliver, or else the ceasefire will end, de facto if not de jure. Back to the basic deal is the best way out of the present imbroglio before things unwind any further. There are those who contend that the LTTE is bent on a long-term war of attrition and will not honour the CFA. This begs two questions; in that case how come it refrained from significant operations against the military from February 2002 up to late 2005? Secondly, why jump to this conclusion before making every effort to implement Geneva 1 in the first place? The LTTE operation against three Karuna camps within the GoSL demarcation on April 30th with all its implications is the shape of things to come. Even nation states reserve the right to cross sovereign borders in similar military situations - this is a hard fact of armed engagement, irrespective of whether you love or detest the LTTE, Karuna or GoSL. A cease-fire to hold must hold comprehensively, and aberrations cannot be outsourced with impunity. If GoSL and the LTTE cannot even ceasefire when are they ever going to get down to substantive issues? A ceasefire in perpetuity is fine for the South and the government, they can get about business as usual and let the North and the East fade from view - logistics, economics and demography makes this possible. Not so for the residents of these two Provinces, nor the LTTE. A cease-fire in perpetuity is living in limbo, in a state of suspended animation, sans reconstruction, sans development and sans normality. Instability and violence will spill over. With the remarkable if uneven progress in Sinhala consciousness since the
first half of the 1990s, the retreat of chauvinist ideology into the dog
box, the resistance of the Tamils and pressure from the outside world, a
non-unitary, devolved, constitutional structure is pregnant in both the
political and military balance of forces. We should expedite its birth, not
sit back and invent pretexts for deferral, foremost among which is the
failure of political leadership. |
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