Fall of Sampur

SF commandos' ultimate show of jungle warfare.

Thamilselvan warns of reprisal attacks
 

War and Peace by Ranga Jayasuriya

Early this week, an intelligence operative listening to LTTE transmissions in Sampur heard pleas for additional troops from the Wanni.

"We can't hold on, need more troops" was the thrust of the message.

But, the response from the Wanni was a total surprise to the intelligent operative.

"If you attacked Mutur, now face this also," was the response from the Wanni to the SoS from its Eastern cadres trying to hold on Sampur.

The response was a pointer to the growing factions within the LTTE, which was the talk in the intelligence circles for some time.

This also suggests that the Wanni headquarters was not consulted by Trincomalee military leader, Soornam before the simultaneous attacks on five military camps early last month.

Losing ground

With the fall of Sampur, the LTTE stronghold in the Southern perimeters of Trincomalee harbour, the Tigers are fast loosing its hold in the East.

Sampur was important to the Tigers in both military and political perspectives.

Fourteen LTTE camps were set upon the Southern perimeter of the

Trincomalee harbour, most of them in the general area of Sampur, which is about 146 square km in size.

Two major sea Tiger bases, Illakkanthai and Soodaikudai on the west of Foul Point were based in Sampur. Illakkanthai was earlier the major launching pad of the sea Tigers. Later, Soodaikudai was used as the launching pad for suicide operations due to its location in the mouth of the harbour.

Soodaikudai was the launching pad for the Sea Tiger boats which embarked on the abortive attack on the security personnel carrier, Jet Liner transporting 840 odd troops.

Having set up a cluster of military camps, thus having laid a siege to the strategically important Trincomalee harbour, the lifeline of 42,000 troops and police in Jaffna, the Tigers brought artillery and 120 heavy mortars to Sampur.

The security forces believe that the Tigers had positioned at least three 122 mm artillery guns in the general area of Sampur.

Another artillery gun is believed to have placed in Ichchalampattu, south of Sampur.

As far as political aspects are concerned Sampur was home to LTTE political headquarters in the Trincomalee district.

Minimum resistance

Tigers showed only a minimum resistance during the security force's capture of their Eastern enclave. Troops captured Sampur in eight days, though small groups of the Special Forces' commandos operated deep inside Tiger territory even before that.

Fall of Sampur was a classic work of the Special Force commandos. They operated as small groups, having penetrated deep inside the LTTE territory.

In the wee hours of Sunday, fortnight ago troops embarked on the mission to capture Sampur. Troops advanced from military camps in Pala Thoppur, Kattaparichchan and Selvanagar.

However, even before the operation was launched, several groups of Special Force Commandos, operating in small groups, had sneaked in to the LTTE controlled area through jungle pathways. Some landed by sea. Their mission was to play the role of the saboteurs against the LTTE military buildup.

They attacked reconnaissance teams of the LTTE sent to monitor the troops advancement. They jammed LTTE communications and attacked their listening posts. Power supply to the LTTE was cut off. The Special Force commandos raided LTTE mortar positions.

They acted as Forward Observers (FO) giving locations and corrections for artillery and air strikes on LTTE positions.

Their role was the pinnacle of the jungle warfare and covert operations. And they played it in full. Their operations deep inside Tiger territory of Sampur, took the Tigers by surprise. Having tried, but in vain to locate this unknown enemy, Tigers took on civilians whom they suspected could have collaborated with the security forces.

Dozens of civilians were arrested and taken to an undisclosed location. But, without anyone's knowledge, SF Commandos continued with their task. Within days, the Tigers came to realise that their hold was loosing in Sampur.

During the course of their retreat, they are believed to have moved two 122 mm artillery guns towards Verugal. One 122 artillery piece is believed to have been destroyed by the air Com. Gen. on Budgetary relief allowance strikes.

Crossing the Kattaparichchan bridge

Kattaparichchan is the last security forces camp on the Sampur-Mutur road.The government controlled area ended at the Kattaparichchan bridge, just a few hundred meters from the security force's camp. Before a fortnight, the troops could see the Tigers on guard on the other end of the bridge.

The bridge was the main road link between the government controlled area and Sampur. Every day, several hundreds of civilians crossed the bridge to go to the government controlled area and vice versa.

Civilian arrivals

However, a few weeks before the abortive Tiger onslaught on the Kattaparichchan, Mutur, Selvangar, Pala Thopur and Mahindapur military camps on August 1, Security forces could monitor a considerable increase in the civilian arrival to the government controlled area.

New arrivals, most of them the new recruits of LTTE civilian militia opted to stay in Mutur. Security forces had their own doubts about the intention of the new arrivals, but they could do a very little.

Then followed the simultaneous attacks on the five military camps on August 1.

Crossing the Kattaparichchan bridge was a daunting task for the security forces. In one failed mission in the mid 90's, forty commandos perished in the Tiger counter attack when they tried to cross the bridge.

Troops had learnt from the past mistakes and they were well aware of the danger ahead. The Tigers had well fortified their positions on the other end of the bridge. Trenches were built. Underground bunkers were built and fortified with coconut trunks and concrete.

Bunkers of that calibre could easily stand artillery fire.

An army officer pointing to a medium size underground bunker captured from the Tigers in Kattaparichchan said the fighters inside the bunker could not be harmed even an artillery shell exploded on it, given the heavy fortification of the bunker, which was also well camouflaged to fend off air strikes.

The LTTE expected the troops to cross the bridge and Tigers cadres were awaiting the troops advancement.

Taking a clue from its past mistake, the Troops did not opt a swift crossing of the bridge. Instead the troops on the other end of the river directed a heavy assault on the Tiger positions from two fronts. As ground troops directed a heavy volume of Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher fire on the LTTE positions, an eight man commando team crossed the bridge.

Three of them stormed the main LTTE camp located at the entrance to the LTTE held area, while others provided fire cover to their comrades.

In a matter of minutes, the commandos neutralized the camp. A group of LTTE cadres hiding in the bush fired at the approaching commandos. Commandos retaliated killing one and inuring four LTTE cadres.

The swift raid by the Special Force Commandos took the Tigers by surprise.

The LTTE gave up the fight and pulled back cadres to the Sampur village.

Needless to say that the recent fighting in the East as well as FDL positions in the North had a heavy tool on the LTTE. At least 900- 1,000 cadres were killed in the two fronts and equal numbers suffered serious injuries which will keep them away from the battlefront for quite a some time.

On the other hand, the series of recent setbacks on the battle-front and superiority of the fire power of the security forces shown in the recent fighting could dissuade the new recruits from the LTTE.

Battle losses

The LTTE would find it difficult to offset its recent battle losses.

The LTTE leadership was well aware that any further drain in its man-power could seriously compromise its fighting strength for a considerable time. Therefore, the LTTE strategy in Sampur was to avoid large scale casualties.

Furthermore, operations by the SF commandos crumbled the LTTE military mechanism. Its communications have been disrupted and reconnaissance teams have been targeted. Artillery and Air strikes conducted, based on the locations and corrections provided by the Commandos were proved to be extremely effective.

This writer saw LTTE bunkers next to the rail bridge, targeted by the MBRL fire.

Their locations were provided by the commandos.

Infantry troops followed the commandos and they could select safe routes based on the information provided by the Commandos. From Kattaparichchan, troops advanced to the Sampur village, with a little resistance from the Tigers.

As Troops advanced, the Tigers vacated camp after camp.

During the eight-day operation, troops hoisted the lion flag on the Foul Point, of which the western edge was once home to Soodaikudai, a major launching pad of suicide boats of the Black sea tigers.

Small groups of commandoes also penetrated deep into Sampur, towards Illakkanthai, once home to a major sea Tiger base. There were small teams of LTTE cadres, estimated to be five groups of twenty members at least till Wednesday in the jungles of Sampur.

As the troops advanced, the bulk of the Tiger force withdrew towards Verugal. Meanwhile, troops cut off the exit points of the Tigers, sending commandoes and infantry troops, locking about four-hundred cadres in the jungles to face advancing troops.

On Tuesday, the LTTE pounded the Selvanagar military camp with artillery fire in a diversionary attack, aimed at easing the security force's cordon.

However, the geography in the area is such that any kind of blockade would not be a total success. The LTTE, of course, with a greater local knowledge could find alternative paths for their escape.

On the political front, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar met Thamilselvam this week, days after the Sampur withdrawal of the LTTE.

Thamilselvam who hitherto disowned the attacks perpetrated by the Tigers on the civilian targets for the first time during the ceasefire warned the reprisal attacks against Sinhalese. He complained of large scale displacement of civilians in Sampur.

His remarks suggest that the Tigers would soon revert to their old practice. Of course, Tigers haven't given up violence against civilians even during the truce agreement, but their conduct was restrained to a certain degree. The recent remarks by the LTTE political commissioner could be a signal that the Tigers plan to revert to its shady past, when they justified, if not, glorified civilian killings.