What after Sampur?

by H. L. D. Mahindapala

With each forward step taken by the Security Forces President Mahinda Rajapaksa advances two steps. If the Army consolidates its position ousting the LTTE from one camp the President consolidates the entire acreage of his national electorate. And if the forces push the Tamil Tigers to retreat the President will not have to lift a finger to push the opposition into oblivion.

The Security Forces too depend on the political will of the Commander-in-Chief to advance and consolidate their positions. It is symbiotic relationship. And the mutual support given to each other has paid off dividends in the first round of Eelam War IV.

The new found will

The fall of Sampur also points not only to the superior fire-power of the Security forces in land, air and sea, but also to the might of the new found will by the foot soldiers to go forward and confront the enemy to the bitter end. Backing them all the way is political will at the highest level. The superior fire-power of the Security Forces, the rediscovered will of the Sri Lankan forces and the political will put together constitute an unbeatable force.

If Sampur does not prove to be the first sod cut in the grave of Velupillai Prabhakaran it will certainly go down in history as the graveyard of the political stupidities of Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe. The latter, for instance pulled up his Navy Commander angrily for defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation by sinking an LTTE boat.

The former hid in her hole, spinning yarns to make-believe that the Sri Lankan Forces were incapable of doing a Sampur. Mahinda Rajapakse has proved them wrong. It is more than a symbolic victory. Apart from Sampur strengthening his political base within the party - the victory announcement was timed well for 55th annual assembly of the SLFP it has enhanced his stature in the national electorate and the international community.

The nation has been made to pay all these years for the failures of the Security Forces. In Sampur they have offered a glimmer of hope to raise the morale of the forces and the nation that was force fed with defeatism by the failed political leadership of both Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe.

The forces have demonstrated that they have the capacity to redeem the sins of their past. They have tilted the military balance in their favour. If they can maintain this new military balance then Anton Balasingham, or whoever his successor is going to be, will not be able to lord it over and dictate to all the communities their terms with Norway twisting and bending to go all the way with the LTTE.

Weaken the Tigers

Besides, every military victory translates not only as political dividends but also as peace dividends. The future of peace depends essentially on weakening the Tamil Tigers. Since all other approaches - from international and regional interventions to banning and diplomatic overtures - have failed the only option unexplored has been the weakening the Tamil Tigers' military machine. Paradoxically, it seems that the future of peace depends on war.

But after Sampur the government has declared that it is not interested in either war or capturing any more territory. Though the intention of this declaration is commendable the agenda of war and peace unfortunately is not set by the government. It has always been determined by the LTTE as seen in Mavil Aru. The prevailing euphoria of Sampur will disappear when the next Mavil Aru is put on the national agenda by the LTTE. What option has the government if it is confronted with another Mavil Aru?

The Tigers are not going to curl up and die because the government says that it is not interested in war. Their politics is based on war and not peace. The agenda for peace coming with conditions as laid down in the Tokyo forum stipulating human rights, democracy, pluralism and rule of law is anathema to the Tigers. Neither the international community nor India has been successful in selling this agenda to the LTTE.

War is essential for them (1) to stand up and be seen as defenders of Eelam - the elusive goal nowhere in sight and (2) for the survival of Vanni hierarchy. Despite the punditry of the constitutional theorists, the NGO agents of the LTTE and peace mudalalis no constitutional model is going to appease them, or make them embrace the democratic process abandoning violence.

They have demonstrated amply that the only model they are prepared to accept is the one in which the LTTE is enthroned as "the sole representatives of the Tamil people". If constitutional models had even a ghost of a chance of resolving the north-south crisis then Neelan Tiruchelvam, the architect of the new constitution for the Tamils, would not have been killed by the LTTE.

Nor would Erik Solheim be in the wilderness today trying to salvage his Ceasefire Agreement which he proclaimed would be the framework for peace.

International and regional agreements, not to mention other theoretical formulas, have not survived or brought peace because it has failed to appease Prabhakaran. His unmistakable preference has been to import American and Russian models of surface-air-missiles than to import Western constitutional models.

After all, he is not commissioning his apparatchiks in USA to buy surface-to-air missile to turn the steel casings into ploughshares, is he? Any solution must begin by dismissing the fashionable premise that Prabhakaran can be converted to the religion of liberal democracy and non-violent politics by offering him a constitution. Or that he can be isolated if others are offered a package.

It is not constitutions - federal, confederal or any other form of devolution - that is going to bring peace. This myth puts the cart before the horse. Whichever way one looks at the solution Prabhakaran sits right in the middle of it blocking all progress. B. Raman, the former India intelligence agent, has written that Prabhakaran must be retired.

But who is going to retire him? Perhaps, the underlying principle in Raman's statement which is to effect a regime change in the Vanni is the first step to a solution. Until then the nation is faced with the stark reality of facing the next war, the date of which will be determined by the Vanni-arachchis.

But where will Eelam War V, VI, VII etc take Prabhakaran? The more he engages in war the more he will lose the capacity to sustain a war or to hold on to territory, if he can gain any. He has no access to unlimited stocks of fire-power or man-power. Nor has he got friendly suppliers of arms and ammunition in the neighbourhood like the Palestinians. Ironically, the Tiger strategy was to wage a war of attrition. Their strategy was to prolong the war hoping to destabilise the nation, drain the economy and win international sympathy.

As in any war they have injected a degree of instability and caused heavy losses to the economy. But the democratic state remains intact and continues to function (with flaws no doubt) and the economy has bounced back with a resilience of a rubber ball leaping up each time it is knocked down.

Evidence: The shrewd Tamil investors abroad are putting their money in Wellawatte and the stocks in Colombo and not in Killinochchi!

North takes the full brunt

So while the south is jogging along, recovering speedily after each successive blow, it is the north that is taking the full brunt of Prabhakaran's four Eelam wars. Step by step, each war has dragged the Tamils of the north and the east down to an unbearable misery created by their political leaders of the past and the present.

Tigers too have dropped precipitously from its original heroic heights to the current depths of being the lowest of low, rejected by the international community and unwanted (increasingly) by their own people who are yearning for an alternative, non-violent means for a solution.

After living through four inconclusive wars, the average Tamil is left dangling in mid-air with no hope of landing on elusive Eelam, either in the short term or in the long term. Eelam has been and is going to be as elusive as Prabhakaran. The violent Tamil politics has now boiled down to a war of Prabhakaran, by Prabhakaran for Prabhakaran.

Besides, each war has resulted in damaging consequences to Prabhakaran's support base and his image, both at home and abroad. Part of it is visible in the international arena where the Tamil Tigers were hoping to win maximum support with the active Tamil diaspora campaigning to rescue the political goals of the four disastrous wars.

In the immediate aftermath of 1983 the diaspora began on the high note of denigrating the Sinhalese. Today they have hit rock bottom, discarded as political pariahs of the international community. With the banning comes the drying up financial resources so vital for Prabhakaran to sustain his killing machinery.

Tigers incomparable to Palestinians

Domestically too, there are no signs of the Tamil people rallying behind Prabhakaran like the Palestinians animated by * intifada. *Missing from the scenario are the political sophisticates/ intellectuals queuing up to join the suicide brigade. Prabhakaran has to forcibly pluck them from schools or from the arms of parents and throw them into the frontlines as cannon fodder.

There are no committed volunteers flying in from all parts of the world to swell the depleted ranks at the front lines. The Tigers bank on the Tamils in the diaspora who finance the last suppers given to the suicide bombers recruited from Tamil orphanages or brainwashed youth to commit hate crimes disguised as "liberation politics".

Tragically, the Tamils in the diaspora have no qualms about financing the last suppers of suicide bombers while they drive their children to elitist schools in the latest model sold in London, New York, Oslo, Melbourne etc. Tamil Tigers and Palestinians are poles apart.

Any comparison is totally misleading because the latter is backed by a cluster of anti-Israeli Arab nations. Tamil Tigers do not have a single nation behind them, except for some vociferous elements in Tamil Nadu, most of whom are on the payroll of Tigers, according to the *Asian Tribune*.

India is sitting on the fence and dithering now but if it intervenes it is not likely to be the supplier of arms, training and finance as it did at the height of its hegemonistic phase led by Indira Gandhi, India's notorious Madame Defarge severing the heads from the bodies of states which were not aligned to India's foreign policy.

Their best backers have been the Norwegians who have no ideological, historical or political bonds that link the Arab nations to the Palestinians. Norwegians are doing it for their own political prestige and economic ends.

Hemmed in by these external and internal circumstances, Prabhakaran will find it increasingly difficult to prolong his war without facing further damaging consequences. If the latest run of events is a guide then it is apparent that the Sri Lankan Forces have overcome the difficulties they faced earlier in their defensive and offensive operations. They have put behind Pooneryn, Mullaitivu and Elephant Pass.

The string of Tiger failures indicates that the Security Forces have learnt sufficiently enough from their past encounters to turn the Tiger tide.

All in all, the recent LTTE forays into Muttur, Mavil Aru, Sampoor in the east and Kilalli, Muhumalai, Nagarkovil and Kayts Island in the north have exposed the exaggerated ower of the Tigers. Military analysts agree that the Tigers overestimated their strength and underestimated the power of the Security Forces. Besides, every encounter has confirmed that the Tigers have lost their early spirit, vigour and power. In land, sea and air they have failed to establish their superiority.

Of course, it is too early to write them off. In the past they have not only performed exceedingly well as their own grave diggers (e.g. Mavil Aru) but also performed better than Lazarus by rising from the grave more than once. Invariably, they were resurrected each time by some external force.

Example: When they were cornered by the Indians they were rescued by the Sri Lankans who mistakenly believed that the Tigers could be used against the Indians. In the end, it was the military backing given to the Tigers and the political pressures exerted by the Sri Lankan government that finally compelled the Indians to leave the shores. That saved the Tigers.

The myth perpetuated by the Tigers, however, is that they beat the world's fourth largest army. The reality is that they wouldn't have had a chance this side of Palk Straits if the Sri Lankan government did not throw their weight behind the Tigers.

The now-and-then differences

But there are also discernible differences between now and then. In the early stages the tendency was to embrace the Tigers who were received warmly with the endearment of "boys". The current trend is to distance them, branding them as "terrorists". Also, earlier most were willing to bet on Prabhakaran. But every one of those who went to his the rescue in the past got their hands burnt.

The last victim was Ranil Wickremesinghe. He went out of his way (he called it "confidence-building measures") to appease him, even signing a secret agreement with him, hoping to win electoral dividends. The Tigers sucked him dry and dumped him at the last presidential election. So who in his proper senses would touch him now?

Furthermore, the history of Tamil Tigers has run down time as a single straight line of alienating themselves from every single community including the international community, India, Pakistan, Muslims and even significant sections of the Tamil community. Besides, the loss of Karuna has weakened not only the eastern flank but dispirited those in his own backyard. LTTE is no longer the monolith that held the Tamils tied to the totem pole of Prabhakaran. It has lost its aura and appeal.

However, buoyed by his past successes Prabhakaran began to believe in his own powers than the forces swirling around him. He relied excessively in his power to kill at will. In the past, no doubt, violence brought him the successes he planned for. But crime does not pay all the time. Prabhakaran's greatest failure is his inability to comprehend the limitations of violence.

Throughout his adult life he has gambled too much with violence. He began by gunning down Alfred Duraiyappah in 1975 his first victim. He has a penchant for killing Tamils. And after thirty years of killings he had shown no remorse or repentance.

He has yet to learn that the violence which paid him early dividends is no longer accepted either by his people yearning for peace or by the world at large which has turned against him. Violence is no longer viable. The only way out for him is to negotiate for peace. But for Prabhakaran negotiating for peace is as risky as going to war.

On balance, he feels more secure in war than in negotiations. He has known only war. He feeds on war. He survives by offering violence as a permanent diet for the Tamils. His chances of opting for peace are as great as Kumar Rupesinghe and A. T. Ariyaratne holding a peace demonstration in Killinochchi, exhibiting placards of war-mongering Tigers forcibly recruiting child soldiers.

After Sampoor the guns are somewhat silent now. But how long will it take for the guns to boom again? And where will the next Mavil Aru be?

Oh, one thing more: how many more Tamils must die to convince the Tamils that Prabhakaran can never deliver what he promises? How can a man hiding in a concrete bunker each time he hears the distant drone of plane come out to deliver the Tamils from the nightmarish myths of his mono-ethnic extremism?