|
|
|
| Sunday, 4 September 2005 |
 |
|
 |
Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
|
Stalking the target 'LK'
by a Retired Senior Army Infantry Officer The assassin, who killed the minister is believed to be a 'sniper' according to politicians, security forces and police, media and public opinion. The perpetrator had removed the weapon, used for this crime, leaving behind few other items, such as 40 mm GL and its 02X live and 01X misfired cartridges and a tri-pod. Therefore, it is difficult to determine, precisely the exact type of weapon used, in this connection. The on-going forensic investigation would, sometimes be able to reveal facts regarding this, from the evidence collected at the crime scene. Yet, the identification of the type of weapon used, from the pellets found in the body of the slain minister, if any or the same found in a wall/any object after piercing his body may be, somewhat impossible as there were no empty cases left behind by the assailants. Even if the type of empty cases are recovered, it might not lead to identifying the type of weapon used, because there are many assorted weapons, which can fire with the same type of ammunition. The assassins seem to have, fully exploited the characteristics/limitations of these specialised weapons, in conformity to the basics and principles of tactics using the available ground situation to successfully accomplish this 'coup de man clandestine mission'. However, the probable 'modus-operandi,' which led the assassins to commit this crime and the type of weapon used, could be figured out by a military research and analysis. Snipers (Military - combat type) Snipers are useful elements on any battlefield. The sniper's job is to kill with a single shot. A camouflaged 'marksman' in a concealed forward position can take out the enemy leaders, or a radio operator, he can pick off machine gunners and pin down units of advancing infantry. A sniper in the dark using night scope is a fearsome, 'phantom hunter' who can create a climate of angst among the enemy. Quality of training standard Sniper is required to have great patience and endurance, for his task demands that he remains in a concealed position, often cramped for long hours with little substance, waiting for the right target and the right moment to strike. Using a first-class rifle with high-resolution optical sights and specially selected top quality ammunition, the sniper is able to shoot people at ranges far greater than an ordinary infantry man. The sniper's reach often comes as a disagreeable surprise, particularly for officers. The American General Sedgewick's last words were "Don't worry men, they couldn't hit an elephant at this dist...." Technology Modern technology in firearms and telescope sights, especially night vision devices, has greatly increased the capability of snipers. Modern sniper rifles are, specially designed weapons adapted for the role. In some models, the traditional bolt-action single-shot rifle has given way to semi-automatic design. The Soviet Army was the first in the field with semi-automatic sniper rifle, the Dragunov based on the action of the AK47 Kalshnnikov and fitted with a long barrel for accuracy. Scope AN/PVS - 2 Starlight scope. This can be used even in the dark. It is battery-powered and uses whatever natural light available. Unlike infra-red sights, the scope cannot be detected by the enemy, unless used carelessly and fails to keep the eye pressed, firmly against the eye piece. If any gap is left, some of the light emitted by the eyepiece will shine out around the eye-shield and the face. Under the artificial illumination, the scope is far superior to the naked eye and gives excellent depth and clarity of vision. Looking across a body of water such as a stream or a lake increases the capability of the scope. Also this scope is a valuable equipment and must not be allowed to fall into enemy hands. If it seems likely that the sight could be captured, it must be evacuated or destroyed. Laser beam target indicator Though a laser rangefinder is useful, it is an active source and may alert the enemy. A laser beam can be detected by sensors on armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) Passive night vision equipment or long range mounted system or the simply Individual Weapon Sights (IWS) from a rifle will give a good short-range observation. A passive system with a range of 150 mtrs, will allow a user to stake out a position by night US Marine corps snipers use the Redfield telescopic sight fitted to the M40 7.62 mm sniper rifle. It enables the sniper to hit targets barely visible to the naked eye. It magnifies the images by a minimum of three times and a maximum of nine. The sight helps to estimate accurately the range of a target and to aim at a precise part of the body. All it needs to decide is whether the target is within 600 yards or not. This night vision device can be used with a scan converter, allowing the image to be viewed (and recorded) on a TV monitor. This weapon can be striped and carried, easily in a concealed manner avoiding detection. Short-range targets can be hit with great accuracy, with the telescopic sight mounted on the rifle. Observations According to media reports a 40 mm GL and its live ammo, a tripod and food-stuff, such as cheese, biscuits, chocolates etc and two cellophane bags of human excreta, have been found in the hiding place. At the time of the assassination the moon, which was in its 3rd quarter and the 'star light' with 'clear sky' would have improved the capability of the night scope used for the crime. Other conditions, such as wind, fog/mist etc are negligible, in view of the short-range. Ground situation Illumination around the swimming pool seems to have increased visibility, together with the reflective light emitted from the water surface. The LTTE conspiracy, in this connection can be corroborated with their past record of carrying out this type of 'life-taking-high risk' missions. Although, at present there may be other groups operating as mercenaries they are not, thus professionally capable of carrying out such intricate tasks of high risk. The kind of food items found in the hideout resemble the same carried by LTTE infiltrators through the Forward Defence Lines (FDL) in the North. The selection of weapons and equipments used for the assassination, is so precise and accurate, in terms of 'tactical considerations' applicable for the execution of a secret mission of this nature and it is, only the LTTE, who could and would go into such details in planning to achieve a high degree of 3Ss-surprise, security and secrecy,; the 'cardinal elements' of success, as per the book. It seems that the LTTE is acquiring this knowledge, particularly of the operations of 'coup de man types (behind enemy lines) from the military journals/magazines and manuals published, periodically world-wide, today. Studying these materials is said to be a habit/hobby of the LTTE Leader, who gives the 'green light' for this kind of missions following his 'personal' scrutiny of the plan. The manual on 'Ultimate Spy' seems to be the guiding book for their pattern of operations of clandestine nature on the tasks, such as intelligence, spy, espionage, assassination, surreptitious reconnoitre, intrusion and surveillance, infiltration and ex-filtration, deception etc; the styles of KGB and CIA during the 'cold war'. Sniper or gun-man According to the range involved, it is, both technically and tactically incorrect to say that it was a 'sniper', who killed the minister. Definition of sniping, simply as per military terminology and the Oxford dictionary, is killing/fire shots/hit from a hiding place, usually at long range. On the other hand, the LTTE being a professional guerrilla outfit, is rather unlikely to employ a 'combat-sniper rifle' to engage a target at less than 50 mtrs. Due to the risk in carrying and the cumbersomeness in handling a standard combat sniper rifle, it may be, possible that the assassins may have used a sniper rifle but, of a commercial type or an ordinary rifle fitted with a telescopic sight (IWS). The order of shots (chest, neck, leg or otherwise) and the interval taken within each shot may help determine whether it was a bolt-action or semi-automatic rifle. Also, the recording of preliminary reconnoitre for assassins to undergo training / rehearsals, prior to the mission and its execution on the day of the assassination on video / photograph using thermal images/NVDs, cannot be ruled out. It was in 1985 that the LTTE took the first officer-target, Lt. Dahanayake, ISR at the Dutch fort in the Jaffna Town, when he, along with his company commander Capt Kotalawala were observing through the 'slit" of the fortress turret. The sniper, by the name of 'Mauran', who was said to be a marksman of the LTTE during this era, took his target, approximately at 800 mtrs across the heavily dense built-up area of No-man's land. This sniper, got subsequently killed in a fire fight with GW troops at Mavaddipuram-KKS during a road picketing operation. Security lapse The biggest concern and serious lapse in the security provided to the minister appears to be the failure to search the subjected house prior to the arrival of the minister. Although this lapse, ostensibly paved the way for the assassins to harbour themselves, the actual unseen lapses' have not been figured out. It is of course easy to say the security should have searched the houses in the neighbourhood whenever the minister had arrived at his residence. How, practical was this? Would the late minister allow this to happen often? Did the security personally know the actual occupants of the houses around, with a list of names, including those of frequent visitors? Has the security evolved a system, by which they be informed of the presence of visitors and outsiders including suspicious visitors around the premises? Even if these arrangements were made what extent could the security, ever expect them to be in perfect order? Wouldn't this cause great inconvenience to the neighbours? Even under the search arrangements in the neighbourhood, couldn't the LTTE assassins use the said house or any other house/building, a roof-top, a tall tree etc, which was overlooking the minister's residence following the search by the security at night. Couldn't the assassins clad in the uniforms as that of the security personnel of the minister gain entry to the said house or any other house during the presence of the occupants, in silence or at gun point and by keeping the required house closed, under the pretext that the occupants were out, prior to/following the search by the security. Standard military operating pattern/procedure The manner, in which the minister was assassinated with the presence of his security, highlights gross violation of basics and fundamentals in the standard operating pattern/procedures (SOP). It was the elite unit of the SL Army, the commandos, who provided security along with some MSD personnel to the minister. The commandos are a well trained, physically fit, specialized outfit with modern sophisticated weapons and equipments for various arduous roles in combat. If so, why couldn't they abort the assassination of the minister? Was it because they did not anticipate such a threat? and if so, what was the reason for not anticipating such a threat? Was it because no one had briefed them? or because there was no laid down standing orders (SOs)/standard operating pattern/procedures (SOP) or security/contingency plan drawn up for the security of the ministers, which they could have followed (although they had been providing security to the minister for many years). Be it VIP or VP (vulnerable point) security in the internal security (IS) environment, be it offensive or defensive in the conventional warfare or in the counter revolutionary warfare (CRW), be it in the USA, UK, China, India, Pakistan or any other country; be it commandos, special forces, SAS, Marines or Infantry, Artillery, Armour or any other fighting entity; be it at any level of command, when it comes to tactics it must be applied through a mechanism of logical thought process called 'appreciation'; the conducting of which, most of the officers of the SL Army are, lacking in. All we learned in various military academics, training centers / schools will, finally have to be processed through this 'appreciation' - 'the ultimate military thought process' to achieve the desired military objectives / aims at any level of command under any type of scenarios (strategic / tactical / operational). Success of any battle at any level depends on the degree of effectiveness of the military appreciation. The said technique is applied by commanders at all levels, even under 'in contact' situations to 'outflank the enemy on any combat field. The security to a VIP/VP or to any other military base/camp is provided in the form of a deployment of troops, and weapons and equipments, according to their characteristics/limitations. An appreciation carried out in a logical sequence would, exactly bring out the most suitable form of deployment within the available resources. This is a standard practice followed by all the professional Armies in the world. At the same time, it is the most difficult part to understand in tactics, which demands a thorough knowledge of military doctrines, concepts, principles etc and characteristics/limitations of all types of weapons/equipments, an expertise ability to analyse the ground, terrain and topography, military-combat experience, and above all an exceptional capacity to analyse the 'threat perception' - the most important aspect in the anti-terrorists or in guerilla warfare. In the case of the minister's security, there had been no such plans, whatsoever. Even if there was a security plan, it would not have been formulated according to a formal military appreciation. This, is the actual truth found in all the military establishments/defensive locations, including those, which are located in the N&E. The security of VPs, VIPs, HSZs etc are, merely 'nominal' and 'superfluous' but has no depth in substance while causing limitless inconvenience to the public by false and blind security measures. The LTTE attack by an explosive laden lorry at the temple of the tooth relic, the LTTE raid on BIA-Katunayake, and the oil refinery at Kolonnawa are classic examples for the so called 'blind security'. This, includes all major military debacles in both defensive and offensive operations that occurred in the N&E in the past-the consequences of not carrying out proper military appreciation. In short, the prolonged conflict in the N&E for over two decades, is also attributed to non-application of this mechanism to formulate a 'National Strategic Defence Initiative Program' (NSDIP). A military program of this nature should have been initiated at the time when Sri Lanka gained her independence. The exact size, composition, force level, types of weapons / equipments / vehicles / crafts and the strategic and tactical important areas to be occupied by military forces to safeguard the country against all threats including natural disasters can, only be assessed, evaluated and determined by a strategic appreciation taking into consideration the geographical layout and configuration of Sri Lanka. Had such a plan been initiated following independence, the insurgency in 1971, the subversion in 1987-1990 and the present separatist conflict would have been nipped in the bud. According to this, the order of largeness of the forces should have been the Navy, the Air Force and the Army, in view of the configuration and the strategic importance of the land in the region. The process of threat analysis plays a vital role on the national security. Experience says that the LTTE, always carries out attacks by skilful exploitation of the tactics and techniques used by the security forces on routine missions/basis. According to their teaching, if you are to defend, you've got to be the attacker and vice versa. In the case of the minister's security, every possible way how the LTTE was planning to assassinate the minister using available ground objects at his residence and in other locations of his frequent visits should have been visualised and planned out with appropriate abortive/counter measures by earmarking suitable persons, weapons and equipments. Formulating plans by a military appreciation is a prime responsibility of the officer, that is why they are, particularly being sent to follow courses overseas, regularly spending, a colossal amount of government funds. Hence, the officers should not expect the fulfilment of this responsibility from the other ranks because, they are the ones, who should carry out the tasks and duties as specified in the plan prepared by the officers. They will do what the officer gives as 'orders' and will follow what the officer gives as 'instruction'. This is why they are given more of ground oriented training than officers. Even the commandos should be well-trained, physically fit and well-equipped personnel who should be, properly briefed, and suitably employed / deployed by officers if consequences of this nature are to be avoided. There is a subtle difference between information and 'intelligence', to process an intelligence picture in the scenario of counter revolutionary warfare is more difficult than that of conventional warfare. What is being fed by our intelligence agencies, at present is the information and not intelligence. This is not, only confined to Sri Lanka but also, almost to all the countries. When the US secretary was called in, before the bench of judges, which was inquiring into the facts that led to the failure in aborting the attack on WTC, to give explanation as to why she, as the national security adviser could not take action, despite warnings given to her by CIA of the impending threats, said "YES! They told me there were threats against the US" "but they, never told me when, where, and how it was going to take place; what they gave me was information and not intelligence". In 1994, the LTTE suffered one of the heaviest casualty tolls when they attempted to attack the defence localities of the 'Weli-oya' sector. The role played by the intelligence, keeping ground troops well informed of impending threats, was unique and outstanding. As for the minister's assassination, the intelligence is also to be held responsible for failing to give an intelligence picture, regarding the assassination of the minister; the way as defined by the US secretary of the State. Since there is no laid down Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which involves conducting appreciations and threat analysis, making security and subsequent review plans, approval/authorization, briefing, supervision and review, etc. regarding the assigning and undertaking of security of VPs/VIPs, the officers involved in this case at 'command' and staff levels cannot, officially be held responsible. One of the major weaknesses of any security force operating in the counter insurgency is the adoption of the same drill on a routine basis. This is why casualties sustained by security forces engaged in this warfare in any part of the world, are very high. Even under the perfect security arrangements based on proper military appreciations, assassination attempts would still be inevitable unless review plans to modify and adjust the original are introduced from time to time, depending on the threat, so that even if there is a plot to assassinate a VIP, it needs to be changed or it could be aborted, if tried and, thus confusion and frustration among those involved in the conspiracy can be created while adding more complexity to their plot than leaving it as simple as that of the assassination of the minister. The manner, in which the minister was assassinated by LTTE assassins and the failure to abort or counter the treat by the security appears to be a case of negligence on the part of those who were on duty. But, if it is analysed in the professional military way, reasons for the failure go beyond the perimeters of negligence, thus, exposing the 'ultimate truth' behind all these happenings in the country. There is, no use trying to hide this reality; We must, at least now admit that our 'professional incompetence', has paved the way for this conflict, and as well as the LTTE to last over two decades. The LTTE have come all the way from a 'small band of guerillas' to a well organised guerilla force, passing the phases of preparatory, resistance, active-resistance of revolutionary warfare and are, now in the open offensive phase within a well 'calculated protracted time frame'. They have, literally stuck to the book in every respect, in order to be a professional guerilla force, whereas the Sri Lankan forces have been heading towards its 'downfall'. This is not because of anything but deviating from the book and allowing 'quantity' to overshadow 'quality'. The entire defence and security system in the country needs 'a complete overhaul'; (this includes all the other systems of the country as well). 'A grand governing strategy' based on a sound 'political and military strategy' must be formulated, considering strategic needs and the threat perception. This would entail a National Strategic Defence Initiative Program (NSDIP), which needs to be evolved from a 'strategic appreciation'. For this, a 'unified command' where all three services will come under a single HQ for all matters (command, control, administration and management) is mandatory. It must be understood that the LTTE are, now in the final phase of a revolutionary warfare. The book and our experiences say that it would be difficult to defeat a guerilla force in the 'open offensive' unless they are tackled by a sound plan with a strong military force. Knowing this reality well, the LTTE must be dealt tactfully and not, by foolish aggressiveness. A kind of 'political demagogic approach' leading towards a subtle political strategy is needed, at this juncture to outwit the LTTE, 'democratically' in the course of time. For this, the present fragile ceasefire must be renewed with a fresh start not only, by way of just amending the MoU (this is, just a paper for the LTTE) but also, having a 'face to face meeting' with the LTTE leader by the President or PM or by both, at any given location in the North. This will carry a greater impact in understanding how to solve the issues that are burning, at present. The involvement, by a 'third party' must be limited to 'observation'. Centres for joint Army-LTTE-CFMG should be established in the N&E to have a personal dialogue, in order to avoid the present misunderstanding and 'cold war'. |
|
| News | Business | Features
| Editorial | Security
| Produced by Lake House |
The exact size, composition, force level, types of
weapons/equipments/vehicles/crafts, and the strategic and tactical important
areas to be occupied by military forces to safeguard the country against all
threats including natural disasters can, only be assessed, evaluated and
determined by a strategic appreciation taking into consideration the
geographical layout and configuration of Sri Lanka. 
